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Members of Congress have a variety of career experiences before Congress, non-political 
and political. In this dissertation, I bring together interdisciplinary strands of research on careers 
and occupational behavior to compare how MCs from different career backgrounds act in the 
U.S. House of Representatives. I argue that career experiences can provide relevant skills and 
insights that members in their first and second terms use to adjust to being Representatives. 
Through a large-scale analysis of members serving in the 101st-112th Congresses (1989-2012), I 
find that precongressional career experiences have multiple connections to members’ decisions.  
Career experiences relate to the contents of members’ legislative agendas, their 
orientation toward legislative activities and constituent outreach, and their partisan loyalty. 
Members with legislative and executive backgrounds are more active in the legislative process 
and more successful in seeing their bills become law. MCs with different career experiences also 
craft different legislative agendas – the number and types of bills on which they take legislative 
action. New MCs significantly introduce and cosponsor a greater number of bills on policy 
topics that relate to their past experience, for instance – medical doctors introducing health bills. 
There is also an impact on the specialization of MCs’ legislative agendas. Those individuals who 
have worked in environments emphasizing specialization, such as state legislators and lawyers, 
focus on a fewer number of policy topics. Finally, MCs with experience in partisan bodies 
donate more campaign money to their copartisans.  My results have implications for policy 
outcomes and constituent representation, addressing debates about the selection of 
representations and the attendant consequences such as the breadth and depth of the legislative 
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Chapter 1: Tracing Career Paths to Congress 
“But the real experience that is important in this job is the experience we bring to the job, the 
experience of having been teachers, farmers, or businessmen[women].” 
Rep. Ronald Packard (R-IN),  




Members of Congress (MCs) arrive on Capitol Hill having had a variety of different 
career experiences. Prior to Congress, they have worked as everything from medical doctors to 
mayors, law enforcement officials to legislators. Nick Smith and Peter Hoekstra represent two 
opposite extremes on the spectrum of career paths that MCs take to office. 
Both are Republicans from Michigan first elected to Congress in 1992. For Rep. Smith, 
being elected to the House of Representatives capped decades of public service. After Rep. 
Smith earned a Master’s degree in Economics in 1959, he spent two years working as an 
Intelligence Officer in the United States Air Force (1959-1961). At the end of his tour of duty, he 
returned home to manage his family’s fifth-generation dairy farm in Addison, Michigan, a period 
that proved to be a fertile beginning for his political career. While living in Addison, Rep. Smith 
served as a Somerset Township Constable, Trustee and Supervisor for six years (1962-1968) and 
for two years as a representative to the Hillsdale County Board of Supervisors (1966-1968). In 
1969, he was appointed the Chairman of the Michigan Agriculture Stabilization and 
Conservation Service. Three years later, he became Deputy Administrator and Director of 
Energy for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, a job he held for three years.  
The next stage of his career began in 1975, when Rep. Smith was offered the position of 
Commissioner of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration and left 
Washington, D.C. to return to his home state. Within four years, he returned to electoral politics, 
winning a seat in the state House of Representatives in 1979 and in 1981. He followed his tenure 
in the state House with an additional ten years of service in the Michigan Senate (1983-1992). It 
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was on the heels of these legislative victories (preceded by his seven other career experiences) 
that Rep. Smith won election to Congress in 1992 (Almanac of American Politics). 
 In comparison, Rep. Peter Hoekstra’s path to Congress was less complicated. After 
graduating from the University of Michigan in 1977 with a Master’s degree in Business 
Administration, Rep. Hoekstra was hired at Herman Miller, Inc., the furniture company credited 
with inventing the first office cubicle. Rep. Hoekstra stayed with Herman Miller for 15 years, 
rising through the management ranks to become vice-president of marketing. In 1992, he left the 
company, his sole employer during his time in the workforce, to launch a successful bid for 
Congress (Almanac of American Politics). 
In short, Reps. Smith and Hoekstra entered Congress with distinctly different career 
experiences. Although they were elected to undertake the same job, they approached it from very 
different positions. This is true of new members of Congress in general. For example, the other 
freshmen MCs elected with Reps. Smith and Hoekstra to represent Michigan in the 103rd 
Congress (1992-1993) had worked as a congressional staffer (Rep. James Barcia, D-MI), an 
insurance agent (Rep. Joe Knollenberg, R-MI), and a state trooper (Rep. Bart Stupak, D-MI).1  
The career diversity in the Michigan delegation is not unique. A report by Congress’ 
nonpartisan research agency identifies a total of 34 different precongressional career experiences 
that members of the 112th Congress had before office (Manning 2012).2  This diversity 
                                                 
1 These differences are highlighted by the fact that the new MCs from Michigan were similar in 
age, race, gender, district demographics, and electoral security. All five were middle-aged white 
men with college or graduate degrees who were married with children and had lived in Michigan 
most of their lives. Additionally, they five came from majority-white, middle class districts – 
four of which were predominately rural, and four of the five had faced competitive elections in 
the fall (Almanac of American Politics).  
2 These include: educators and administrators from the elementary to graduate level; medical 
doctors and nurses; dentists and ophthalmologists; veterinarians; psychiatrists and psychologists; 
ministers or religious officials; mayors; lieutenant governors; county and local officials, judges 
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notwithstanding, some paths to office are more common than others. For example, 41% of new 
MCs serving in the 101st-112th Congresses had previous business experience, 36% had legal 
experience, 67% had legislative political experience prior to Congress, and 81% had political 
experience of any kind.  
This dissertation explores how MCs’ diverse career experiences connect to their 
legislative behavior in the House of Representatives. For instance, do career experiences relate to 
the issues that MCs fight for in the House? Do they affect how MCs engage in legislative activity 
and constituent outreach? Do they color how MCs interact with their party leaders and 
colleagues – their loyalty to their party and partisan interests? 
I illuminate the legacy of precongressional career experiences across a variety of types of 
legislative behavior and careers by weaving together the inter-disciplinary literature on careers 
and occupational behavior with legislative scholars’ insights into MCs. I argue that 
precongressional career experiences do have strong connections to MCs’ behavior in their early 
terms. I expect that precongressional career experiences influence MCs’ issue agendas, 
legislative and outreach activity, and partisan loyalty, as I take up in the chapters to follow.  
My work highlights the influence of precongressional career experiences on 
representation and policy outcomes, and my findings have implications of interest to scholars, 
citizens, and political practitioners. In the following, I outline three broad motivations for 
                                                                                                                                                             
and prosecutors at the local, county, state and federal levels; state or territorial legislators; 
congressional staffers; law enforcement officials from local police officers to FBI agents; 
scientists – chemists, physicists, microbiologists, and engineers; reporters, journalists, radio 
broadcasters, and media producers; accountants; pilots – including the former pilot of the 
president’s helicopter, Marine One; screenwriters; professional football players; farmers and 
ranchers;  social workers; members of the military Reserves, as well as former restaurateurs, real 
estate agents, auctioneers, car dealers, construction workers, insurance agents, stockbrokers, and 




studying the intersection of precongressional and congressional careers, detail how this approach 
differs from existing studies of occupational and legislative behavior, discuss the limits to this 
approach, and overview how I bring the two bodies of literature together to identify three key 
ways in which precongressional careers relate to the decisions new MCs make in office. 
Why Study Precongressional Career Experiences? 
Freshmen MCs arrive in Congress having had a variety of career experiences. I define 
MCs’ career experiences as the distinct jobs and positions they have held throughout their adult 
life. Their careers are the combination of these experiences – as illustrated by the example of 
Rep. Smith above (Wilensky 1960). As I elaborate below, I argue that there are three broad 
reasons that connecting MCs’ experiences before office and their behavior in Congress is 
important. First, it provides insights into congressional behavior and legislative outcomes. 
Second, it highlights the connection between the types of MCs elected to office and the type of 
representation and policy outcomes that result. Third, it speaks to long-standing debates about 
the selection of elected representatives, which resonate strongly in a contemporary political 
environment marked by antipathy to ‘career’ politicians (Herrick and Fischer 2007).  
Understanding Congressional Behavior and Legislative Outcomes 
Freshmen MCs face a steep learning curve upon election to office. As one MC, a former 
professor of political science, noted, “For many members, the transition from the campaign trail 
to congressional life is fully as jolting as any career change” (Price 2000, 63). Connecting career 
experiences and congressional decision-making provides fresh insights into legislative behavior 
during a crucial period of MCs’ legislative careers. It also addresses a significant number of 
questions about new MCs’ behavior in office. For instance, do new MCs dive into the policy 
process or concentrate their attention on beefing up relationships with voters in the district? How 
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many, and which, policies do they take action on? How loyal are they to their party on the votes 
they take and in their campaign donations to copartisans? 
If precongressional experiences speak to MCs’ decisions, then it is important to 
understand the influence of these experiences on representation, public policies, and party 
activity. As Matthews (1984) concluded, “it seems safe to assume that the skills, attitudes, and 
goals of legislators are the product of their total life experiences” – which includes their career 
experiences. As he continues, “knowledge about who legislators are and how they got to be there 
should contribute to a better understanding of legislative behavior and institutions” (547). This 
dissertation facilitates the assessment of congressional behavior and representation by clarifying 
when and how the personal histories of legislators are relevant to their political careers. 
Unpacking Congressional Structure 
A second motivation for my work is to highlight the connections between the structure of 
Congress and the outcomes that result. For example, the framers of the constitution divided 
power across levels of government (federalism) to provide a “double protection” against 
government abuses of individual rights (Federalist No. 51). Since MCs are free to take whatever 
career path to Congress that they wish, many have diverse political experiences at a variety of 
levels of government (federal, state, county, or local). Individual legislators and their career 
experiences are part of the tie that binds together the levels of government and the political 
outcomes that are produced.  
Additionally, there are multiple career paths to Congress because the constitutional 
requirements for holding congressional office are sparse (Schlesinger 1966). The only 
constitutional qualifications are that representatives be popularly elected every two years, at least 
6 
 
twenty-five years of age, a United States citizen for seven years, and “an inhabitant” of the state 
from which they are elected (Article I, Section 2).  
The authors of the constitution specifically chose not to establish more stringent 
professional standards for holding congressional office. As they explained, “No qualification of 
wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or 
disappoint the inclination of the people” (Federalist No. 57, emphasis added). The framers 
clearly envisioned a relationship between the rules about selecting representatives and the policy 
outcomes that would result. By prohibiting occupational requirements, they imagined that a 
larger spectrum of interests could gain a hearing before Congress, bolstering its 
representativeness and legitimacy.  
This suggests a basic logic. Change the rules about serving in Congress and the type of 
individuals selected to serve and the outcomes that result change as well. This observation 
speaks directly to on-going complaints about Congress. For example, concerns about the 
unresponsiveness of ‘career’ politicians to constituent interests have fueled a movement to install 
limits on the length of legislative terms (Jacob 1998). The impact of these decisions, though, 
depends on how MCs act during their early terms in Congress (before the limits would kick in). 
Not all MCs would be equally affected by term limits. MCs with political experience, for one, 
have more to lose in terms of their political reputations and the potential damage of electoral 
defeat (Maestas et al. 2005). 
 The effects of term limits on congressional representation depend on whether or not the 
MCs most affected by term limits differ from their colleagues, such as in the loyalty they show 
their party or the policy expertise they bring to office. If they do, then the implications of term 
limits are more serious than if MCs from distinct career backgrounds act similarly in office. It 
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follows, then, understanding the behavior of MCs based on their career backgrounds facilitates 
the evaluation of proposed legislative reforms like term limits.  
A similar argument can be made about concerns over congressional salary, benefits, and 
retirement packages. As was the case with legislative term limits, whether changes to 
congressional salaries or benefits influences representation and policy outcomes depends on how 
the MCs most affected by those changes act in office compared to MCs who would be less 
affected. For instance, perhaps MCs who can step back easily into their old careers, such as 
business owners, are less likely to stay in Congress if changes were made to their salaries or 
benefits. Likewise, MCs who can receive a more lucrative salary or benefits package in the 
private sector may find that option has greater appeal if the congressional alternative diminishes 
in value. In either scenario, congressional reforms interact with precongressional career 
experiences to shape reelection and tenure decisions. If precongressional career experiences 
relate to the decisions that MCs make in office, as I find they do, then these reforms have 
substantive effects. In the long run, they may change the aggregate composition of the chamber 
(who runs for office) and the outcomes that emerge (what laws are passed). 
Selecting Representatives: Who Represents the Public? 
The study of precongressional experiences has merit for a third and final reason. By 
clarifying the decisions that new MCs make and the implications they have, my work addresses 
the question of which individuals are best equipped to represent the public. This question has 
been articulated repeatedly throughout American history. In 1888, for instance, Woodrow 
Wilson concluded, “We are too apt to think both the work of legislation and the work or 
administration easy enough to be done readily, with or without preparation, by any man of 
discretion and character” (171).  
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This same concern continues today, especially as the Tea Party movement rearticulates 
the importance of precongressional career experiences. For instance, one of the Tea Party’s ‘15 
Non-Negotiable Core Beliefs’ is that “political offices must be available to average citizens” 
(www.teaparty.org).  In line with this, adherents repeatedly vocalize the claim that some types of 
experience (business experience, in particular) are more valuable preparation for Congress than 
others (notably, political experience) [Drucker 2011].  
Numerous political candidates have echoed these claims. For example, the 2012 
Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, premised his candidacy as “America’s Come 
Back Team” on his experience in the business world (Purdum 2012). Congressional candidates 
for the 114th Congress concurred, emphasizing their business experience. For example, an 
advertisement for Mike Collins, a Republican candidate running for the open seat in Georgia’s 
10th district, describes Collins in the following terms: 
“‘At 15 he overhauled his first engine, by 25 he bought his first truck. Today Mike 
Collins is a successful businessman with a whole fleet of trucks…Mike believes 
Washington needs an overhaul’” (Cahn 2014). 
  Voters’ behavior seems to acknowledge these different experiences, too. The proportion 
of freshmen MCs without any kind of prior political experience spiked in the 104th (1995-1996) 
and 112th Congresses (2011-2012), important elections when Republicans took over control of 
the chamber from Democrats. Indeed, the 112th Congress ushered in the freshmen cohort with 
the least political experience in decades (Steinhauer 2010).  
Again, then, my work has motivations both scholarly and applied. My findings contribute 
to debates among scholars about preparation for congressional office and the potential 
implications for public policies and public representation. They also contribute to on-going 
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discussions about the relative merits of certain candidates, helping voters ascertain the veracity 
of claims made about individuals’ candidacy for office. 
A New Approach to the Study of Career Experiences and Legislative Behavior 
I argue that studying the variety of career experiences that bring MCs to office sharpens 
our understanding of legislative behavior, clarifies the impact of institutional structure and 
proposed reforms, and helps to navigate contemporary political debates. The study of 
precongressional experiences is important for another reason. It brings together two diverse 
bodies of scholarship – the study of careers and occupational behavior, and of legislative politics 
and legislative behavior.  
Much is known about careers and the impact of career decisions on occupational 
behavior. Sociologists, psychologists, economists, career counselors, and scholars of labor 
relations and organizational behavior all contribute to the study of “individual behavior and its 
immediate contexts, looking at psychological, personal, and social antecedents and consequences 
of work behavior” (Abbot 1993, 190). The thrust of this research varies by discipline. For 
instance, sociologists examine the consequences of individual characteristics like gender, race, 
inequality, and income, as well as characteristics of work environments – unions, social control 
of work, and technology. Economists focus more predominantly on structural characteristics of 
the workplace: labor unions, wages and management, and collective bargaining. In contrast, 
psychologists (theoretical – industrial/organizational psychologists, or applied – vocational 
psychologists), focus on the individual consequences of work, studying topics such as stress, 
motivation, job satisfaction, and career adaptability (Abbot 1993).  
Although it is easy to imagine how similar concerns – stress, job satisfaction, career 
adaptability – apply to legislative behavior, political scientists’ theories about legislative careers 
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and behavior generally are independent of these considerations.3 ‘Careers,’ ‘careerism,’ and 
career-centered concerns refer not to individuals’ life-long experiences in the workforce but to 
the shape and structure of their political experiences in public office (Polsby 1968). In this 
framework, the congressional career begins once MCs arrive in Washington, D.C. It 
encompasses the decisions MCs make, the actions they take, the length of time they serve in 
Congress, the positions they hold, and whatever ramifications all of these may have.  
In other words, the  congressional career is not typically conceptualized in light of past 
career decisions, whether the focus of the study is how MCs advance legislation through the 
House, follow the party line on important votes, or financially support the party’s electoral 
causes (Heberlig and Larson 2012, Stratmann 2000, Wawro 2001). Scholarly studies typically 
give little consideration to how differences in “who legislators are and how they got to be there” 
influence their behavior in office (Matthews 1984, 547). 
Scholars of political ambition examine how and why individuals seek political offices at 
specific times (to accomplish a goal, to enjoy the office itself, or to seek a higher office in the 
future [Schlesinger 1966]). While these considerations address who is elected to Congress, 
ambition scholars typically focus 1) narrowly on “the location of congressional service in typical 
U.S. political careers” instead of the broader picture of how these experiences fit in the 
framework of individuals’ other career experiences, or 2) on what prompts MCs from certain 
occupations to seek office (Hibbing 1991, 406, see also Fox and Lawless 2005, Lawless 2012, 
Matthews 1984). These are important insights. They help clarify how the behavior of candidates 
seeking higher office changes to accommodate their office-seeking goals, e.g. how state 
legislators seeking House seats become more attentive to their constituents or representatives 
                                                 




seeking Senate seats cast a wider net with their policy agendas (Hibbing 1986, Francis and Baker 
1986, Maestas 2000). What these studies do not indicate, though, is how past experiences 
differentially translate into how individuals pursue their personal, policy, or political goals once 
they are elected to Congress, especially in the beginning of their time in office.   
Additionally, the connections that scholars draw between career experiences and 
legislative behavior do not provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the 
connection between precongressional career experiences and legislative behavior. For instance, 
legislative scholars have concluded that MCs without prior political experience are less likely to 
follow expected norms of behavior like compromise and cooperate with other members 
(Frantzich 1979, Matthews 1960, Payne 1980). Looking more narrowly at specific kinds of 
experience, Carnes (2013), for example, demonstrates that MCs from working-class backgrounds 
are more likely to vote liberally on domestic economic issues due to the way that social class 
backgrounds influence legislators’ group identifications, material interests, and policy positions. 
Similarly, Miller (1993, 1995) finds that lawyers in Congress have more favorable attitudes 
towards the courts. Legislative experience, its influence on congressional behavior, and its 
influence on policy outcomes have commanded attention as well, such as the ability of state 
legislators to secure desired committee assignments (Berkman 1993, 1994, Little and Moore 
1996). While these studies are informative, they tell us little about the overall relationships 
between a broad range of career experiences and congressional behavior. 
Integrating Congress Into the Career 
Where does this leave the study of precongressional career experiences? Neither the work 
of occupational nor of legislative scholars paints a clear, comprehensive picture of how career 
experiences speak to MCs’ legislative behavior across a spectrum of different activities. In other 
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words, it remains unclear what difference it would make if voters elected a former governor, 
state legislator, nurse, or CEO to Congress. As I argue in the chapters to follow, neither approach 
accords with the way scholars of occupational behavior conceptualize a career: a constellation of 
distinct jobs, each of which I call a career experience.  
MCs enter office having had many different career experiences. To become an MC, an 
individual must put other career options on hold – both during the campaign and while in 
Congress. Although legislative scholars have treated the congressional career as distinct, in 
reality, it is not separate from the career experiences that have come before it. The congressional 
career is another career experience. Isolating it from MCs’ career background enforces an 
artificial distinction in MCs’ careers and precludes a comprehensive understanding of career 
experiences in Congress. In this dissertation, I address the question of precongressional careers 
in a new way by taking seriously the idea that serving in Congress is a part of an individual’s 
larger career – one that began before Congress (and will likely continue after it). By doing so, I 
can weave together the insights of occupational scholars about career experiences and the 
insights of legislative scholars about legislative behavior to identify connections between 
precongressional career experiences and new MCs’ decisions. 
  I focus on MCs in their first four year in office.4 Not only do new MCs lack personal 
congressional experience during these terms, but these years influence the trajectory of MCs’ 
careers. For instance, how easily or how well MCs transition to congressional life influences 
                                                 
4 In general, MCs’ first four years in office are their first and second terms. There is one 
exception: if MCs initially entered Congress in a special election. These MCs may serve three 
terms in four years: one year or less following the second election, a full two-year term, and then 
the first portion of another two-year term.  
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their willingness and ability to continue in office (Fischer and Herrick 2002, Hibbing 1982 a, 
1982b, Moore and Hibbing 1998).5  
I look at career experiences in two broad ways. First, I compare the group of MCs who 
enter Congress having had other political experiences (i.e. state legislators, governors, 
administrators, etc.) to the group of new MCs without any prior political experience – political 
amateurs (Canon 1990). Drawing this comparison allows me to address concerns, like those I 
noted above, about the impact of ‘career’ or experienced politicians versus amateur politicians or 
‘citizen legislators’. But political and nonpolitical experiences can differ significantly – from 
Cabinet officials to county judges or from elementary school teachers to carpenters or airline 
pilots, for instance. To explore this variation, I also dive more deeply into each group (politically 
experienced versus no prior political experience) to investigate how MCs with different types of 
political and nonpolitical experiences act in their early terms in Congress. 
The Limits of Studying Precongressional Careers 
The focus of my dissertation is the relationship between new MCs' precongressional 
careers and their subsequent behavior in office. One limit to this approach is the potential to 
draw spurious conclusions about career experiences and their legislative behavior. While new 
MCs enter office from different career backgrounds, many other aspects of their lives before 
Congress differ as well. For instance, they come from different social class backgrounds, have 
different habits (i.e., smokers or nonsmokers), personalities, educations, and different processes 
of political socialization. 
                                                 
5 Both terms are important in this regard. Since new members face a steep learning curve their 
first term, it is reasonable to view members as still acclimating to Congress during their second 
term – when they have more time to evaluate what worked or did not work in their first term. By 
including MCs’ first four years in my analysis, I paint a richer picture of how new MCs decide 
what to do in Congress. 
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All of these considerations can play directly into MCs' political behavior (Burden 
2007,Canon 1990, Carnes 2013, Lawless 2012, Prewitt 1970, Schlesinger 1960). In addition, 
they may also speak directly to individuals’ career decisions – why, for example, an individual 
pursued a career in dentistry versus the military, or in corporate finance versus education. Thus, 
the potential problem is whether my findings tap the effect of career experiences, or whether they 
are really capturing other important characteristics of MCs and their personal backgrounds that 
may play into their legislative behavior (such as their family history, political socialization, 
education, personality, etc.). 
In short, the reasons that MCs choose different career paths (personality, socialization, 
background, etc.) may influence their congressional behavior – not the career experience itself. 
In addition, relating career experiences to MCs' legislative behavior only points out that a 
connection exists. It does not establish that the relationship is causal, nor does it point out why 
the two are related (for instance, because MCs develop patterns of work that they carry over to 
Congress, etc.). In an ideal (and hypothetical) world, one way to respond to these concerns 
would be to run a randomized experiment. If I could control for other important considerations 
(socialization, personality, family background, etc.) and randomly assigning MCs to different 
career paths, I would be able to isolate the variables of interest and glean more crisp insights into 
the relationship between careers and legislative behavior.  
Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on one's perspective), I do not have the ability 
to manipulate hypothetical congresses, so randomly assigning career experiences to MCs is out 
of the question. Another alternative would be to control for the selection effect influencing how 
individuals choose different careers, since there are many reasons that individuals could purse 
the same career. (For instance, someone could become a doctor because of a deep-rooted 
15 
 
appreciation for the human body, a harrowing medical experience, or because of family 
expectations and pressure.) The data I have collected do not allow me to distinguish between 
these reasons. Nor is it easy to control for MCs' political socialization, family history, 
personality, etc. In the following, I take into consideration what I can (education, for one). But, 
since I cannot run randomized experiments on MCs, the controls are admittedly imperfect and 
valid causal inference is not possible. 
But this does not nullify the value of studying career experiences. Even without being 
able to draw causal inferences, the study of precongressional careers still answers interesting 
questions. For one, it sheds light on the types of qualities that candidates use to present 
themselves to voters and that voters may, in turn, use to evaluate candidates. For instance, a 
candidate whose makes campaign promises about reforming health policies but has no 
demonstrable experience in the health profession  may be seen by voters as a bigger gamble than 
a candidate who has been trained in the medical field and built a decades-long career in the field.  
In sum, in the following, I outline broad patterns that appear between MCs' 
precongressional careers and legislative behavior, acknowledging that these conclusions are the 
best that the data on real-life MCs allow. In the rest of this chapter, and more fully in chapter 
two, I draw on the literature from scholars of occupational behavior to point to areas of 
congressional behavior that may differ according to career experiences. To be clear, these 
insights are helpful for thinking about potential connections between careers and congressional 
behavior, but I cannot conclusively infer from the data whether these relationships are at work. 
Even if I cannot draw causal conclusions about it, I contend that looking at the connection 
between career experiences and legislative behavior has merit. By allowing me to make 
observations about whether MCs from different career paths act differently during their early 
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terms, it addresses the situation of voters and candidates and sheds light on a fundamental 
characteristic of Congress: MCs arrive there from many different career paths. In the chapters to 
follow, I explore three broad points of connection between MCs’ career experiences and their 
legislative behavior. 
Policy Preferences 
 I anticipate that precongressional career experiences relate to the issues that individuals 
are exposed to and the expertise they develop (Hall 1996, Holland 1985). When MCs arrive in 
office, I expect that they are especially attentive to these issues, prioritizing them at the expense 
of others. Take, for example, the behavior of Representative Kathy Dahlkemper (D-PA).  
 In her first term in office (111th Congress), Rep. Dahlkemper, a clinical dietician, 
introduced 6 bills on the House floor that pertained to medical or health-related topics. In 
contrast, in the preceding two congresses, new MCs individually introduced an average of one 
health-related bill per Congress. Along the same lines, the only bill that Rep. Steve Southerland 
introduced during his first term in Congress (112th Congress) was to ensure that “funeral and 
burial arrangements were not to be considered assets under the Supplemental Security Income 
program” (Skotzko 2011). A unique bill to be sure, it would have been an odd choice if Rep. 
Southerland had not been the co-owner and president of Southerland Family Funeral Homes 
before running for Congress. 
I expect that such examples are common among legislators. If precongressional career 
experiences relate to the content of bills that MCs’ introduce into policy debates, it has important 
implications. This connection affects how voters’ preferences are represented in the legislative 
process – how MCs take the issues and ideas they hear while campaigning for office and turn 
them into public policies. In the aggregate, if MCs with medical experience are more active on 
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medical issues, as the example of Rep. Dahlkemper suggests, then a Congress composed of a 
greater number of medical professionals would introduce and (perhaps) pass more health-related 
legislation than a Congress composed of business or legal professionals. In short, the relationship 
between MCs’ career experiences and their legislative agendas influences the aggregate 
congressional agenda.  
I also contend that precongressional experiences intersect with MCs’ individual agendas 
another way as well: through the number of policy topics that MCs address. Congress addresses 
an impressive array of public policies, everything from space exploration and underwater drilling 
to the protection of civil rights and intellectual copyrights. MCs are free to dive into whatever 
policy debates they like. They could dabble in a little bit of everything – addressing a spectrum 
of policy topics in their legislative introductions and cosponsorships, or what is known as 
generalizing. Or, they could focus their attention more narrowly or specialize on a few policy 
topics.  
I posit that the specialization of MCs’ legislative agendas also varies with their 
precongressional careers. I argue that MCs with legislative experience and political amateurs 
with legal experience enter office more familiar and practiced with the logic of specialization 
(i.e., focus resources on a few issues to increase credibility, expertise, and influence among 
colleagues and voters). Similar to the way that lawyers specialize in an area of law, I posit that 
MCs with legislative or legal experience do not try to ‘do it all’ in their early terms in office. In 
sum, I anticipate that precongressional careers influence both the types and numbers of topics on 





Legislative and Outreach Activities 
I also expect that precongressional career experiences connect to the decisions MCs make 
about how to pursue their policy goals and reach out to their constituents. The volume of 
legislation that MCs produce is their choice, as is the effort they put into building relationships in 
the district. If MCs with prior political experience are more familiar with the policy process than 
political amateurs, it may facilitate their legislative activity compared to amateur MCs without 
prior experience. As one senior MC described the learning curve for freshmen MCs in the 112th 
Congress, 
“A lot of these freshmen have never served in public office, much less in the legislative 
arena...[they lack] the bigger picture that a lot of us who have been around a long time 
have already understood” (Stanton 2012). 
The same type of connection could emerge among political amateurs and also among 
politically experienced MCs given the type of political/nonpolitical experiences that MCs have 
had. For example, the legal practice revolves around the law, and uses similar professional skills 
(Eulau and Sprauge 1964). In light of these similarities, I anticipate that political amateurs with 
legal experience introduce and cosponsor more bills (and place more of their staff in their D.C. 
offices to work on them) compared to other amateurs. When comparing MCs with different 
kinds of prior political experience, I expect that MCs with legislative or executive experience are 
more active in the legislative process than MCs with other political experiences. Having worked 
in or with a legislature should provide a clear understanding of the effort involved in, and 
benefits accrued by, different legislative and outreach activities. Overall, I posit that 





 Finally, MCs’ experiences before office may touch the relationships they form with 
copartisans and party leaders. Congressional career advancement depends on successfully 
navigating and leveraging social networks and interpersonal relationships. The examples of 
Reps. Jeff Denham (R-CA) and Diane Black (R-TN) are illustrative here. 
Denham, a former almond rancher and later entrepreneur, won a seat in the California 
State Assembly in 2000. While serving in the state legislature, he roomed with Kevin McCarthy 
(R-CA), who was elected to the House of Representatives and went on to be the Republican 
Majority Whip in the House of Representatives. After Rep. Denham was also elected to 
Congress, the partisan relationships he formed prior to election influenced the relationship he 
developed with his party in Congress (and gave rise to his reputation for being a messy 
roommate) [Skotzko 2011]. On votes when the two parties took opposite sides, Rep. Denham 
voted with his party on 97% of them, crossing party lines on only 3% of party line votes. In 
comparison, other new MCs crossed party lines twice as often on these votes. 
Similarly, Rep. Diane Black (R-TN) entered Congress in 2010 with a wealth of political 
experience and relationships. She had served six years in the Tennessee House of 
Representatives before being elected as a state Senator in 2004 and as the chairwoman of the 
Tennessee Senate Republican Caucus in 2006. As a freshman MC, Rep. Black was also loyal to 
her party; like Rep. Denham, she voted with the party on 97% of party line votes.  
Like Reps. Denham and Black, then, I anticipate that MCs with political experience are 
more loyal than other MCs. By comparing politically experienced MCs to political amateurs as 
well as looking at types of nonpolitical and political experience, I am able to flesh out the 
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connections between precongressional careers and MCs’ decisions about important votes (when 
the parties take opposite positions) and an important resource (donating campaign cash).  
In sum, the study of precongressional careers illuminates connections between 
congressional behavior and legislative outcomes by shedding light on MCs’ policy preferences, 
legislative and outreach activities, and party loyalty. All of these considerations touch on on-
going debates about the selection of representatives that will be faithful to voters’ interests. As 
one scholar of legislative behavior concluded, “it seems safe to assume that the skills, attitudes, 
and goals of legislators are the product of their total life experiences” – which includes their 
career experiences. As he continues, “Thus, knowledge about who legislators are and how they 
got to be there should contribute to a better understanding of legislative behavior and 
institutions” (Matthews 1984, 547). Through its insights into legislative behavior and outcomes, 
this dissertation facilitates the assessment of congressional behavior, an appraisal that is central 
to legislative representation.  
My argument addresses the policy and institutional implications of MCs’ career paths. In 
the words of one legislative scholar, “if we are to understand [MCs’] behavior we must know 
who they are; the kinds of experiences they have had” (Davidson 1969, 11, emphasis added).To 
date, it is unclear whether MCs’ backgrounds – political versus nonpolitical and different 
varieties of each – affect how new MCs act and, therefore, whether precongressional careers 
shape congressional behavior in ways that influence representation. By addressing this question 
in my dissertation, my work 1) yields new insights into legislative behavior, 2) clarifies the 
impact of the structure of political institutions on political outcomes, and 3) helps us navigate 





To see these implications, I take into account the diversity of MCs’ precongressional 
careers, rather than focusing on only a select group of MCs or one type of career experience 
(Berkman 1994, Canon 1990, Carnes 2013, Little and Moore 1996). I examine a variety of 
decisions that new MCs make: how many bills to introduce and cosponsor, the policy scope of 
these bills (whether they are symbolic or broad reaching), how many and what policies to focus 
on (education, versus agriculture, versus health, etc.), how much money to spend on constituent 
outreach, how frequently to vote with the majority of their party, and how much money to donate 
to copartisans. Touching on their legislative, constituent, and partisan activities, my dissertation 
provides a broad perspective on the intersection of congressional and precongressional careers.  
Chapter two looks at the intersection of career experiences and legislative behavior. 
Drawing from the interdisciplinary literature on careers and occupational behavior, I explain why 
career experiences may hone skills and provide insights that become useful decision-making 
resources for new MCs. My expectation is that MCs’ policy interests, approaches for 
accomplishing policy goals, as well as patterns of interaction with their colleagues, differ with 
past precongressional experiences.  
Having sketched out my expectations about precongressional career experiences, chapter 
three fills in the picture of these experiences and overviews the systematic approach I take to 
studying them. I focus on the 838 new MCs (in their four earliest years in office) who served 
during the 101st-112th Congresses (1989-2012). I outline how career experiences are categorized 
and provide a flavor of these experiences.  
I test my expectations in chapters four, five, and six. Chapter four investigates how MCs 
divide their scarce time, energy, and resources on Capitol Hill. In this chapter, I focus on two key 
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decisions that MCs make: how active to be in the legislative process (the volume of their 
legislative introductions and cosponsorships, as well as the type of bills introduced), and how to 
reach out to constituents in their districts through district travel, constituent mailings, and staff. I 
explore basic differences between MCs with and without prior political experience, and then 
look separately at political amateurs and at politically experienced MCs.  
Chapter five examines MCs’ issue priorities. Drawing comparisons between the policy 
insights provided by different experiences, I illustrate how MCs’ precongressional career 
experiences track with the issues they prioritize in office and, as a result, the breadth and depth 
of their individual policy agendas. In the aggregate, I argue that this policy specialization 
influences the representativeness of the institutional agenda and the way in which constituents’ 
preferences are taken into consideration during the policy process. 
Chapter six explores the relationships that MCs develop with their party leaders and 
colleagues. Looking at campaign contributions and roll call votes, I describe how partisan 
interactions vary with precongressional experiences, nonpolitical and political. I trace out these 
patterns over the votes that new MCs take and the amount of money (if any) they contribute to 
help copartisans win (re)election. Chapter seven concludes, summarizing my argument, its 










Chapter 2: The Intersection of Precongressional Careers and Legislative Behavior 
 
In 1958, Reid Ribble’s father, an ordained minister, founded a roofing and siding 
company in Appleton, Wisconsin. Growing up, Ribble’s career ambition was to follow his father 
into the ministry, not the roofing business. So, upon graduating from high school, Ribble 
enrolled in Grand Rapids School of Bible and Music to become a Baptist minister. But it was not 
to be. Partly through his studies, Ribble dropped out and joined the family business, beginning a 
three-decade long career in the roofing industry. By 1982, Ribble had become company 
president. Dissatisfied with the on-going national debt and budget crisis, he ran in the Republican 
primary for the 2010 congressional election. Winning the crowded primary, later that fall he 
defeated Democratic incumbent Steve Kagen with 55% of the vote without any prior political 
experience (Almanac of American Politics, ribble.house.gov).  
Rep. Ribble repeatedly drew on his experience as a business owner throughout his first 
term. Less than two weeks into the start of the 112th Congress, Rep. Ribble and freshman 
colleague Rep. Scott Rigell (R-VA) announced the creation of the Job Creators’ Caucus, an 
exclusive working group for former small business owners. As Rep. Ribble explained, 
“Decades of experience taught me what it takes to run a successful business that creates jobs. All 
the members of this caucus bring that same experience to the table and stand ready to apply their 
private sector skills into molding a more jobs-friendly government” (Ribble 2011). 
Rep. Ribble would continue to cite his experience in the roofing business throughout his 
first term to explain his position on issues (“Energy efficiency is also an important part of the 
equation.  My former roofing company was an innovator and a leader in this regard, using less 
energy and in turn lowering the demands on our resources”) and to sponsor and cosponsor 
legislation (H.R. 2898, Regulation Moratorium and Jobs Preservation Act of 2011). 
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In addition, due to his business experience, in 2011 Rep. Ribble was hand-picked by the 
Republican party leadership to address President Obama during a budget negotiation meeting. As 
described by a New York Times journalist who followed freshman MCs in the 112th Congress, 
“After the Republic leaders and committee chairmen each spoke, there was time 
for a comment from a single freshman. McCarthy [Rep. Kevin McCarthy, 
Republican majority whip] had seen to it that the designee be Reid Ribble of 
Wisconsin....[he] spoke of a regulation that had once been on the books 
forbidding workers from carrying plastic water bottles up to a rooftop – thus 
necessitating frequent (and dangerous) trips up and down the ladder to drink. 
McCarthy wanted Ribble to share that story of egregious overregulation with the 
president” (Draper 2012, 228).  
Outlining the Study of Precongressional Careers 
Rep. Ribble was not shy about drawing attention to his prior experiences as a guide or 
explanation for the decisions he made as a freshman MC. New MCs face a steep learning curve 
upon entering Congress. Among other things, they need to determine what to do, how to do it, 
and how to work with their new colleagues. MCs have to be doing this work, in real time, as 
soon as (if not before) they are sworn into office. In this environment of rapid and hands-on 
learning, new MCs can draw on what is familiar from past experiences to help them navigate and 
succeed in their new job in Congress. Legislative scholar Richard Fenno once observed that: 
“When they are at home, members of Congress tend to do what they are experienced, 
comfortable, and talented at doing and tend not to do what they neither like nor do well” (1978, 
127). I argue that this holds in Washington, D.C. as well.  
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Specifically, I expect that career experiences can strengthen MCs’ legislative and 
political knowledge, develop policy expertise, and partisan connections. Not only are these skills 
and insights relevant to congressional decision-making, but they can reinforce the advice that 
new MCs receive from other sources or provide insights when other resources do not. As a 
result, I argue that new MCs from different career backgrounds make different decisions about 
what to do in Congress. I expect that this connection between careers and congressional behavior 
is particularly poignant during MCs’ first four years in office, when they likely still are adjusting 
to their new jobs as members of the House of Representatives.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I address why I focus on 
new MCs. Then I discuss the situation new MCs face, since I assume that new MCs have a 
number of demands and challenges they need to sort through. After describing these, I trace out 
the resources that MCs can have to help them figure out what being a new MC means, point out 
their limits, and argue that career experiences may be a helpful addition to this list.   
In light of this, drawing on the idea of career assets, I identify a three-part framework for 
thinking about the value of past experiences in a new job: how, why, and with whom individuals 
work. After that, I map out how this fits onto the congressional experience. I expect to observe 
differences in the effort that new MCs allocate to legislative and outreach activities (the ‘how’ of 
work), the number and types of topics that new MCs take up (the ‘why’ of work), and MCs’ 







Why New MCs?  
In my dissertation, I focus on new members of Congress, those in their first four years in 
office.6 While there is no reason why past career experiences could not influence MCs’ behavior 
during their later terms as well, I concentrate on what legislative practitioners and scholars note 
is a crucial period at the beginning of MCs’ congressional career, the transition to office (Barnett 
1999, Canon 1990, Hibbing 1991, Stratmann 2000). During this period, new MCs are more 
vulnerable to electoral defeat, less likely to receive their desired (and desirable) committee 
assignments, and in greater need of policy and political information (Hibbing 1991, Jacobson 
1987, Stratmann 2000). Additionally, they are the least acclimated to Congress and its norms, 
such as not publicly criticizing colleagues, specializing on a few policy topics, cultivating 
friendly relationships with other members, and participating in committee work (Asher 1973, 
Canon 1990,  Frantzich 1979, Matthews 1959, 1960). 
Likewise, at the beginning of their time in Congress new MCs must become acquainted 
with legislative procedures. As one MC suggests, “The very nature of the legislative process 
does require that new members take more time to become acquainted with committee activities 
than those who have served for many years” (quoted in Asher 1973, 138). As another MC notes, 
this learning process is necessitated by the institutional structure and size of the House of 
Representatives: “In a body as large as the House of Representatives with 435 elected, coequal 
members, there has to be a structure if we’re ever going to get anything done. And it takes a long 
time to learn that structure, to learn who has the power” (quoted in Fenno 1978, 138).  
                                                 
6 MCs whom were elected to office, defeated or retired, and then elected again to the House at a 
later date are not included in this analysis even if their second stint in Congress began during my 
time period of study. Having already served in office, these MCs understand what congressional 
life is like. I expect that their decisions differ significantly from other MCs in ways not directly 
related to their other career experiences, so including them in the analysis is not helpful.  
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In addition, new MCs must learn how to interact with other political actors. For instance, 
David Price, a political scientist-turned-member of Congress, explained: 
“Term-limit proponents often seem to think that serving effectively in Congress 
requires no particular experience or expertise…I have heard members of the 
Intelligence Committee say that it took them four years simply to know how to ask 
the right questions of career people who were accustomed to revealing only what 
they wished to, and I confess that sometimes I felt the same way on the Banking 
Committee” (Price 2000, 250). 
In sum, the first few years in Congress are a period of intensive and hands-on learning. 
As legislative scholar Richard Fenno suggests, “the controlling variable is time, because all 
careers can be thought of as developing and changing with the passage of time” (Fenno 1978, 
171, emphasis original). In the words of one first-term MC: “I’m still caught up with reelection, 
with my survival I’ve been in office nearly two years and I’m still campaigning. I’m still trying 
to please everyone, still running. I don’t feel like an incumbent and I haven’t started acting like 
an incumbent” (Fenno 1978, 180).7  
My focus on new MCs’ first four years is also consonant with what scholars of 
occupational behavior address as an important period in any career – the transition to a new job. 
Career transitions are typically associated with lifestyle changes– income, location, 
acquaintances, leisure time – that can influence future occupational decisions (Pilot and 
                                                 
7 Note that the MC who made this comment did so in 1978, when the average MCs’ campaign 
contributions were $111,232 (Jacobson 1992). By 1989, this increased five-fold to over $500,000 
to spend on their campaign, and it tripled to over $1.8 million dollars in the 2010 election. The 
increased cost of congressional campaigns means that MCs (or congressional candidates) must 
spend a greater portion of their time campaigning and fundraising. In short, being a new MC has 
most likely only gotten harder over time. If new MCs found the adjustment to Congress difficult 
almost three decades ago, then I expect that the new MCs in my sample did so as well. 
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Rosenthal 1988). Workplace success can impact the rest of an individual’s career by altering 
her/his ability to secure other jobs and influencing the type of jobs s/he could get (Baruch 2004, 
DeFillippi and Arthur 1994). 
 As I explain in greater detail below, career transitions are an ideal opportunity for seeing 
whether individuals from different career backgrounds take different approaches to their new job 
in Congress. Because I am interested in using the observations of scholars of occupational and 
career behavior to provide insight into legislative politics, I focus on MCs’ first four years in 
office. 8 Throughout the following, I use the term ‘new MCs’ to describe these MCs.  
The Life of a New MC 
 One of the things that makes the study of new MCs interesting is that MCs’ early terms 
are often described, by members themselves and by political observers, strongly: a “necessary 
learning curve…[a] struggle to get organized,” “an unbelievably grueling march,” a “whirlwind,” 
or an information overload (Barnett 1999, 77, Livingston 2013). Part of the intensity comes from 
the number of demands on new MCs’ time and attention. These range from keeping in touch 
with constituents, to setting up the offices in which MCs work, to learning how to introduce a 
bill. I outline these tasks below, as they are key to understanding why precongressional career 




                                                 
8 Extending this exploration over the entirety of MCs’ congressional careers opens up additional 
questions for study. For example, does the effect of career experiences diminish over time? Do 
some career experiences exert a more lasting effect than others? At what point do prior 
experiences stop shaping members’ behavior? These are important questions that invite follow-
up analysis to the present study. 
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Setting Up Shop  
New MCs need to hire staff and set up their congressional offices.9 Congressional staffers 
perform a range of duties – answering constituent mail, helping voters with problems, scheduling 
events, working on legislation, and bargaining over policies with other politicians (Fox and 
Hammond 1977). They bear the burden of responsibility for the behind-the-scenes, detailed 
investigation, analysis, and negotiation that make the legislative process work (Hall 1996, 
Salisbury and Shepsle 1981).  
Not only do MCs depend on the legislative footwork and information provided by 
legislative staffers, but, in some cases, staff deliberations proxy negotiations between the MCs 
themselves (Hall 1996). Bauer et al. observed that: “The Congressman is typically thrust 
unprepared into a specialized milieu and confronted with a massive volume of highly technical 
legislation, with most of which he can deal only superficially” and therefore must “count on the 
assistance of a modest staff” (Bauer et al. 1963). According to former Senator Dick Clark, “there 
is no question of our [MCs’] enormous dependency on [staff] influence. In all legislation, they’re 
the ones that lay out the options” (as quoted in Fox and Hammond 1977). 
At the same time, hiring can be time consuming, since there are numerous positions to 
hire and competition for them is intense. For example, a Republican freshmen elected in 1992 
received “close to two thousand resumes” (Sherrod 1999, 12). As he described it, “A special 
room had been set up in the basement of the Rayburn House Office Building with mailboxes and 
desks for members-elect to process applications and interview potential staff. The mailboxes 
were stuffed with resumes” (Sherrod 1999, 12). This accords with the advice political consultant 
Tom Mantos gives congressional staffers: “The most likely chance to get a job might be with 
                                                 
9 The average new MC in the 104th-108th Congresses (1996-2004) employed seven district 
staffers, eight Capitol Hill staffers, and had two district offices. 
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new members, so my advice is that they know where the new member temporary offices are 
during new member orientation, and that they drop off their resume in those temporary offices” 
(as quoted in Cahn 2012). While it may not be a glamorous task, staff and office decisions have 
real implications for the quality and quantity of MCs’ activities. 
Learning About the Institution and Its Members  
 In addition to having new employees, new MCs have 434 new colleagues to meet. While 
some may be familiar from past experiences, the majority are not, which is notable in a 
legislative body that depends on cooperation and collaboration (Aldrich 1995, Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005, Downs 1957). Whose advice to take, who to trust, who not to offend, 
who to support – these are questions that new MCs have to sort out again upon reaching 
Congress.10  
In addition, there are new rules to learn – the political, policy, and legislative rules or 
norms of congressional life. Congress is a procedurally complex institution (Canon 1989, 
Hibbing 1988, Polsby 1968). There are rules to master about the most basic elements of MCs’ 
responsibility as legislators, such as how to introduce a bill, offer an amendment, speak on the 
House floor, etc. In addition, there are structures and precedents that are followed about how 
leaders are recruited and selected (Polsby 1968, 153). New MCs can be at a loss to know how to 
work in light of this complexity. 
                                                 
10 Likewise, party leaders often know little about their newest members. While the party 
organization may provide financial or electoral assistance to congressional candidates, party and 
committee leaders are unlikely to be acquainted with every new MC, her/his district concerns, 
personal legislative interests, and political goals (Heberlig and Larson 2012). As recounted by a 
freshman representative and former lawyer, the Speaker of the House had no idea he had been a 




 For instance, as I noted in chapter one, freshman representative Steve Southerland (R-
FL, 112th Congress), owned a funeral home before being elected to Congress and did not have 
any prior political experience. During his first term, he reported that “he leans heavily on his 
staff for learning the legislative process” (Skotzko 2011). To give another example, during the 
budget negotiations of the 113th Congress, Rep. Paul Ryan observed that “part of the challenge is 
explaining to freshmen who were just elected the logistics of what they will be dealing with in 
the first quarter of their first year in Congress” (Newhauser and Strong 2013). Institutional 
procedures can be an on-going hurdle for new MCs to overcome in their early terms. 
Ascertaining Constituent Opinion and Allocating Attention 
Finally, new MCs have to decide what their constituents want them to do and how they 
will respond. These can be time consuming and difficult tasks. For example, a diversity of 
opinions is represented in any single congressional district – economic, racial, ethnic, 
generational, political, etc.  – which can translate into competing constituent opinions about the 
MC’s ideal positions and priorities.11 For instance, a senior citizen may consider Medicare and 
Social Security reform to be the most pressing public problem, while parents of young children 
may prefer Congress to concentrate on reforming education policies.  
This disagreement can be troublesome for MCs. Because they are the district’s sole 
representative, district heterogeneity makes it difficult for MCs to take actions that avoid the 
perception that they are acting against or indifferently to (at least some portion of) their 
                                                 
11 For example, averaging across all congressional districts in my sample, 77% of district 
residents live in urban areas, 25% work blue collar jobs, 15% are veterans, 12% live below the 




constituents.12 Said one MC of his constituency, “It’s a mixed up district. People split seventeen 
ways on every issue. No matter how I vote, as many people agree with me as disagree” (Fenno 
1978, 154). Similarly, reported another, “It’s hard for me to imagine a majority of my 
constituents agreeing on anything” (Fenno 1978, 161). 
 Over time and after repeated interactions with constituents, MCs become more familiar 
with district opinion and more knowledgeable about when voters will respond to their actions 
(Bianco 1994, Fenno 1978, Parker 1986). But since these relationships take time to develop, new 
MCs may be uncertain about what their constituents want and how voters will react to their 
decisions (Kingdon 1989, Stratmann 2000). This uncertainty compounds the difficulty of 
determining what policies to take up and what new MCs should be doing with their time in 
Congress  – whether it is working on legislation, participating in policy debates, helping voters 
with their problems, or connecting with constituents, etc. (Arnold 1990, Bauer et al. 1963, Clapp 
1963, Hall 1996, Kingdon 1989).  
The Resources of New MCs and Their Limits 
 While helpful, these resources that new MCs have at their disposal may be limited in 
amount (exhaustible), limited in availability or accessibility (irrelevant), or produce additional 
uncertainty for new MCs. For example, congressional staffers play a key supporting role as new 
MCs transition into their new job.13 Congressional staff can help MCs learn the congressional 
ropes (Fox and Hammond 1977, Hall 1996, Kingdom 1989, Malbin 1979, 1981, Salisbury and 
Shepsle 1981). Staffers of retiring or unsuccessful candidates often move to other Capitol Hill 
offices, and new MCs can benefit from their congressional experience.  
                                                 
12 During the 101st-112th Congresses, new MCs won with an average of 64% of the two-party 
vote, including those who ran opposed (Almanac of American Politics). 
13 In the analysis to follow, I take staff resources into account by investigating how new MCs 
differently allocate their staff between the district and D.C. offices. 
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For example, when Rep. Harry Johnston (D-FL) replaced retiring Democrat Rep. Dan 
Mica (D-FL) in the 101st Congress, he hired several of Rep. Mica’s staff, including his District 
Office Administrator. As reported by a newspaper in his district, this contributed to a smooth 
transition that “wouldn't have happened if this staff had disappeared and a new congressional 
staff been appointed. We will be able to start at a much more advanced point,’ Ms. Stoll said. 
‘We'll be able to hit the ground running, and there won't be a moment lost in the transition’” 
(Lipman 1988). At the same time, while staff can be helpful, their time and energy is 
constrained. There is only a finite number of tasks they can accomplish, places they can be, 
questions they can answer, etc. In addition, if hired from another office or without having prior 
staff experience, staff may have limited familiarity with the district and/or congressional 
procedures. 
Political Parties and Colleagues 
MCs have other people they can draw on for assistance as well: political parties and 
copartisan colleagues. Political parties make organized efforts to assist their new members in 
adjusting and transitioning to their new job with party-led New Member Orientation sessions, 
which have been described as legislative “boot camps” or “crash course[s]” that run the gambit 
from “everything from ethics to setting up an office to survival techniques for families, to 
procedures and rules, to how to set up an office and hire staff” (Barnett 1999, 77; Price 2000, 
31). According to congressional journalists, this two week period entails “packed schedules of 
presentations, briefings, receptions, luncheons and party meetings to attend” (Dumain 2012).14  
                                                 
14 In recent congresses, the culminating event of New Member Orientations has been ‘the room 
draw,’ the lottery through which new members draw numbers in order to select their new office 
suites (Gale 2013b). 
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Party support for new members does not dry up after the session has begun, either. 
Throughout the session, parties also provide orientation and advice on key issues, votes, or 
topics. The whip system both collects information about MCs’ preferences for party leaders and 
communicates the party position to rank-and-file MCs (Burden and Frisby 2004, Cox and 
McCubbins 1991, Hager and Talbert 2000, Ripley 1964). Additionally, parties also hold regular 
caucus meetings to keep informed of member preferences and to help new MCs adjust to being a 
member of the party ‘team’ (Barnett 1999). Additionally, party leaders (and their staff) 
sometimes offer new members advice. For example, as recounted by a freshmen member of 
104th Congress: “As new members we did not know how to work the rules or system. So we met 
with key people on leadership staffs who could help us. We could say, ‘Here is what we are 
after, but we don’t know how to get there.’ They would say, ‘Here is how you can do it’” 
(Barnett 1999, 195-196). 
 Finally, part of a party’s support for its new members consists of enmeshing them in the 
network of partisan relationships and connections that comes with being a member of the 
Democratic or Republican party. As a result, MCs can leverage personal connections to other 
colleagues. For example, when conflicted about what position to take on an important vote, new 
MCs can examine the positions of colleagues to see what they should do (Kingdon 1989, 
Stratmann 2000). Members of the state delegation may be particularly helpful here. Their voting 
and policy positions can help new MCs break down how a complex piece of legislation would 
influence the residents in their state and, by implication, their district (Fiellin 1962, 1970, Born 
1976, Kingdon 1989, Truman 1956). Likewise, congressional committees provide smaller, more 
intimate settings for new MCs to get to know and learn from more senior colleagues (Fenno 
1973, Frisch and Kelly 2006).  
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Although parties do provide their members with valuable assistance, particularly on key 
votes, they do not do so on every issue (Cox and McCubbins 2005). On some issues or at 
different times, party resources are not available to new MCs. Not all issues are divisive along 
party lines, so party leaders have reduced incentives to monitor members’ actions and 
reward/sanction them accordingly (Lee 2009). For another, overusing the whip system could 
weaken its effectiveness in the long-run and at strategic, key moments. Similarly, parties 
purposefully try to provide their members with enough discretion so that MCs can keep the seat 
for the party (Nocera 2012).  
 While parties may provide voting cues, electoral assistance, and brand-name recognition 
among voters in the district, they do not impose restrictions on how members spend their time or 
what issues to take up. New MCs retain a significant degree of discretion about how they spend 
their time, focus their energy, and craft their legislative agendas (Hibbing 1991, Hall 1996). 
There is no quota of activities, such as bill introductions or trips home, that party members must 
meet. On these questions, party assistance is likely to be less specific or not as relevant. The 
same is true of their colleagues. Like parties, other colleagues are less likely to provide advice 
about how new MCs should spend their time or what issues they should take action on. 
Outside Resources 
Other resources offer aid and assistance to MCs, too. For instance, there are external 
orientation sessions that MCs can attend like the “Bipartisan Program for Newly Elected 
Members of Congress” run by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University or 
those run by think tanks (e.g., Brookings Institute, American Enterprise Institute) and the 
Congressional Research Service – Congress’ nonpartisan research agency. Other nonpartisan 
groups, like the Congressional Management Foundation, send MCs guides and policy memos 
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about how to establish and manage a congressional office. Rep. David Price noted the value of 
all this assistance as lying “not only in furnishing a common background on various issues but 
also in providing an introduction to the workings of Congress” (Price 2000, 32).  
Similar benefits can be accrued from interest groups. Through direct lobbying, they 
provide new MCs political and policy information (Esterling 2004, Wright 1996). Since new 
MCs lack the same information sources and insights of more senior MCs, this information can be 
a valuable asset for evaluating the political/electoral ramifications of taking (or failing to take) a 
certain position (Ainsworth and Sened 1993, Austen-Smith 1993, Hamm 1983, Heitshusen 2000, 
Lohmann 1998, Smith 1984). Likewise, interest groups may also provide legislative ‘subsidies’ – 
political ‘intelligence’ (head counts, strategies, etc.) and legislative insights (e.g. procedural 
recommendations, material for speeches) – that help like-minded MCs support the group’s 
position (Hall and Deardorff 2006, Hansen 1991). Grassroots mobilization also sends MCs 
signals about the direction and salience of constituent opinion (Berry 1999, Goldstein 1999, 
Hansen 1991, Kollman 1998). As explained by the president of Americans for Tax Reform, 
interest groups like his own  “will be inviting all of them [members-elect] to come…talk about 
what’s of interest to them and how we can work together” (Ackley 2012). This assistance can 
help new MCs in ascertaining what to do and how to do it.15  
At the same time, MCs may have latent questions about the objectivity and 
trustworthiness of interest group information and assistance. For instance, if interest groups 
target ‘fence-sitter’ MCs undecided on an issue, MCs could be receiving information that 
contradicts personal or district preferences (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994, Baumgartner and 
                                                 
15 Beyond the legislative arena, interest groups can help new MCs determine when additional 
oversight of federal bureaucracies is needed (Hall and Miler 2008). Interest groups’ amici curiae 
legal briefs also shine light on the likely opinion of different constituents on current court cases 
(Caldeira and Wright 1990, Hall and Miler 2008, Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997). 
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Leech 1996, Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, Kollman 1997).16 In the same vein, interest groups 
may misrepresent the implications of a policy change or strategically reveal information to 
induce their desired outcome (Austen-Smith 1993, Rasmussen 1993). Finally, the information 
they provide may be incomplete. Interest groups typically specialize on one or only a few policy 
topics, whereas a much broader range of public policies are important to constituents (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006). Interest groups may focus on one policy topic at the expense or exclusion of 
other salient considerations. 
Turning to the Familiar: The Relevance and Value of Precongressional Career Experiences 
In sum, during their early terms new MCs face various tasks and decisions while 
receiving help from a variety of sources. At the same time, these resources are limited. All told, 
there are gaps where new MCs are left ‘on their own’ to navigate their new work environment 
and its concomitant tasks. It is because new MCs have discretion over their congressional 
decisions that new MCs from different career backgrounds can take different courses of action in 
office.  
When new MCs enter office, they are new to Congress, but they are not blank slates. A 
variety of personal experiences inform MCs’ decisions (Burden 2007, Carnes 2013, Frisch and 
Kelly 2006, Hall 1996, Kingdon 1989). Legislative scholars have explored how several aspects 
of MCs’ decision-making (voting, legislative participation, and committee assignments) are 
influenced by their personal experiences and preferences (Frisch and Kelly 2006, Hall 1996, 
Kingdon 1989). MCs who smoke, for example, are more likely to cosponsor and speak on behalf 
of tobacco de-regulation bills (Burden 2007). Likewise, MCs with daughters are more likely to 
                                                 
16 Whether interest groups lobby ‘counteractively’, targeting MCs opposed to their group’s 
position, or lobby their ‘friends’ (supporters of the group’s position) has been a subject of debate. 




vote liberally on women’s reproductive rights issues, their ideology and party affiliation aside 
(Washington 2008).  
Personal preferences can help MCs decide how to participate and what positions to take, 
especially when constituent interests are non-existent or when interests within the district 
conflict. In these scenarios, MCs may “look within” to their own personal values, beliefs, or 
preferences (Mansbridge 2003, 520, see also Parker 1992). In this way, MCs take actions that 
constituents prefer because of internally held beliefs not just the fear of electoral defeat. For 
example, former House member (and current Senator) Kirsten Gilibrand (D-NY) related her 
legislative efforts to protect enlisted members of the military from abuse to her experience as a 
mother: “Some of these male senators can’t imagine themselves being victimized or brutalized. 
But I can imagine this happening to me. I can imagine it happening to my sons. And it drives me 
crazy” (Osnos 2013, 44). 
These examples suggest that personal experiences outside of Congress shape MCs’ 
decision-making while they are in Congress (Burden 2007, Frisch and Kelly 2006, Hall 1996, 
Kingdon 1989, Washington 2008). I argue that this includes their career experiences. I define a 
career as the sum of all the different work experiences an adult has in the workforce, be it 
working in industry, teaching preschoolers, or holding congressional office (Wilensky 1960).  
A career consists of the entirety of individuals’ “varied experience in education, training, 
[and] work in several organizations” including even “changes in occupational field” (Baruch 
2004, 65). Scholars compare a career to a pearl necklace. Similar to how a pearl necklace is made 
by stringing individual pearls end-to-end, a career is formed from the sequence of individual jobs 




Career Based Skills and Insights 
I expect that individuals from different career backgrounds make different decisions 
about legislating, connecting with constituents, and interacting with their party in their early 
terms in office. Career experiences may provide practical skills and insights that are applicable 
on Capitol Hill.17 An individual’s occupational background shapes the “skills and knowledge, 
understanding and experience” s/he acquires in the workplace (Brown et al. 2012, 755, see also 
Leong and Walsh 2012). If these skills are ‘portable’ – meaning they can be applied to a new 
work environment – then they can helpful for obtaining other jobs or being ‘employable’ (Arthur 
1994, Fugate et al. 2004, Porfeli and Savickas 2012).  
 Individuals now frequently change both jobs and employers during the trajectory of their 
career.18 As a result, they need to know how to “set realistic goals [for seeking employment] and 
outline steps to achieve them” (Rosenthal and Pilot 1998). This includes everything from 
knowing how to find necessary job information to how to match personal interests with potential 
work opportunities (Ebberwein et al. 2004, Krumboltz et al. 2013, Rosenthal and Pilot 1988).  
Successful employees use their past experiences as a resource and guide in a new 
environment (Arthur 1994). To orient themselves in a new workplace, they do what is familiar to 
                                                 
17 This is true even if MCs selected precongressional careers for reasons that, by themselves, 
may influence their subsequent legislative behavior. Again, I cannot test the causal relationship 
between career experiences and congressional behavior, but I can point to broad patterns and 
differences in the behavior of MCs from different career backgrounds. The skills and insights 
they acquire from those backgrounds may play into these differences. 
18 What careers look like has changed over time. The ‘traditional’ career, predominant after 
World War II, largely played out within a single corporation. Career advancement meant 
promotion to positions of greater responsibility within the same company (Adamson et al. 1998, 
Wilensky 1960). In general, this is no longer believed to be the case. Faced with “fast 
developments in multiple areas – economy, technology, and society in general,” individuals 
more commonly pursue different positions in different companies over the course of their career 
rather than promotion up a single corporate ladder (Baruch 2004, 58, see also Briscoe and 
Finkelstein 2009, Chudzikowski 2012, DeFillippi and Arthur 1994, Hall 1976).  
40 
 
them, or things that they already know how to do. By doing so, they transfer and apply skills and 
insights acquired in one work environment to another. For instance, an accountant-turned-
entrepreneur could apply her accounting expertise to a new pottery business. A medical doctor 
elected to Congress could turn to his experience establishing a clientele base and securing 
patients’ trust to strengthen his relationship with his constituents. For example, Rep. Joe Heck 
(D-NV), a former doctor, chose to emphasize his medical experience in campaign 
advertisements, explaining, 
“I think there is a natural trust between patients and their doctors, and there 
should be a trust between constituents and their representatives, and I think 
talking about my experience as a doctor helps solidify that position” (Steinhauer 
2012).  
Three Broad Categories of Career Skills and Insights 
In a new work environment, the expectation is that employees turn to what is familiar 
from past experiences. In fact, scholars of organizational and occupational behavior argue that 
employees’ success depends on how well they do so. In particular, successful employees use past 
experiences to help them know why they are doing what they do, how to do it, and with whom to 
do it with (Arthur and DeFillippi 1995, 7).  
The ‘why’ of work is the knowledge and importance of the values and interests of the 
organization, “the sense of purpose, motivation, and identification” central to the work (Baruch 
2004, 61). For new MCs, this entails becoming familiar with their employers (constituents), be it 
by holding events where constituents can visit them, hosting town halls sessions to hear 
constituent feedback, attending and speaking at district events, soliciting constituent feedback, 
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etc. As one new MC colorfully put it, rather than have political consultants tell him about 
constituent opinion, he goes to where his constituents are:  
“When I go home on the weekends, and put on my flip-flops and my shorts and my 
John Deere hat, I go to Walmart. I don't need to hear from a political 
prognosticator on what I need to do or how I need to do it.” (Skotzko 2011).  
Second, by looking to their past experience, employees can learn how to adapt 
previously-acquired skills to their new job. This relates to the ‘how’ of work that I noted above 
and can occur formally through structured programs or informally through “self-study and 
experiential learning through apprenticeship programs and on-the-job activities” (Arthur et al. 
1995).  As the vocational counseling literature emphasizes, either route is useful: “the most 
effective way to learn a new skill is to try doing it” (Krumboltz et al. 2013, 16).  
Third, employees also tap into their earlier career experience to learn how to interact with 
new coworkers in an unfamiliar social environment and its associated “attachments, 
relationships, reputation, sources of information, and mutual obligations” (Baruch 2004, 61). 
Navigating a new social environment and hierarchy encompasses everything from learning who 
does what, to which coworkers will be receptive to questions, to how to develop relationships for 
networking. MCs recognize the importance of this type of knowledge. For instance, as a MC 
recounted, success is “a matter of learning how to get things done, knowing the people, and 
working without raising hackles” (Fenno 1978, 179). 
In sum, in every work experience, employees pick up insight into the reason for their 
work, how to do the work, and how to interact with others. Employees can use the lessons and 
skills learned in previous work experiences to help them adjust to a new job. In consequence, 
occupational behavior is “likely to be strongly influenced by a person’s prior history of skill 
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accumulation and task-relevant experience” (DeFillippi and Arthur 1994, 314). As a result, the 
values and interests that employees internalize from their employers, the skills and abilities that 
they learn on the job, and their collegial interactions vary from job to job. Developed at the 
“intersection of person-in-environment”, these skills and insights are shaped by the specific 
occupational environment in which employees work (Porfeli et al. 2012, 749). Employees take 
on their next jobs in distinct ways as a result. 
Outlining Expectations About Precongressional and Congressional Careers 
According to this logic, if MCs have different precongressional career experiences, then 
they should approach their congressional jobs in ways that reflect their prior work experiences. 
The ‘why’-‘how’-‘whom’ categorization is useful because it points to three aspects of 
congressional behavior where I expect to see connections between MCs’ behavior and their past 
experiences. As I touched on in chapter one and as I elaborate below, these include the issues 
and topics MCs advocate, their legislative and outreach activities, and their interactions with 
copartisans. 
The ‘Why’ of Work: Issue Prioritization 
Consider, for instance, the challenge that new MCs face in understanding the interests 
and values of their new employers, voters. Issue attention, or deciding “what to do with [their] 
time,” is one of the “principal dilemmas” that new MCs must address (Hall 1996, 9, see also 
Bauer et al. 1963, 405). Notes one MC, the “sheer busyness” of the Washington schedule 
“surpasses what almost all members have experienced in their previous careers and requires 
specific survival techniques. Most important, you must set priorities” (Price 2000, 62). The 
president of the nonprofit Congressional Management Foundation concurs. His best advice for 
new MCs is to set priorities: “We say that if you don’t focus, you’ll become one of two types of 
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members of Congress. If you’re in a safe district, you’ll be ineffective. For an unsafe district, 
you’ll be a former member of Congress” (Gale 2013a). 
Furthermore, new MCs must prioritize their voters’ diverse and potentially competing 
interests, as I noted earlier. I expect that prior occupations are relevant here. If work experiences 
affect the issues to which MCs are exposed, they can help MCs develop familiarity, expertise, 
and interest with specific issues, thereby reducing the information costs associated with 
legislative advocacy and facilitating legislative activity and specialization [i.e., focusing on one 
issue over, and to the exclusion, of other issues]  (Berkman 1993, Carnes 2013, Frisch and Kelly 
2006).19 These experiences help to clarify for new MCs why these policies are important – the 
substantive and real consequences for constituents. 
For example, according to a journalist’s account of the 112th Congress, Rep. Emmanuel 
Cleaver (D-MO) drew on his previous work experiences to urge President Obama to oppose 
Republican budget cuts that would eliminate block grant funding for local governments. As Rep. 
Cleaver explained to the president:  
“‘Look, I was mayor of Kansas City. The community development block grant 
program? Huge for me. That’s how I got infrastructure projects funded – how I 
did all sorts of things. If you cut that, Mr. President, the effects will be real’” 
(Draper 2012, 255).  
I gauge connections between precongressional careers and legislative behavior by 
looking at 1) the topics of the bills new MCs introduce and cosponsor, and 2) the number of 
different topics on which they take action. My expectation is MCs from different career 
backgrounds are active on different issues. Take, for example, medical experience. I anticipate 
                                                 
19 Individuals select jobs partly based on the job’s congruence with their personal interest in 
topics or work environments (Holland 1985). 
44 
 
that, compared to other new MCs, those with medical experience are familiar with complicated 
health issues, have developed preferences on them, and know more about these issues than their 
non-medical colleagues. As a result, I expect that they introduce and cosponsor more medical-
related bills than other MCs. 
I contend that the same career-agenda connection is true of other occupations as well. 
MCs from business backgrounds, for example, have insights into budget, jobs, or corporate 
issues (be it from the career itself or the reasons they chose the career in the first place). 
Likewise, MCs with political experience attend more closely to issues related to government 
operations owing to their prior experience with these issues. So, too, with MCs from law-
enforcement backgrounds: their personal experience focused on crime or law-enforcement 
related legislation, and their interest in these issues may have motivated their career choice to 
begin with. Compared to other MCs without these same experiences, I anticipate that MCs 
introduce and cosponsor more legislation on policies related to their past career experiences.  
The Sanchez sisters, Linda and Loretta, provide one interesting example. Reps. Linda and 
Loretta Sanchez are notable in that they are the first sisters ever to serve in Congress 
(lindasanchez.house.gov). As sisters, in almost every way, their backgrounds are the same. Two 
of seven siblings, they are both Californian Democrats who were raised in southern California by 
Mexican immigrants, self-described “product[s] of public schools and Head Start” 
(lorettasanchez.house.gov). Yet, despite their similarities, they took different career paths to 
Congress. Rep. Loretta Sanchez, the older of the two sisters by nine years, received a M.B.A. 
from American University in Washington, D.C. in 1984. After graduation, she worked as a 




Her younger sister, Rep. Linda Sanchez, attended the University of California, Berkley, 
and the University of California, Los Angeles for law school, graduating the year before Loretta 
was elected to Congress (1995). According to her House website, after working in private 
practice, she went:  
“to work for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 
441 and the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA)…served as the 
Executive Secretary-Treasurer for the Orange County Central Labor Council, 
AFL-CIO. Congresswoman Sanchez is still an active and card-carrying member 
of the IBEW Local 441” (lindasanchez.house.gov). 
First elected to Congress in 2002 (108th Congress), she represents the 39th congressional district 
(and, later, the 38th due to redistricting), which neighbors her sister’s district in Los Angeles. 
 What is interesting in the case of Reps. Linda and Loretta Sanchez is that their behavior 
as new MCs maps onto their career paths, all other background similarities aside. For example, 
compare the bills each introduced in their early terms in office. Rep. Loretta Sanchez, the older 
sister and financial analyst who worked for Booz Allen Hamilton, introduced bills related to 
military policies and personnel, such as H.R. 1350 “Freedom of Choice for Women in the 
Uniformed Services Act”, H.R. 4388 “Military Retention Benefits Training Act”, and resolutions 
honoring the heroisms and sacrifice of troops during the Vietnam conflict. In contrast, her sister, 
Rep. Linda Sanchez – the “card-carrying member” of the local union – took legislative action to 
recognize and honor “America’s labor movement” as well as support “the designation of a 
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National Labor History Month” (thomas.loc.gov).20 As was true for these two representatives, I 
anticipate that new MCs’ legislative agendas should reflect their career paths to office. 
I also expect to observe differences in the number of topics that new MCs take on as a 
result of their past experiences. Not all career experiences cover the same breadth of concerns, 
but – even more importantly – some career experiences are more specialized, confined to a 
smaller number of topics, than others. I anticipate that legislative and legal experiences are 
influential here. MCs from these backgrounds have had first-hand exposure to the logic of 
specialization (by taking up too many topics, MCs might reduce their effectiveness at advocating 
for any particular one), and they have worked in environments where specialization is important 
and perhaps necessary. Consequently, I hypothesize that former state legislators and 
congressional staffers introduce and cosponsor bills on a smaller number of policy topics than 
other experienced MCs. 
I also anticipate that the logic of specialization runs parallel to the logic of legal 
specialization. Lawyers generally specialize or work in specific areas of the law, or 
predominately practice one kind of law – family law versus tax law, for example (Miller 1995). 
In fact, they may choose a legal career because they are interested in a particular area of legal 
practice. Once elected to Congress, I expect that amateurs who have had legal experience 
specialize their legislative agendas on a smaller number of policy topics. 
These concerns, about the types and number of topics that MCs take up have real 
implications. For example, the policies that become law are a function of the types of bills that 
members introduce. If career connections emerge, then it suggests that changing the composition 
                                                 
20 Along the same lines, but outside of my scope of study, Rep. Loretta Sanchez founded the 




of who serves in Congress could have an effect on the mix of policies that are discussed and, 
eventually, passed into law. Similarly, connections between new MCs’ past career experiences 
and congressional policy agendas should strengthen the quality of policy discussions that occur 
on Capitol Hill as new MCs bring first-hand and career relevant insights to bear on these 
decisions. In sum, I expect that MCs from different precongressional careers engage with distinct 
mixes of public policies in office. As a result, precongressional career experiences should speak 
to the aggregate, institutional agenda as well.  
The ‘How’ of Work: What to Do  
Like issue prioritization, equally important for policy outcomes is how MCs choose to 
allocate their time and effort among their various options, ranging from legislative activities in 
Washington, D.C., to relationship-building activities in the district. Due to limits on MCs’ time 
and finances, MCs make strategic decisions about how to allocate their resources between these 
Hill and district-oriented activities.21 “The problem of how best to distribute” their effort is 
another key concern that new MCs must address (Clapp 1963, 57, see also Hall 1996). As Fenno 
(1978) summarized, “The job of a Congressman requires that some things be done in 
Washington and others be done in the district. At the least, legislation is passed in one place and 
elections occur in the other. The allocative problem, therefore, comes with the job” (33). 
To examine these decisions, I look at two key ways that MCs can invest their time and 
resources. First, I examine their legislative activity on Capitol Hill – the volume of bills they 
introduce and cosponsor bills, the types of bills they work on (whether they make little to large 
                                                 
21 Clearly, legislative activity and voting are activities that MCs do with the district in mind. 
Nevertheless, I distinguish between activities that occur in, or are oriented toward, the district 
versus D.C. because MCs are resource-constrained. The Representational Allowances that MCs 
are given by the House to set up their offices and hire staff force strategic decisions about how to 
allocate resources between district and Hill-oriented activities.  
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changes in public policy), and the likelihood that these bills become law. Second, I probe how 
new MCs spend their office budget. I examine the percent of their money they spend on traveling 
to the district, hiring district staffers, or sending mailings to their constituents. In doing so, I am 
able to tap whether MCs from some backgrounds make greater efforts to contribute to policy 
outcomes or connect with their voters than other MCs. 
Like issue prioritization, I expect that MCs from various work experiences approach 
these decisions differently. One obvious distinction is between political and nonpolitical career 
experiences (Abramowitz 1991, Canon 1990, Jacobson 1987, Lazarus 2008).22 Political 
experience should familiarize MCs with how the public articulates political concerns and how 
elected officials should behave. From prior interactions with the public, political experience can 
help MCs determine how to balance legislative activity with constituency service (Fenno 1978). 
Having cultivated relevant political and policy knowledge before office, I contend that politically 
experienced MCs allocate their energy and effort differently than political amateurs. I posit that 
politically experienced MCs enter office more familiar with public policies and procedures. As a 
result, I hypothesize that they introduce and cosponsor a greater volume of bills than political 
amateurs. If MCs with political experience undertake a greater volume of legislative activity, I 
anticipate that they place more of their staff in their D.C. offices as a result.  
But I also expect that the type of political and nonpolitical experiences should help 
distinguish MCs’ behavior. To explore this, I split my sample into two groups (MCs with any 
prior political experience and political amateurs) and then focus on different experiences within 
each group of MCs. Among MCs with prior political experience, legislative political experience 
                                                 
22 One useful framework is to think in broad terms of the types of careers that would equip MCs 
with relevant skills and explore more nuanced categories therein (Davidson 1969). 
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provides unique insights into legislative processes and constituent interests (Berkman 1993).23 
MCs have first-hand practice developing skills and resources used on behalf of (often the same) 
voters within the legislative process (Carson et al. 2011, Maestas 2000, 2003, Robeck 1982). 
When translated to Congress, these assets can facilitate how MCs participate in the policy 
process and build relationships in the district. For example, freshmen MCs with state legislative 
experience in the 112th Congress preferred ‘across-the-board’ spending cuts to a ‘targeted 
approach,’ perceiving it to be “easier to explain back home than to justify each and every 
reduction” (Draper 2012, 77).  
I anticipate that MCs with executive political experience, such as gubernatorial or federal 
executive experience, are also attune to public opinion, managing staff, courting public attention 
(Hamman 2004). But these skills are cultivated within a very different work environment, where 
“command and control techniques [are] acceptable” and “everything revolved, or seemed to 
revolve, around” the chief executive (Barnett 1999, 136, Matthews 1960, 1075). This difference 
is important. MCs with executive experience may be more comfortable being on the cutting edge 
of an initiative, ‘out in front’ (similar to sponsoring legislation) rather than collaborating or 
supporting other members’ work (similar to cosponsoring legislation). I expect this to relate to 
the mix of legislative activities they pursue. I hypothesize that MCs with state legislative or 
executive political experience introduce a greater number of bills than MCs with other political 
experiences.  
Likewise, I expect that MCs with legislative and executive political experience, versus 
other types of political backgrounds, introduce bills making more weighty changes to the law. 
                                                 
23 As supporters of the constitution contended, the election of legislatively-experienced MCs to 
Congress facilitates the conveyance of “considerable knowledge” and “local information”, to 
“the great advantage” of Congress (Federalist Papers No. 56). 
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These bills are more contentious and require a more thorough understanding of the policy 
process, the state of current policy debates, and how to advocate for a position in the face of 
disagreement – which both legislative and executive experience should provide (and which may 
lead individuals to pursuing these careers in the first place). Because they suggest substantive 
policy changes, these bills also are more likely to face resistance in passing both chambers of 
Congress. As a result, I hypothesize that MCs with legislative and/or executive experience 
introduce fewer bills that become public laws compared to MCs from other types of political 
backgrounds. 
I also expect to find variation in behavior across different nonpolitical experiences among 
political amateurs. Legal and legislative careers bear a strong resemblance to one another in 
terms of the tasks undertaken (writing and interpretation of legislation, representation of others’ 
interests, etc.) and the ways they are undertaken (negotiation, bargaining, debate, etc.) [Cohen 
1969, Eulau and Sprague 1964, Gold 1961, Green et al.  1973, Miller 1995, Podmore 1977, 
Schlesinger 1957]. Because of this similarity, I hypothesize that amateurs with legal experience 
introduce and cosponsor a greater volume of bills when compared to all other amateurs. I also 
focus on business experience, to see whether current claims about MCs from business 
background are borne out in the analysis.  
Like issue prioritization, then, there should be career-based differences in MCs’ 
legislative and outreach decisions. MCs who dedicate more resources to constituent outreach 
make it easier for individuals in their district to contact, keep tabs on, and query their 
representative. If MCs from particular backgrounds are more or less active in the policy process, 
then their influence on policy outcomes also could vary. As a result, there is district-by-district 
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variation in the role that constituent preferences have in the policy process due to the career paths 
that brought their representatives to Congress.  
The ‘With Whom’ of Work: Party Loyalty 
 Finally, I anticipate that MCs from diverse precongressional career experiences interact 
differently with their party and partisan leaders. In Congress, the work environment is structured 
around political parties (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005, Rohde 1991). There, partisan 
interactions take many shapes – from MCs’ conversations, votes, and donations to copartisans, 
among others. I focus on voting loyalty on the votes where parties take opposite sides and 
campaign contributions to copartisans. As before, I look at broad differences in the behavior of 
new MCs with and without political experience, and then separately examine new MCs with 
political experience (highlighting different kinds of political experience) and political amateurs 
(examining various nonpolitical experiences). 
I anticipate that party loyalty differs among experienced versus amateur MCs in regards 
to campaign contributions, but not votes. On votes where the two parties take competing 
positions, I expect that political amateurs reference the party position as a useful voting cue, 
thereby increasing their party loyalty (Stratmann 2000). While politically experienced MCs may 
use the party line as a voting cue as well, I argue that experienced MCs are also loyal voters 
because of the partisan nature of their past experiences. (MCs may pursue these careers because 
they are partisan or learn the value of party loyalty from them.) 
 I expect that this same insight translates into increased campaign donations to 
copartisans. In general, party leaders give their new members a ‘pass’ on donating money to 
copartisan candidates (Heberlig and Larson 2012). Compared to MCs with prior political 
experience, amateurs generally have greater electoral vulnerability. This, in combination with the 
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party’s blessing to concentrate on their own races, could incline political amateurs to spend their 
campaign cash on their own race. While experienced MCs may like to do the same, I expect that 
they do not. MCs develop political relationships through their prior political experience. I 
hypothesize that experienced MCs donate more money to their colleagues and friends as a 
consequence of these relationships: they have a wider circle of contacts to support. 
There is an additional way, though, that political experience may relate to partisan 
loyalty. In addition to developing political relationships, political experience may emphasize the 
importance and norms of party loyalty, the importance of parties in negotiating political 
compromises, and the role that parties play in the electorate (Aldrich 1995, Frantzich 1979, 
Heberlig 2003). I anticipate that these lessons are particularly relevant (or motivational) for MCs 
who have worked in a legislative setting (state legislatures and/or Congress) and/or for a political 
party. As a result, I hypothesize that MCs with state legislative, congressional, and/or party 
experience vote more frequently with their party and donate more money than other experienced 
MCs.  
In light of the congruence between the legal and legislative fields, amateur lawyers are 
familiar with the bargaining, negotiation, and compromise that characterize policymaking (Eulau 
and Sprague 1964, Podmore 1977). While these skills could be applied to bipartisan ends, I 
expect that amateur lawyers use them to partisan ends nonetheless. Their professional skills 
make them attractive congressional candidates and frequent targets of party recruitment efforts 
(Lawless 2012). I anticipate that these partisan attachments encourage MCs’ voting loyalty 






I argue that MCs from different precongressional experiences make different decisions in 
their early terms in office in regards a wide range of precongressional experiences and 
congressional behavior: campaign contributions, roll call votes, building relationships in the 
district, and working on legislation. These aspects of legislative behavior touch on key 
determinants of constituent representation. Career experiences do not pre-determine legislative 
behavior, nor are they the only guides that new MCs have at their disposal for navigating their 
transition to office. Nevertheless, I argue that MCs from different precongressional careers act 
differently, in part because career experiences can develop relevant insights and skills for future 
careers.  
The connections that I expect between careers and congressional behavior are important 
for both substantive outcomes and democratic accountability. As Prewitt (1970, 14) writes, “In a 
representative democracy, it is thought to be more important to control who is to gain office than 
to try and control the behavior of the incumbent.” By providing insight into the behavior of 
candidates from different occupational backgrounds, the study of precongressional career 
experience pushes towards additional insights for legislative scholars and individual voters. It 
illuminates the decision-making process and behavior of MCs with distinct backgrounds, helping 
to clarify how they make choices and take actions with the choices and constraints they face. 
 Having traced out why and how precongressional careers should relate, it remains to be 
seen if they actually do. Chapters four, five, and six take up this task. Chapter four looks at MCs’ 
allocation of effort and energy, chapter five at their legislative agendas, and chapter six at their 
partisan relationships and behavior. Before I turn there, I take a closer look at precongressional 
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careers themselves. In chapter three, I trace out the different paths that MCs take to Capitol Hill 
























Chapter 3: Exploring Precongressional Careers 
 
I argue that MCs from diverse career backgrounds encounter different skills and insights 
in their previous experiences and make different decisions about what to do in their early terms. 
In this chapter, I take a closer look at what MCs have done before Congress. I start by 
overviewing the concept of career experiences and then discuss how I code MCs’ career paths. I 
outline broad trends in occupational backgrounds, discuss common combinations of experiences, 
and tease out how these paths layer onto other salient influences on congressional behavior, such 
as party affiliation, gender, race, and district characteristics.  
My goal in overviewing MCs’ career experiences is to establish a foundation for the 
analytical chapters to follow. All MCs came to Congress from somewhere – not just the districts 
they represent but also the jobs they left to work in Congress. As I seek to make clear in this 
chapter, the variation in these experiences provides fertile ground for expanding our 
understanding of the men and women who become MCs.  
Who Are These New MCs? 
I study the precongressional career experiences of all 838 MCs in their first four years 
during the 101st-112th Congresses (1989-2012). As shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, the 
number of new MCs in each Congress is not constant, from a low of 42 MCs (in the 102nd 
Congress, 109th Congress, and 112th Congress) to a high of 115 MCs (during the 103rd 
Congress). This fluctuation maps onto changes in the macropolitical environment. For instance, 
in the 104th Congress (1995-1996), the Republican Party secured the majority of House seats for 
the first time in over four decades. Interestingly, that majority was premised both on the large 
number of freshmen MCs who entered the House in the 104th Congress, “a boisterous, 
ideological group of first-term members who seemed to welcome their label as ‘revolutionaries’” 
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(Barnett 1999, xiii), and also the large number of sophomore MCs who returned in the 104th 
Congress. The groundwork for the watershed moment in the 104th Congress was laid in the 103rd 
Congress. There is a similar surge of freshmen members in the 112th Congress (2010-2011), 
when the Republicans, again, took away the House majority from the Democrats.24 
New MCs vary on multiple dimensions beyond career experiences, as shown in Table 
3.2. This variation allows me to draw conclusions about career experiences across a variety of 
other personal and political considerations. For example, men outnumber women: there were 705 
new male MCs to 133 female MCs in their first and/or second terms. Likewise, there were only a 
handful of minority MCs: 100 in total. Overall, new MCs were well-educated. About 65% of 
them (539) had graduate degrees; only 67 (8%) had less than a college education.  
As expected, new MCs come from all over the United States, but not from all fifty states, 
actually. The outlier is Alaska, thanks to Rep. Don Young (R - AK). After graduating from 
college, Rep. Young moved to Alaska from California, where he worked in construction, 
commercial fishing, prospecting, and education before being elected mayor of Fort Yukon and 
serving in the Alaska state legislature (young.house.gov). In 1973, he was elected as the at-large 
representative for the state of Alaska. He has been reelected to every Congress since then – 
making him the most senior member of the Republican Party in the House. Since Alaska has 
only one House seat, there are no new MCs from Alaska in my data set during this period.25 But, 
                                                 
24 While I do not study the factors that make the election of new MCs more or less likely, I note 
these trends to highlight the importance of new MCs for congressional outcomes. By their very 
election, new MCs have an impact on policy outcomes by helping to secure the majority for their 
party. For example, as an aide to Speaker Newt Gingrich in the 104th Congress explained, “It is 
true that we used the freshmen very effectively against some of our members...We would say to 
chairman X…‘The freshman and sophomore classes are 53 percent of the vote. If you can find a 
bigger bloc of votes, you can do what you want’” (Barnett 1999, 205). 
25 The number of new MCs from each state depends on the size of the state population.  
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by examining a large number of MCs across a broad period of time, I examine MCs that come 
from diverse geographical backgrounds. 
 Most of the 838 new MCs elected to Congress from 1989-2012 serve more than one term 
(see Table 3.1).26 Of those who did not, four retired, eight died or resigned midterm, ten ran for 
higher office, and ninety-one lost their reelection race. 27 For example, at the urging of senior 
Republican leaders, first term Rep. Wes Cooley (R-OR) stepped out of a reelection race 
following concerns about misrepresentations of his past (Toner 1996). In contrast, Rep. Denise 
Majette (D-GA) only served one term, but in hopes of securing an open Senate seat. (She was 
unsuccessful) [Biographical Directory of the United States Congress]. Rep. Ann Buerkle (R-
NY) – a former nurse, city councilwoman, and assistant attorney general – was not reelected. In 
2010, with Tea Party support, she edged out the sitting incumbent, Democrat Rep. Dan Maffei, 
by 638 votes (Broughton 2011).28 She faced off against Rep. Dan Maffei again in 2012, but this 
time in a redrawn district that was more heavily Democratic. Maffei won, 49-43% (Center 2013). 
Finally, other MCs serve partial terms, either due to winning a special election (in the case of 93 
                                                 
26 If I count the number of MCs by the number of terms they serve, I have 1,458 MC-Congress 
pairs Because MCs’ precongressional career experiences remain constant across their time in 
Congress, the following discussion about career experiences is framed in terms of the 838 
unique, new MCs. In the statistical analyses in the next three chapters, I account for the 
correlation between MCs across different terms by clustering the standard errors on the 
individual MCs. 
27 The largest number of MCs that did not return for a second term occurs in the 104th (1995-
1996), 105th (1997-1998) and 112th Congresses (2011-2012): 22, 20, and 29 MCs, respectively. 
The majority of MCs who did not return to the 104th Congress were Democrat and were 
Republicans in the 105th Congress. In the 112th Congress, it was mostly Democrat MCs who 
failed to return for a second term. 
28 Owing to the district’s Democratic leaning, Rep. Ann Buerkle recounts that, at the beginning 
of her campaign, she spent “‘time at the back of small town parades, knowing full well that few 
people took her campaign seriously’” (Broughton 2011). A visit to the district from the House 
Minority leader, Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), which she managed to squeeze in on her daughter’s 
wedding day – “‘I was sort of overdressed…I was in my mother-of-the-bride garb’” – boosted 
her credibility with voters (Broughton 2011). 
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new MCs) or leaving office early – either because they died, were charged with crimes, or 
appointed to another office.29 
MCs’ electoral margins are generally tightest in their earliest races. In their initial 
election to Congress, successful candidates won 59% of the two-party vote, excluding the 15 
MCs who ran unopposed. In contrast, after one term in office, 79 MCs ran unopposed and the 
other successful incumbents received 64% of the two-party vote, a 5% average increase from 
their initial successful congressional election. 
What Is a Career Experience? 
 For the congressional candidates who are elected to office, I define a precongressional 
career experience as a job held prior to entering Congress. Following the occupational behavior 
literature, I look at all of the jobs held by MCs during their time in the adult workforce. In most 
instances, this translates into the period of employment starting after college. Alternatively, it 
starts with jobs held after high school for the 67 MCs that did not attend or complete college. 
Jobs can be categorized based on the level of skill or training needed to complete the job 
or the salary provided. 30 A professional job, such as a medical doctor or lawyer, requires specific 
training and certification by an independent body (such as a medical board or state bar 
                                                 
29 Rep. Mark Amodei (R-NV) is an example of a MC who served a partial term due to a special 
election, replacing Rep. Dean Heller (R-NV) [New York Times 2011]. Two first-term MCs died 
in office – Larkin Smith (R-MS), in a plane crash, and Walter Capps (D-CA), of a heart attack at 
the age of 63. Three MCs – Reps. Frank Balance (NC), Eric Massa (NY), and William Janklow 
(SD) – left following ethical violations or criminal charges. More virtuously, Rep. Dan Coats (R-
IN) was appointed to the Senate in 1989 after the sitting senator, Dan Quayle, was elected vice-
president (Biographical Directory of the United States Congress). 
30 Nonpolitical experiences can be categorized based on whether the job has certain features 
(professional jobs are characterized by an abstract or cognitive based of knowledge, specialized 
training, autonomy, prestige, a professional ‘code of ethics,’ and collegial collaboration), 
completes certain tasks (managerial administrative, clerical, executive tasks for white collar jobs 
versus manual or physical labor for working-class or blue collar jobs), or has certain duties or 
responsibilities (Carnes 2013, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
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association, for example), and is paid a high salary (Adler et al. 2008). White collar jobs, like 
those in the business or financial sector, require a certain degree of private training and provide 
“moderate to high levels of material security,” whereas many blue collar jobs are manual, 
unskilled positions that pay less well (Carnes 2013, 31). I make no distinction based on the tasks 
accomplished or the salary earned.  
I also include partisan political experience in my coding of precongressional career 
experiences, even though some partisan positions are volunteer (like being county party chair). 
While unpaid, I include these positions because they have important political responsibilities 
(like recruiting candidates, mobilizing voters, and fundraising, in the case of party chairs) from 
which individuals may acquire important skills, insights, or relationships.31  
At the very least, they can teach potential candidates what not to do if they want to be 
successful in politics. For example, in the summer of 2013, Montgomery County Republican 
party chairman Jim Allen received national attention for making offensive comments about the 
candidacy of Erika Harold. Harold fell under Allen’s ire for challenging the sitting incumbent 
Rep. Rodney Davis (R-IL) in Illinois’ 13th congressional district, where she grew up and 
attended the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign before being crowned Miss America in 
2003. Following the publication of the email, the Illinois Republican party chair and the 
Republican National Committee chair asked Allen to resign; he complied after issuing an official 
apology to Harold (Chicago Tribune, Reilly 2013). 
Finally, I look at volunteer partisan positions because of prior expectations about political 
experience and legislative behavior. For instance, congressional candidates with political 
                                                 
31 These positions follow the basic logic of the definition of a job outlined above – completing 
work in exchange for payment, such as the exercise of political power, the accumulation of 
political capital, or developing political relationships. 
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experience are more strategic in their electoral calculations and more successful on Election Day 
(Jacobson 1987, Abramowitz 1991, Lazarus 2008). These insights can be gleaned from unpaid 
political experiences as well as paid positions (like governors, state legislators, mayors, or 
cabinet officials). In any case, I do not believe this exception will bias the results. Of the new 
MCs with prior political experience, 681 of the 682 held at least one paid political position in 
addition to any volunteer political experience. (The exception, Rep. Mike McIntyre was a private 
practice attorney in North Carolina and delegate to the Democratic National Convention.)  
Coding Career Experiences 
 In order to code precongressional career experiences, I need a standard that is uniform 
across MCs, constant across time periods, and publicly available. MCs’ official biographies 
distributed by their House offices are a promising start. For one, no one should know their 
personal experiences better than the MC her/himself. For example, consider Rep. Aaron Schock 
(R-IL) – currently the youngest member of Congress (and the one who appeared shirtless on the 
cover of Men’s Health in May 2011). His official House website explains that, prior to being 
elected to Congress at the age of 28, he had served in the state legislature, started his own small 
business, and worked as the Director of Development for Petersen Companies of Peoria, Illinois. 
The website also notes that Rep. Schock got his start in politics when he was elected to the local 
school board at the age of 19 and became school board president at the age of 23 (Perrine 2011, 
schock.house.gov).  
Another advantage of MCs’ House biographies is that, since they are public, it is unlikely 
that MCs would outright misrepresent their experiences (or get away with it for long).32 But 
these official biographies have disadvantages. There is no guarantee that they are a 
                                                 
32 While campaigning for an open Senate seat in 2011, Senator Kirk (R-IL) was alleged to have 
exaggerated his military record, an error the press quickly noted (Montopoli 2010).  
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comprehensive record of MCs’ career experiences. For instance, a MC could highlight previous 
jobs that he or she believed would resonate with constituents, emphasizing some while ignoring 
others.33 In addition, since these biographies are written by MCs’ staffers, there is variance in 
what is included across MCs.  
Because I examine a large number of congresses across a number of years (1989-2012), 
this becomes a significant problem if I cannot identify whose biographies are incomplete. To 
illustrate, consider Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA). From her House biography, it is clear that she has 
significant public service – serving the residents of the San Francisco Peninsula while on the San 
Mateo County Board of Supervisors and later in the California State Assembly and State Senate 
(speier.house.gov). The biography also states that, while a staffer for Rep. Leo Ryan (D-CA), she 
was “shot five times while trying to rescue constituents from the People’s Temple compound in 
Jonestown, Guyana” and that she was the “first Californian state legislator to give birth while in 
office” (speier.house.gov). However, it does not mentioned that, from 1996-1998, she also 
worked as the Director of Governmental Affairs for Community Gatepath, a nonprofit 
organization that advocates and provides services for the disabled in San Mateo County, or that 
she was the Director of Government Affairs for the company Electronic Arts, and a private 
practice attorney from 2007-2008 (Community Gatepath).  
To address these data concerns, I use MCs’ biographies in the Almanac of American 
Politics, a biennial reference book of every MC and congressional district published by the 
National Journal. The Almanac’s biographies are advantageous for several reasons. First, the 
Almanac covers every Congress since 1972, spanning multiple decades and changes in partisan 
control in Congress. Second, these biographies are written by an independent research team and 
                                                 
33 I am not implying that MCs purposefully mislead their constituents, only that the Almanac 
provides a more comprehensive data source for my purposes. 
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should be free from idiosyncratic MC-to-MC bias or temporal shifts in how MCs describe or 
distribute their biographies (addressing questions about the availability of biographies for MCs 
serving in office prior to recorded internet archives). Finally, the Almanac focuses only on MCs’ 
adult career experiences, which matches my definition of career experiences. I begin with the 
101st Congress (1989-1991) to alleviate concerns about the reliability, completeness, and 
availability of other data such as district demographics and campaign finance contributions.  
To code MCs’ career experiences, I read the biography for each of the 838 new MCs that 
served during the 101st-112th Congresses (1989-2012). A sample biographical entry looks like 
the following, for Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) – the representative infamous for shouting “You lie!” 
during President Barack Obama’s first State of the Union Address in January 2009: 
Military Career: Army Reserves, 1972-1975; South Carolina National Guard, 1975-
2003; Elected Office: South Carolina Senate, 1985-2001; Professional Career: 
Practicing attorney, 1972-2001.  
I group career experiences into broad categories, following the example of Fox and 
Lawless (2005), the Congressional Research Service (Manning 2012), and Carnes (2013). These 
categories include: agriculture, business, city official, congressional staff, county official, 
consulting, education, entertainment, federal official, judge, lobbyist, manual work, media, 
medical, military/law enforcement, nonprofit, party official, private attorney, public attorney,  
religious, school board, social worker, state employee, state legislator, sports, union official, 
White House staff, and miscellaneous (airline pilots, substance abuse counselor, childcare 
specialist, gun control activist, etc.).  
Rep. Wilson (R-SC), for example, is coded as having three precongressional career 
experiences: military, state legislative, and private attorney. Because there is broad variation 
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within each of these categories, I recorded as much information on each position as possible, 
allowing me to distinguish – for instance – between local, state, and national party officials or 
private practice attorneys and attorney generals. The full codebook can be found in Appendix A 
at the end of this dissertation. 
Do Order and Length of Experience Matter? 
 I code every single career experience for every single new MC. I do not distinguish new 
MCs’ career experiences based on the order in which they accumulate – first, middle, last, etc. In 
other words, I examine the overall collection of experiences, not their sequence or the length of 
time spent in each career experience. I do not capture these considerations for several reasons.  
First, new MCs point to all of their experiences to identify with constituents. Most new 
MCs have had political experience, but most of their constituents have not. Given this, 
capitalizing on the full range of their experiences (political and nonpolitical) helps MCs to 
strengthen the perceived connections between them and their constituents. For example, Rep. 
Kristi Noem (R-SD) served for four years in the South Dakota House of Representatives before 
being elected to the House. Yet she omits this experience entirely in her official biography, 
where is described as a “wife, mother, experienced rancher, farmer, and former small business 
owner” (noem.house.gov).34 Studying the entirety of MCs’ career experiences captures the 
reality of MCs’ situation as new MCs and how they communicate with their constituents.  
Second, MCs may draw from all of their career experiences. While the last experience 
may be of foremost prominence in their memory, this does not entail that they forget everything 
that came before. In fact, the decisions they made in that penultimate experience were shaped by 
                                                 
34The rest of the statement focused on the lessons learned from her experiences managing the 
family farm and owning a small business. Her state legislative experience is noted in the 




the experiences that came before it (DeFillippi and Arthur 1994). Including all of MCs’ career 
experiences aligns with interdisciplinary discussions of careers, career experiences, and their 
effect on occupational behavior (Arthur 1994, Porfeli and Savickas 2012). Finally, factoring in 
the order or length of the experience is difficult and beyond the scope of the current project. 
However, the decision to study every career experiences points to question for future study, 
which would help clarify whether tenure in a job or its proximity to working in Congress relate 
to MCs’ early congressional behavior.  
What Have MCs Done Before Office? 
 Looking at what new MCs have done before office is where the study of precongressional 
careers gets particularly interesting because the short answer is: a little bit of everything. The 
variation in these experiences is striking. Some MCs have been political, and even presidential, 
appointees. For instance, prior to serving in Congress, Rep. Bobby Jindal (R-LA), a graduate of 
Brown and Oxford Universities, was appointed Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health 
and Hospitals. In 1998, he was appointed the Executive Director of the National Bipartisan 
Commission on the Future of Medicaid and, afterwards, the President of the University of 
Louisiana System. In 2001, President George W. Bush appointed Jindal to be the Assistant 
Secretary for the Department of Health and Human Services. After an unsuccessful run for 
Louisiana governor, Rep. Jindal was successfully elected to the 109th Congress in 2004. (He 
retired after the 110th Congress and won the Louisiana gubernatorial race in 2007) 
[http://gov.louisiana.gov].  
Other new MCs have held prestigious or powerful political positions. For instance, three 
former governors were elected to Congress – Reps. William Janklow (R-SD), Michael Castle (R-
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DE), and Joseph Brennan (D-ME). Rep. Diane Watson (D-CA) served as the ambassador to 
Micronesia. Rep. David Funderbank (R-NC) was the ambassador to Romania.  
Other new MCs have worked outside of politics in education, medicine, agriculture, 
entertainment, and media. Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), for example, was a lecturer at Harvard 
Business School, and Rep. Louis Capps (D-CA) worked at Santa Barbara City College teaching 
early childhood education. In the entertainment business, Rep. David Phelps (R-IL) toured as a 
gospel singer/songwriter, and Rep. Sonny Bono (R-CA) was one half of the famous Sonny and 
Cher duo. Not all new MCs’ nonpolitical experiences have won that that much fame, though. 
Rep. David Curson (D-MI) worked in a Ford factory after serving in the military, and Rep. Bob 
Brady (D-PA) started working as a carpenter after high school graduation. 
In addition, a significant number of MCs have worked for, started, or owned a business – 
ranging from pizza parlors and other restaurants, to insurance agencies, construction companies, 
a winery, an engineering firm, and real estate companies. Some of the more uncommon 
experiences are among the most interesting. Reps. Jim Gibbons (NV), Clyde Holloway (LA), 
and Chip Cravaack (MN) were commercial airline pilots.  After Rep. Jim Ryun (R-KS) won a 
silver medal in track during the 1968 Olympics, he started his own running camp and toured as a 
motivational speaker. (He decided to run for Congress after learning during the 1996 Olympic 
Torch relay that his district would be an open seat in the next election [Fraioli 2014].) And Rep. 
Jeb Bradley (R-NH) was once a street magician in Switzerland before moving back to the East 
Coast and opening a health food store.  
This variety is reassuring, in one sense. There are no explicit occupational requirements 
for serving in Congress. Likewise, true to the intentions of the framers of the constitution, at first 
glance, there appear to be no implicit occupational requirements either. MCs can, and do, get 
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elected to Congress from all walks of life, which helps bolster the representativeness of the 
institution intended to represent the public. 
Popular Career Paths 
At the same time, not all career paths are equally popular routes to Capitol Hill. Table 3.3 
ranks my 28 broad categories of career experience from most to least common.35 State legislative 
experience tops the list, followed by several nonpolitical experiences: business, legal experience, 
military/law enforcement experience, and education. Other common political experiences 
include: city officials – everything from mayors to city administrators, state officials – such as 
agency or gubernatorial staff, and congressional staff.  
It is not surprising to find business experience at the top of the list. It has attracted recent 
attention on the campaign trail, in part, because it provides useful skills and insights for a 
legislative career. These skills range from the general – a sense of vision, a commitment to goal-
driven action, and the ability to find or create new solutions – to the specific: negotiating, 
building coalitions, and articulating arguments to diverse audiences (Carnes 2013, Lawless 
2012). Candidates are not shy about drawing attention to these benefits. During the 2010 and 
2012 elections, political observers noted that, “it may be that candidates with no experience in 
elective office but a strong string of successes in the business world will be the right fit for the 
electorate this fall” (Cillizza 2010, see also Miller 2010). The Republican presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney argued, “For 25 years, I spent my life in business. I only spent four years as a 
                                                 
35 The total number of MCs listed in the table exceeds the total number of new MCs (838), 
because new MCs are counted once for each of their precongressional career experiences. For 
example, MCs with three prior experiences, such as a teacher/state legislator/congressional 
staffer (like Reps. Peter Roskam R-IL, Ray LaHood R-IL, and Laura Richardson D-CA), are 
counted three times in Table 3.3: once in the row for education, once in the row for state 
legislator, and once in the row for congressional staff. 
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governor, and I joke that I didn’t inhale. I’m still a business guy, all right? I know how to lead us 
out of this stagnant Obama economy and into a job-creating recovery” (Purdum 2012).  
Congressional candidates made similar claims. For example, Darcy Burner – a 
Democratic congressional candidate and former Microsoft program manager – focused her 
campaign on a simple message: “I'm a mother and businesswoman who wants to take the country 
in a different direction” (as quoted in Lawless 2012, 133). Joe Carvin, a Republican candidate 
who ran against incumbent Rep. Nita Lowey (D-NY) in the 112th Congress, “touted his business 
experience” as a hedge-fund founder and manager, claiming that “it would help him get 
legislation that would support jobs” (Buss 2012). 
 Business experience is coded for employment in for-profit ventures in the private sector, 
be it corporations, banks, insurance, real estate, etc. Business experience was coded irrespective 
to the positions that MCs held within the company, but many MCs with business experience held 
management or leadership positions. (For example, 98 MCs had been the president, vice-
president, or executive director of a company.) These companies range in size from Fortune 500 
companies to large and small businesses. For example, Rep. Suzan Delbene (D-WA) was the 
former corporate vice president of Microsoft’s mobile communications business and Rep. 
Shelley Berkley (D-NV) was the vice-president of the Sands hotel and casino in Las Vegas, 
Nevada (Almanac of American Politics 2000, delbene.house.gov). In contrast, Rep. Sue Kelly 
(R-NY) was the owner of Sue’s Florist before winning election in the 104th Congress (Almanac 
of American Politics 1996).  
 It is also not particularly surprising to find legal experience near the top of the list. There 
is a historic precedent for lawyers being elected to Congress. From the first Congress, the legal 
profession has been a dominant path to Congress (Derge 1959, Davidson 1969, Miller 1993). 
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Likewise, as I flesh out in later chapters, there are substantive reasons for expecting that legal 
experience may yield unique insights into legislative politics.  
 Educational experience is equally diverse: 37 administrators, 77 college or university 
professors, and 61 other teachers were newly elected to Congress during these years. 
Interestingly, the number of educators elected to Congress has declined over time, from a peak of 
roughly 20% of new MCs in the 103rd and 104th Congresses (1993-1994, 1995-1996) to a low of 
10% of MCs in the 112th Congress (2012-2012). These changes are most likely associated with 
the increasing prominence of business experience as a precongressional career. In 1989, for 
example, 40% of new MCs had business backgrounds. By 2011, 53% of new MCs had business 
experience. These electoral trends suggest that occupational backgrounds, and the claims that 
candidates make about them (“I think a business perspective is a bit of what California needs 
right now”), have particular salience in moments of electoral change (Cillizza 2010).36 For that 
sentiment to be realized, though, MCs from various backgrounds need to act differently in office. 
Political versus Nonpolitical Career Experiences 
There are various ways to study career experiences to assess claims like these. I could 
look at each career experience individually, or group them into broader categories (i.e., manual 
versus skilled labor, white collar versus blue collar jobs, etc.). I do two things. First, I compare 
all MCs with any prior political experience to MCs who enter as political novices (no previous 
political experience of any kind). Second, I look separately at MCs with, and without, political 
experience.  
I consider the broad distinction between politically experienced and amateur MCs 
because scholarly expectations about political experience compete with on-going advocacy for 
                                                 
36 As claimed by congressional candidate Meg Whitman, the former eBay CEO, in a 2010 
campaign ad (Cillizza 2010). 
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citizen legislators. Legislative scholars have argued that political experience increases electoral 
success. MCs with prior experience have better name recognition among voters (Abramowitz 
1991). They can use their previous offices to build up their electoral constituency, as do 
representatives running for the Senate and state legislators running for the House (Hibbing 1986, 
Maestas 2005). Candidates with political experience may also be familiar to party leaders and 
campaign donors, having their own donor rolls or previously interacted with key leaders in the 
state (Heberlig and Larson 2012). 
In addition, politically experienced congressional candidates are more strategic in the 
decisions they make about when to run for higher office (Lazarus 2008). Having previously won 
elections, they are better at assessing when conditions are favorable to success. They are also 
more stalwart and savvy campaigners and fundraisers, so they have larger ‘war chests’ with 
which to fund their election activities (Goodliffe 2001). Finally, experienced candidates are more 
risk averse than political amateurs (Jacobson 1987). Because MCs cannot hold another political 
office while serving in Congress, running for office means giving up the known security of their 
current position for the unknown risks of a lengthy, expensive, and public campaign – with 
potentially negative reputational consequences if they lose. If precongressional political 
experience shapes the probability that individuals get elected to Congress, it is not unreasonable 
to think that the insights and skills acquired in those past experiences carry over past Election 
Day, too. 
The flip side of this argument is that political experience is an undesirable quality in 
representatives. This argument emerged in response to the public’s plummeting perception of, 
and trust in, legislative representatives. The fear was that legislators’ quest for reelection led 
them to “ignore their duties as representatives of the people” (Constitution of the State of 
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Arkansas). Reformers’ proposed solution was to elect citizen legislators, those with no prior 
political experience or no desire for a continued congressional career (Herrick and Fisher 
2007).37 The logic behind this solution was that citizen legislators, who would come into office 
directly from their experiences as private citizens, would be more responsive to constituent 
interests and thus more immune to other influences (Armor 1994). In addition, lacking personal 
political experience, political amateurs would be forced to draw directly on their private 
experiences when making decisions in office. As a result, they could better understand 
constituent preferences and craft legislation for the ‘average’ American.  
 In short, reformers’ hope was that installing term limits would interrupt the link between 
legislative behavior and reelection in order to give renewed meaning to the idea of representation 
by the people for the people. As summarized by Rep. Allen West (R-FL), a political amateur 
elected to the 112th Congress, political amateurs (or citizen legislators) embodied “what the 
founders intended: They wanted people of various walks of life to serve and then come back 
home and live under the laws they created” (Steinhauer 2010). 
At the state level, the move to implement term limits levelled off in the late 1990s, when 
Massachusetts became the first state to repeal its state legislative term limits (National Council 
for State Legislatures 2013).38 Nonetheless, being a ‘citizen legislators’ is still trumpeted as an 
ideal qualification for MCs. According to a spokesperson for the National Republican 
Congressional Committee, the election of political amateurs is evidence that “Americans had 
                                                 
37 The term limit movement had the greatest support at the state level. At one point, twenty-one 
states implemented limits on their state legislatures (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming). In 1995, 
the Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the Arkansas state constitution that would have 
limited the number of terms of MCs in the case U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton. 
38 Washington followed suit in 1998, Idaho and Oregon in 2002, Utah in 2003, and Wyoming in 
2004 (National Council for State Legislatures 2013). 
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clearly had it with sending the same politicians to Washington and getting the same old 
results…Their lack of political experience was and is their best asset” (Steinhauer 2010).  
This claim has only seemingly grown in popularity with the rise of the Tea Party 
movement. For example, after announcing his intention to seek an open Senate seat, Rep. Paul 
Broun (R-GA) was praised by the Madison Project, a political organization that seeks to help 
elect Tea Party candidates, as 
“a doctor, solider, citizen legislator, and proven constitutional warrior. He has 
been inviolable...[not succumbing] to the establishment meat grinder in D.C. 
Broun is the consummate constitutional champion who puts people and principles 
before politics. That is why his leadership is needed in the United States Senate, 
which is full of governing-class elites from both parties” (Cahn 2014). 
Likewise, the push to disassociate oneself from a ‘career politicians’ led former presidential aide 
Matt Miller (D-CA) to announce his candidacy in similar terms: 
  “I’m a proud Democrat; but too often, politicians in both parties care more about  
winning elections than solving problems. We have to tackle huge 
challenges…Getting serious about these challenges means embracing bold ideas 
– the kind of fresh thinking we aren’t likely to get from career politicians. I’m 
running for Congress because it’s time to expect more” (Cahn 2014). 
Defining Political Experience 
To explore these contrasting claims, I code a MC as having political experience if s/he 
held positions that dealt specifically with political issues, including: city/county/state/federal 
officials, state legislators, governors, attorneys or judges, congressional or White House staff, 
and party officials (local, state, or national). In my sample, MCs acquired political experience at 
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all levels of government (local, state, federal) and in all branches of government (executive, 
legislative, and judicial). These positions were elected (like governors or state legislators), 
appointed (like cabinet officials), and meritocratic (like state bureaucrats and legislative staff). I 
include all of these experiences, and any combination thereof, under the broad umbrella of 
political experience. 682 of the 838 new MCs I examine had at least one prior political 
experience.39 I use the term political amateurs to describe the 156 MCs without any 
precongressional political experience.40  
Because MCs can acquire legal experience in both the private and public sectors, there is 
enormous variation in what constitutes ‘legal experience’. For example, Rep. Roger Wicker (R-
MS) was a U.S. air force judge advocate, whereas Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) served as a 
municipal court judge, and 2012 Republican presidential contender Rep. Rick Santorum (R-PA) 
worked for a private law firm. I distinguish between political and nonpolitical judicial 
experience. MCs with political judicial experience have worked in public office or for the public 
sector as judges (city, county, state, federal) or attorneys (again, city, county, state, and federal). 
Legal experience in the private sector, such as corporate, tax, patent, or private practice lawyers, 
is coded as nonpolitical experience.  
Far and away, legislative experience is the most common political experience. Half of 
new MCs (416 of 838) come from the state legislature, giving renewed emphasis to the idea of 
                                                 
39 Those with only political experience are ‘career politicians’ in the truest sense. Of the 682 
politically experienced MCs, 73 (11%) held only political positions prior to Congress. Infamous 
Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-NY) is one example. Before serving in Congress, Rep. Weiner worked 
as a staffer for Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY) and was elected a member of the New York City 
Council.  
40 To-date, the Almanac remains the most comprehensive and consistent source of data on career 
experiences. When in doubt, I double checked the Almanac’s biographical information against 
the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Congress’ online repository of official 
member biographies.  
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state legislatures as legislative apprenticeships or training grounds for higher office (Berkmann 
1993, 1994). The majority of this experience (288 of 416 former state legislators, 70%) occurred 
in legislatures that were less professionalized, i.e. bearing less resemblance to Congress in terms 
of session length, salary, and staff support (Squire 2007). A professionalized legislature is the 
most similar to Congress: members serve full time, meet regularly for extended sessions, are paid 
a competitive salary, and have legislative staff.41 I code the professionalism of the state 
legislature using Squire’s (2007) index of professionalization.42  
In general, state lawmakers served an average of nine years in the state capitol. Rep. 
David Scott (D-GA) had the longest tenure, twenty-eight years. In contrast, Rep. Laura 
Richardson (D-CA) served less than a full year in the California House of Representatives before 
winning a special election to fill the seat held by the late Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-
CA). Like Rep. Richardson, most former state legislators (316 of 416, 76%) used their legislative 
seats as a platform for a congressional bid. Many, like Illinois state senator Debbie Halvorson, 
drew directly on their state legislative experience to emphasize their qualification for the House. 
In a tight race for an open seat against a political amateur, Rep. Halvorson, “highlighted her 
years in the Senate, where she sponsored legislation aimed at cutting prescription drug costs for 
seniors and advocated for affordable health care for small-business owners” (Roll Call 2008). 
State legislators who took time off before Congress only did so for an average of less than one 
                                                 
41 128 former state legislators worked in the professionalized legislatures of California, 
Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin. 
42 This index is created by comparing congressional and state indicators of legislative salary, 
session (average days in session), and staffing (staff to member ratio); a score of 1 denotes 
perfect resemblance, and a score of 0 denotes no resemblance at all. Legislative professionalism 
scores are available for 1979, 1986, 1990, and 2003. For each former state legislator, I average 
the professionalism of the legislature over the years they were in office (if those years crossed 
the periods from 1979-1985, 1986-1989, 1990-2002, 2003-present). 
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year, although there was a twenty-five year gap for Rep. William Jenkins (R-TN) – during which 
he worked as a policy advisor to the governor, board member of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
and state circuit court judge. 
 Other types of legislative experience are common, too. For instance, 96 former 
congressional staffers won election to their own seat in Congress. Congressional candidates 
contend that staff experience gives them an electoral advantage. For instance, Rep. Bill Huizenga 
(R-MI) worked as Rep. Peter Hoekstra’s (R-MI) district policy director from 1996-2002 before 
deciding to run for office himself. He started in the Michigan legislature and, in 2010, won the 
seat held by his former boss. As he explained: 
"My job was literally to be his [Rep. Hoekstra’s] eyes and ears. And it was a 
huge advantage in the campaign because we were going into some of these 
small towns, and my opponents had never been there before, but I had. ... I 
knew asparagus was important, I knew particular manufacturing issues were 
important. ... I knew them" (Dumain and Estepa 2011). 
In addition, 27 MCs worked as state legislative staffers, 68 MCs had been county legislators, and 
118 had been city legislators.  
Both executive and judicial experiences are common as well: 57 former mayors, 23 MCs 
with county executive or administrative experience, 3 former governors, 23 lieutenant governors 
or gubernatorial staff, 86 state bureaucrats, and 33 federal and cabinet level officials were elected 
to Congress from 1989-2012. The exact experiences included in these categories are quite varied 
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– from working for the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and Small Business Administration to the 
Departments of State, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Interior, to name a few.43  
Also during this time period, 28 former judges (from the city, county, state, and federal 
courts), and 139 public attorneys – 41 of whom worked at the federal level – were elected. 
Finally, 91 MCs enter Congress with prior partisan experience in addition to legislative, 
executive, and judicial experience. In general, this experience was with state or county party 
organizations, although some MCs worked for national party organizations. For instance, Rep. 
Tom Cole (R-OK) was the executive director of the National Republican Congressional 
Committee from 1991-1995 prior to his election to the 108th Congress in 2002. Likewise, future 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) served as the Finance Chair for the Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee from 1985-1986. 
Number and Combinations of Career Experiences 
 Looking at the frequency of career experiences in the aggregate tells nothing about how 
they play out on the individual level, my primary unit of analysis. Just like the types of career 
experiences, I find far-reaching differences in the number and combinations of MCs’ 
experiences. Rep. Nick Smith (R-MI), introduced at the opening of chapter one, is the paradigm 
of career diversity, having nine career experiences before Congress.44 But not all MCs have such 
                                                 
43 Positions within these offices varied, too. For instance, Rep. Harold Ford Jr. (D-TN) worked as 
a special assistant at the Department of Commerce whereas Rep. Joe Sestak (R-PA), a three star 
Admiral, was the Director of Defense Policy for the National Security Council (joesestak.com). 
44 Rep. Lynn Schenk (D-CA) also had numerous experiences. After completing graduate work at 
the London School of Economics, but before winning election to the 103rd Congress, Rep. 
Schenk worked as a Californian deputy attorney general, an attorney for the San Diego Gas and 
Electric Company, a special assistant to vice presidents Nelson Rockefeller and Walter Mondale, 
a deputy secretary and secretary of the California State Department of Business, Transportation 
and Housing, a private attorney, the state co-chair for Michael Dukakis’ presidential campaign, 
and – finally – the commissioner and vice chair of the San Diego unified port district 
(Biographical Directory of the United States Congress).  
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prolific precongressional careers. For instance, after earning a Ph.D. in political science from the 
University of California, Davis, Rep. Dave Loebsack (D-IA) moved back to his home state, 
Iowa, to teach at Cornell College (in Mount Vernon, Iowa). He taught there until winning 
election to Congress in 2007 (loebsack.house.gov/biography). 
 On average, new MCs from 1989-2012 had three career experiences before office; the 
distribution of number of career experiences is found in Table 3.4. 68 MCs had one only career 
before Congress (19 business men/women, 12 lawyers, 11 state legislators, 5 educators, 5 
doctors, 4 military/law enforcement officers, 4 media, 2 congressional staffers, and a handful of 
others – like former NFL quarterback Rep. Heath Shuler, D-NC). Only 13% of all new MCs 
have had 5 or more career experiences. 
 In Table 3.5, I show which nonpolitical experiences are the most common for MCs with 
prior political experience. Business and legal experience top the list, followed by service in the 
military and education. I compare combinations of experiences across different levels (local, 
state, federal) and branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial – I also include 
partisan, for the sake of reference) in Table 3.6.45 Five MCs had legislative, executive, judicial, 
and partisan experience.46  
 
 
                                                 
45 To be clear, I do not distinguish along these lines in the chapters to follow, but note them here 
to outline the general patterns that emerge from MCs’ precongressional career experiences. 
46 One of these was Rep. Pat Danner (D-MO). After graduating from Northeast Missouri State 
University in 1972, she was the vice chair of Ninth Congressional District Democratic 
Committee of northeast Missouri and the chair of Macon County Democratic Committee for two 
years. From 1973-1976, she was the district assistant to Rep. Jerry Litton, and was appointed by 
President Jimmy Carter to be to the Ozarks Regional Commission federal co-chair. She held this 
position for 4 years before being elected a state senator in 1983, after which she won election to 




Other Characteristics of New MCs and Their Relation to Career Experiences 
Of course, MCs vary; simply looking at a picture of each incoming cohort drives home 
that point. Studies of legislative behavior and outcomes take these factors into consideration, 
examining characteristics like education, social class, race, age, gender, and party affiliation on 
how MCs vote, and what policy positions they take (Matthews 1960, Frantzich 1979, Burden 
2007, Carnes 2013). Table 3.7 compares MCs with different career experiences based on: party 
affiliation, gender, race, percent of the two-party vote share, ideological distance from party 
mean, number of career experiences, and district characteristics.  
As expected, the MCs who take different career paths vary on other dimensions. 
Interestingly, this variation appears to be associated with career decisions. For example, a greater 
percent of doctors and farmers are Republican than Democrat. But there is an approximately 
equal number of MCs with state legislative, gubernatorial, and legal experience by party 
affiliation. To take another example, there were only two women with military or law 
enforcement backgrounds elected to Congress during these years: Rep. Sandy Adams (R-FL) – 
an investigator in the Orange County Sherriff’s Office, and Rep. Heather Wilson (NM) – an Air 
Force veteran who attended the United States Air Force Academy. But 17% of doctors were 
female, as were 19% of state legislators and 19% of MCs who had worked with/for state 
governors.  
There are patterns in the types of districts that elect MCs with different career 
experiences as well. For instance, MCs with business backgrounds represent districts that have 
fewer residents living at or below the poverty level. Not surprisingly, the districts represented by 
MCs with agricultural experience also stand out. They are more rural, for one. On average, 
across all congressional districts, about 22% of district residents live in rural areas. This 
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increases to 36% for the districts that elect agriculturally experienced MCs. These districts are 
also whiter (80% of residents are white versus the national district average of 69%).  
Conclusion 
In light of the responsiveness of MCs to constituent concerns and interests, the 
demographic backgrounds of MCs’ districts should shape their congressional decision-making. 
As the next three chapters demonstrate, though, the effect of career experiences on legislative 
behavior is robust to these (and a variety of other) considerations. In fact, in regression analyses 
that take into account the considerations listed in Table 3.7, I find that career experiences are 
strongly related to new MCs’ congressional behavior – the mix of legislative and outreach 
activities they undertake, the topics they take up in office, and how they interact with copartisans 
on the House floor. 
The framers of the constitution specifically avoided occupational requirements for 
serving in office.47 As a result, MCs hold a variety of different jobs before office, from 
carpenters, to teachers, doctors, and state politicians. In the following chapters, I demonstrate 
that these experiences do connect to the decisions that new MCs make in office, influencing the 






                                                 
47 This does not mean that they were ambivalent about who would serve in office, though. As 
Carnes (2013) notes, in the Federalist Papers No. 35, Alexander Hamilton proposed that a 
government staffed by men of business and professional careers was “natural.” Hamilton 
believed the working class preferred to be represented by such professionals (Carnes 2013, 138).  
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101 1989-1990 48 47 95 Democrat Democrat Republican 
102 1991-1992 49 42 91 Democrat Democrat Republican 
103 1993-1994 115 44 159 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
104 1995-1996 93 93 186 Republican Republican Democrat 
105 1997-1998 80 73 153 Republican Republican Democrat 
106 1999-2000 48 71 119 Republican Republican Democrat 
107 2001-2002 48 47 95 Republican Republican Republican 
108 2003-2004 58 45 103 Republican Republican Republican 
109 2005-2006 42 49 91 Republican Republican Republican 
110 2007-2008 64 39 103 Democrat Democrat Republican 
111 2009-2010 71 51 122 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
112 2011-2012 99 42 141 Republican Democrat Democrat 






Table 3.2 Gender, Racial, and Educational Differences Among 
New MCs, 101st-112th Congresses (1989-2012) 
 # New MCs % of Total MCs 
Men 705 84% 
Women 133 16% 
Minorities 100 12% 
Less than College Degree 67 8% 
College Degree Only 232 28% 
Post-College Degrees 539 64% 










Table 3.3 The Variety of New MCs’ Precongressional Career Experiences 
Career Experience # MCs  Career Experience # MCs  
State legislator 416 Consultant 37 
Business 366 Media 35 
City official 307 School board 34 
Legal 272 Federal official 33 
Military/law enforcement 203 Judge 28 
Education 154 White House staff 24 
State employee 132 Lobbyist 18 
Congressional staff 96 Sports 10 
Party official 91 Manual work 9 
County official 88 Miscellaneous 8 
Public attorney 83 Entertainment 7 
Nonprofit 71 Religious official 7 
Medical 46 Social worker 7 
Agriculture 39 Union official 7 
Note: A MC may be counted multiple times in the table if s/he had multiple career experiences. 
On average, new MCs in the 101st-112th Congresses had 3 precongressional career experiences. 
68 MCs had only 1 precongressional career experiences, and Rep. Nick Smith (R-MI) had the 
most with 9 precongressional career experiences. Only 114 new MCs had 5 or more career 
experiences. See Table 3.4. for the distribution of MCs by number of precongressional career 
experiences. 























Table 3.4 Distribution of Career Experiences  







1 68 8% 
2 227 27% 
3 246 29% 
4 182 22% 
5 66 8% 
6 34 4% 
7 11 1% 
8 2 0.2% 
9 1 0.1% 
Source: Almanac of American Politics 
 
 











Note: The total does not sum to the total number of MCs with any political experience (682) 
because new MCs may have multiple types of nonpolitical precongressional career experiences.  
















Table 3.6 Variation in Political Career Experiences By 
Level and Branch of Government 
Experience at Levels of Government # MCs 
State experience only 221 
Local and state experience 174 
Local experience only 84 
State and federal experience 62 
Local, state, federal experience 60 
Federal experience only 56 
Local and federal experience  25 
Experience in Branches of Government # MCs 
Legislative only 266 
Legislative and executive 185 
Executive only 53 
Legislative and partisan 32 
Judicial only 29 
Legislative and judicial 27 
Legislative, executive, and partisan 25 
Legislative, executive, and judicial 16 
Executive and judicial 15 
Partisan only 13 
Executive and partisan 8 
Legislative, executive, partisan, and judicial 5 
Executive, partisan, and judicial 4 
Partisan and judicial 3 
Partisan, judicial, and legislative 1 
Note: Local experience includes local administrative officials, city legislators, majors and other 
city officials, county officials, city and county judges and attorneys, local party officials, and 
school board officials. State experience includes state legislators, judges, attorneys, party 
officials, and other state officials (department, legislative, and gubernatorial staff). Federal 
experience includes FBI and CIA agents, executive agency officials, federal judges and 
attorneys, national party delegates, campaign party officials, national party officials, 
congressional staff, and White House staff. Legislative experience includes city and county 
legislators, state legislative staff, state legislators, and congressional staff. Executive experience 
includes local administrative officials, mayors, and other city officials, county executive and 
administrative staff, school board members, gubernatorial and state agency staff, executive 
agency officials, FBI and CIA agents, and White House staff. Judicial experience includes city, 
county, state, and federal judges and attorneys.  Partisan experience includes local, county, state, 
national, and campaign staff or officials, as well as delegates to the national party conventions. 





Table 3.7 Comparison of Individual and District Characteristics by Precongressional Experience 
 
State 
Legislators Cong. Staff Gubernatorial Legal Business Medicine 
% Democrat 47% 51% 50% 51% 34% 30% 
% Republican 53% 49% 50% 49% 66% 70% 
% Female 19% 18% 19% 10% 14% 17% 
% White 87% 90% 88% 88% 93% 93% 
Vote Share 65% 65% 61% 65% 62% 62% 
Ideo. Distance  0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.2 
# Experiences 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.2 3.4 3.1 
% Poverty  12.30% 12.90% 14% 12.20% 12.00% 13.30% 
% White 69.40% 66.80% 68.40% 68.80% 72.30% 73.20% 
% Rural  21.80% 12.60% 29.60% 22.10% 24.80% 30.60% 
% Veterans  14.90% 15.10% 15.40% 14.60% 14.80% 14.80% 
Note: MCs may be included in the calculations for multiple columns, if they had multiple 
precongressional career experiences.  
Source: Almanac of American Politics 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Variation in Number of New MCs by Congress (1989-2012) 
 

























Chapter 4: Deciding What to Do As A New Member of Congress  
 
Blake Farenthold’s (R-TX) election to Congress in 2010 was surprising in many respects. 
When Farenthold entered the race the day before the deadline, he text messaged his wife Debbie 
that he had flown to Austin, Texas, ‘to file’. Not understanding what he was filing, she “went 
into a panic,” and wanted to know why he had to fly to Austin to file for divorce (Steinhauer 
2010). Farenthold’s last-minute candidacy surprised political observers as well. He was a staunch 
conservative with disparate career experiences – founder of a computer and web-design 
consulting company, partner at a law firm, cohost of a radio talk show program – but had never 
held political office. In contrast, the sitting incumbent, Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), won his first 
political race in 1965 (when Farenthold was four years old) and had represented the heavily 
Hispanic district since it was created in 1982. Despite Rep. Ortiz’s seniority and Farenthold’s 
inexperience, Farenthold won the election. When he heard that he had won, Farenthold told a 
local news station, “Early on in the race, I had a nightmare that I won…it's like, ‘Now what do I 
do?’” (McCormack 2011). 
That sentiment did not go away once Rep. Farenthold arrived on Capitol Hill. As 
described by a journalist observing the freshmen class in the 112th Congress, a month passed 
before Rep. Farenthold had set up his House website, frustrated by having to choose from the 
officially-approved options when his “former company could’ve done the job for half that” 
(Draper 2012, 93). It was several months into his first session before he hired a legislative 
director – “it sounded to him like a middle management job” –or a communications director – 
“he’d been an attorney and a radio talk show host, after all. No one had to coach him on how to 
communicate” (Draper 2012, 92). At the same time, he prioritized traveling to the district where 
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he had significant ties, publicizing his intention “to be in South Texas as much as possible” and 
returning on a weekly basis (Farenthold 2011). 
Career Experiences and Variation in Legislative Behavior 
Rep. Farenthold faced many choices about how to devote his time, energy, and resources 
in office, as is true of any new MC. One thing that makes Rep. Farenthold a notable example is 
that his actions strongly suggest that these choices were informed by his previous experiences. In 
this chapter, I contend that this is a broader phenomenon; MCs from different career 
backgrounds pursue different mixes of legislative and outreach activities in their early terms. By 
legislative activities, I mean the actions that center on passing bills into law, like crafting 
legislative proposals or supporting (cosponsoring) other MCs’ bills (Frantzich 1979, Hall 1996, 
Matthews 1960, Payne 1980, Wawro 2000). I also include MCs’ legislative effectiveness (the 
proportion of bills introduced by an MC that become law each Congress) and the types of bills 
they introduce (symbolic versus otherwise) to probe the substantive implications of these 
legislative decisions. By outreach decisions, I am referring to decisions outside of the legislative 
realm that help MCs build relationships with voters, such as spending time in the district, 
dedicating staff-power to district offices, or paying for publicity campaigns.48 
New MCs differ greatly in their choices about how to allocate their time and effort. Table 
4.1 shows this variation. Some MCs never introduce or cosponsor a single bill during either their 
first or second term, while others introduce over 60 bills and cosponsor over 800 bills.49 
                                                 
48 Of course, legislative decisions are a form of ‘constituent outreach’ as well, and all of these 
activities are intended to help MCs secure reelection (Mayhew 1974). I refer to them separately 
for the sake of clarity. 
49 Rep. Joe Sestak (D-PA) introduced 62 bills in the 111th Congress. Reps. Suzan DelBene (D-
WA), Dan Coats (R-IN), and Mel Reynolds (D- IL) each had a term where they did not 
cosponsor a single bill. In contrast, Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA) cosponsored 838 bills during 
the 102nd Congress. 
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Likewise, during the 104th-108th Congresses, new MCs spent anywhere from $1,700- $279,000 
on district travel and $0-$330,000 on constituent mailings, and vary the staff support for their 
district versus D.C. offices (Parker and Goodman 2009, Young 2006).  
Outlining Expectations about Career-Activity Connections 
As I explained in chapter two, I expect that these decisions may be informed by MCs’ 
previous career experiences. For example, new MCs may choose to engage in activities that are 
familiar from their jobs before Congress, leading them to divvy up their effort and attention in 
distinct ways.50 I make three basic comparisons about MCs’ legislative and constituent outreach 
activities.  
First, I compare MCs with political experience to those without it. I hypothesize that 
experienced MCs undertake more legislative activities and do so more successfully because they 
have sharper political and policy insights. Second, I unpack these comparisons further by taking 
a closer look at political amateurs. I explore how nonpolitical experiences shape congressional 
behavior by concentrating on two common experiences: legal and business experience. I 
anticipate that amateurs legal experience have increased legislative activity, given similarities 
between legal practice and training and legislating which may familiarize and prepare political 
amateurs for legislative activity. I also discuss why or why not political amateurs from diverse 
backgrounds, such as business, would reach out to constituents differently.   
Third, I examine politically experienced MCs and how prior political experiences equip 
them for congressional office. I hypothesize that both executive and legislative experience 
                                                 
50 As I noted in the first chapter, I cannot test whether this relationship is causal. It may be that 
individuals with certain skills or interests choose careers that reinforce these traits, thus leading 
to distinct patterns of behavior. Either way, careers are good markers for how new MCs act in 
their early terms. In addition, these cues are often used by candidates to describe their purported 
activities and they are easily accessible to voters. Both of these considerations increase the 
importance of understanding differences in behavior by MCs from different career paths. 
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familiarize new MCs with policy topics and processes, so that they are more legislatively active 
compared to other MCs with political experience. I anticipate that MCs from legislative and/or 
executive backgrounds also work on legislation that proposes larger changes to the law as the 
result of their first-hand experience with salient public policies. Because these bills are more 
likely to face resistance in being enacted, I expect that MCs with legislative and/or executive 
experience are less likely to see their bills become law relative to other experienced politicians.  
Why These Activities? 
I examine the mix and the volume of legislative and outreach activities because they have 
implications for congressional outputs and representation and because they generally are left to 
MCs’ individual discretion. These activities are substantively meaningful. By taking up 
legislative work, MCs demonstrate responsiveness to district interests, denote empathy with 
constituents, and indicate follow-through on campaign promises (Arnold 1990, Mayhew 1974). 
In the aggregate, these decisions alter public policy. Similarly, by putting their energy and effort 
into constituent outreach activities, MCs increase the ability of citizens to access the political 
system and the ability of the MCs her/himself to identify constituent concerns (Bianco 1994, 
Fenno 1978).51 These activities lie at the heart of representation, particularly as it is viewed from 
MCs’ perspective.52  
By concentrating on these legislative and outreach activities, I capture prominent ways 
that MCs act on behalf of, and build rapport with, constituents. If MCs approach these decisions 
                                                 
51 These decisions have taken on symbolic significance. In recent Congresses, MCs have reduced 
their total expenditures in protest of government spending and in acknowledgement of the 
fiscally conservative sentiment that propelled them to office (Draper 2012, Dumain 2012).  
52 This is what political scientist Richard Fenno describes as: “The view over the congressman’s 
shoulder: nearly everything he does to win and hold support – allocating, reaching, presenting, 
responding, communicating, explaining, assuring – involves representation. It is a view of 
representation as a process. It is a view of representation as politics, with all of the uncertainties 
of politics” (Fenno 1978, 240). 
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differently because of their precongressional experiences, then the extent to which voters’ policy 
concerns are incorporated into the policy process varies systematically across congressional 
districts. The same is true of how easily constituents can access and monitor their 
representatives: it depends on how often MCs return to the district and communicate with 
constituents. If this differs based on their past experiences, then who voters elect to represent 
them shapes how they are represented in Congress. My insights into these decisions allow 
scholars and citizens to better assess arguments made about the role of experience in Congress. 
MCs are not told by party leaders or other colleagues exactly how often they must travel 
to their district or how many bills they need to sponsor or cosponsor. This element of discretion 
is important for understanding why I concentrate on legislative and outreach activities like those 
found in Table 4.1 to the exclusion of others like committee requests, assignments, and transfers, 
working behind the scenes to build legislative coalitions, attaining leadership positions, etc. 
(Clapp 1963).53 These other considerations result from the judgments, decisions, and perceptions 
of other political actors. For example, while new MCs request assignment to certain committees, 
the assignments they receive are ultimately the result of party leaders’ decisions.54 Hence, I focus 
on the tangible and independent decisions that new MCs make to provide a firm understanding 
of how these experiences shape the decision-making of individual MCs. 
                                                 
53 Later, I look at the type of bills that MCs introduce (based on the extent of changes to existing 
law) and whether their introduced bills become law. These other activities are certainly 
important, and have been the subject of prior attention (for instance, see Fenno 1973, Frisch and 
Kelly 2006, Smith and Deering 1984, Wawro 2000).  
54 I do not look at MCs’ committee assignments because these may not be sincere. An MC’s true 
committee assignment preferences may differ from her/his expressed preferences if s/he believes 
that s/he has little to no chance getting assigned to her/his top committee of choice. In this 
scenario, an MC may request a second or third place preference instead, which could weaken the 
connection between career experiences and MC decision-making. 
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Although my primary focus is on MCs’ individual decision-making, I also examine 
legislative effectiveness, the proportion of MCs’ bills that become public law each Congress. 
Although a variety of other factors and considerations outside of MCs’ control affect the fate of 
their legislation, understanding how precongressional career experiences play a role helps to 
interpret the relationship of these experiences to policy outcomes. 55 In sum, I balance my focus 
on the individual legislative and constituent outreach activities that reside squarely under MCs’ 
control with a broader consideration of the long-term and aggregate effect these decisions have 
on policy outcomes. 
Political versus Nonpolitical Experiences 
To explore connections between precongressional careers and congressional behavior, I 
begin with a broad and basic comparison: MCs with political experience prior to Congress versus 
political amateurs. A variety of arguments, positive and negative, describe the purported effect of 
political experience, from an advantage at the polls, to a head-start in fundraising, to the policy 
positions adopted by MCs (Robeck 1982, Canon 1990, Abramowitz 1991, Lazarus 2008, Bielat 
2012). Nevertheless, it has been less clear how and why political experience contributes to the 
ways that new MCs allocate scarce resources like time, energy, and finances.  
Increased Volume of Legislative Activity for Politically Experienced MCs Versus Amateurs 
There are reasons to expect that political career experiences shape the volume of MCs’ 
legislative activity. Congressional districts overlap other political constituencies: federal, state, 
                                                 
55 Legislative effectiveness is influenced by the macro-political environment (e.g., policy 
windows and the public mood), the internal politics of each chamber (e.g., the decision-making 
and politics of congressional committees, the strategies and priorities of party leaders), as well as 
inter- and intrabranch relations – the decisions of the other chamber and president (Anderson et 
al. 2003, Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, Frantzich 1979, Hall 1992, Jeydel and Taylor 2003, 




and local; legislative, executive, and judicial (Schlesinger 1966). As a result, individuals with 
political experience are likely to become familiar with how the public articulates political 
concerns and wants political officials to respond (Fenno 1978). They also gain familiarity with 
policy issues and institutions, learning how political institutions work and how to operate within 
them (Matthews 1960, Frantzich 1979). Insights into policy issues, political institutions, and 
constituent preferences help MCs overcome the learning curve involved with legislative activity. 
I expect that this leads to a greater willingness to participate in the legislative process or 
‘shoulder’ their share of the congressional workload (Matthews 1960, Payne 1980).  Three 
hypotheses result. 
First, I hypothesize that MCs with prior political experience introduce a greater volume 
of legislation than amateurs. Experienced MCs can learn policy ideas from previous political 
initiatives. Likewise, their experience provides insights into, and familiarity with, what the public 
expects of MCs. As a result, I anticipate that experienced MCs introduce a greater volume of 
bills than political amateurs.  
Second, if MCs with prior political experience have a greater familiarity with public 
concerns and the political processes, then they may start their time in Congress more adept at 
crafting legislation that eventually becomes law. These MCs may be more likely to introduce 
bills that tap salient public preferences or be more knowledgeable about how to navigate their 
bills through the legislative process. I anticipate that MCs with political experience introduce a 
higher proportion of bills that are passed into public laws than political amateurs (Anderson et al. 
2003, Frantzich 1979, Jeydel and Taylor 2003, Volden and Wiseman forthcoming). 
Third, I expect that MCs with political experience cosponsor a greater number of bills 
than political amateurs. Seasoned politicians know what it is like to allocate limited resources 
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(like time or effort) to tend to a much less limited demand for government action. As a result, 
MCs with political experience grasp how cosponsorship publicly acknowledges constituent 
concerns while conserving scarce resources. Also, I anticipate that politically experienced MCs 
are familiar with the benefits of collaboration and coalition building – characteristic of 
cosponsorship – having collaborated with others in the past. 
Comparing Legislative Activity of MCs with and without Prior Political Experience 
In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, I split new MCs into two groups by prior political experience and 
compare the number of bills per Congress that they introduce and cosponsor, as well as the 
proportion of bills that become public law (her/his ‘hit rate’, shown in Figure 4.2).56 For 
instance, if a MC introduced 10 bills in one Congress, her ‘hit rate’ would be .50 if 5 bills 
eventually became law, 0.00 if no bills became law, and 1.00 if all 10 bills were passed into law.  
Looking at the panel on the left, the basic pattern fits with my expectation that 
experienced MCs introduce more bills than amateurs, but there is no significant difference in the 
volume of introductions. As I hypothesized, experienced MCs cosponsor more bills than MCs 
without political experience (t=-3.76, p=.00). In Figure 4.2, only the smallest (and 
nonsignificant) differences emerge regarding the proportion of bills that become public laws (.09 
for amateurs versus .10 for experienced MCs). In general, new MCs with prior experience are 
not more successful than political amateurs at introducing bills that become law.  
 
                                                 
56 Volden and Wiseman (2009, forthcoming) use a more encompassing measure of legislative 
effectiveness that takes into consideration differences in both the types of bills MCs introduce 
(i.e. the extent of changes made to existing law) and how far they progress in the legislative 
process (i.e., referred to committee, receives action in committee, receives action beyond the 
committee stage, etc.). This measure exceeds the degree of specificity I need. I rely on the more 




Constituent Outreach: Differences in Staff Allocations 
In addition to legislating, new MCs also have incentives to build up their electoral 
support in the district (Fenno 1978). This is true of both politically experienced and previously 
inexperienced MCs, whether they do so by traveling to the district, placing more staff in district 
offices, or beefing up their mailing to constituents. All new MCs value the electoral connection. 
As a result, I expect the strongest difference to emerge on district staffing. The reason relates to 
the casework activities that district staffers undertake – helping constituents solve problems they 
encounter with bureaucracies or other government bodies (such as processing an application or 
getting a social security payment). [Cain et al.  1987, Fiorina 1977, Serra and Cover 1982].  
Successfully resolving casework problems requires knowledge of the political system and 
skill in navigating local, state, and federal bureaucracies. I anticipate that politically experienced 
MCs have more practice with these tasks than political amateurs. For example, in his first term, 
Rep. Blake Farenthold (R-TX) – the lawyer/talk show host discussed at the introduction to this 
chapter – tried to assist a business in his district that was seeking to expand production to China. 
Although he described himself as eager “to get to work for the people of the 27th District,” Rep. 
Farenthold also was candid about “how difficult it is to get things done in Washington” (Gomez 
2011, Miller 2010). “Unable to make progress” with helping the business, Rep. Farenthold 
openly admitted that he had entered office “with the youthful vigor that I could single-handily 
change the world. But you fast come to the realization that you are 1/435th of one-half of one-
third of the government” (Gomez 2011).  
Compared to MCs with political experience before Congress, amateurs like Rep. 
Farenthold face barriers to addressing casework problems. Lacking the same knowledge and 
contacts of experienced MCs, they need more help in navigating the bureaucracies or agencies 
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with which constituents are having problems. This implicates the number of staffers that 
amateurs send to their district offices.57 In addition, in light of amateurs’ greater unfamiliarity 
with the policy process and barriers to casework, amateurs may have a greater desire to invest 
resources and effort in constituent casework. Again, this may lead them to increase their district 
staff. Finally, if experienced MCs are more comfortable with constituency service and more 
active in the legislative process (as I anticipate), then they may not place as many staffers in their 
district offices. For these reasons, I hypothesize that amateurs, on average, devote a greater 
number of staff to their district offices than experienced MCs (since casework problems 
primarily are handled by district staff) [Cain et al. 1987, Young 2006]. Beyond this, I do not 
expect that amateur and experienced MCs differ greatly in their outreach patterns, since all MCs 
have electoral incentives to develop strong ties to their districts as I noted above. 
Measuring Legislative Activity and Constituent Outreach 
 To see if these patterns appear, I compare the constituent outreach activities of MCs with 
and without prior political experience in Figure 4.3. Amateurs do allocate more of their staff to 
their district offices than experienced MCs, but the difference is not significant – nor is it for 
mailings and district travel – shown in the bottom panel.  
I extend my preliminary analyses about MCs’ legislative and outreach decisions by 
estimating a series of regression models that take into consideration other influences on MCs’ 
decisions. My sample is all MCs in their first four years during the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-
2008). Each data observation is a MC-Congress pair. Because introductions and cosponsorships 
                                                 
57 There is also reason to think that the number of district vs. D.C. staff is as the product of the 
type of staffers that new MCs can hire – how politically, and congressionally, experienced they 
are. If experienced MCs can hire a greater number of experienced staff, particularly those with 
political experience in the district, then experienced MCs may not need to send as many staff to 
their district offices. Since my data do not allow me to test this hypothesis, future work would 
help clarify the interplay of experience and staffing.  
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are count variables, I estimate negative binomial regression models; the rest of the models are 
ordinary least square regressions. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are legislative participation and constituent outreach decisions: 
number of bills introduced, number of bills cosponsored, hit rate, percent of staff working in the 
district, and percent of representational allowance spent on mailings and on district travel. I 
measure MCs’ legislative activities in multiple ways; each measure captures the decisions that an 
individual MC makes in one congressional term (both sessions, two years). The first two 
variables capture the volume of MCs’ legislative activities: how many bills they introduce and 
cosponsor per term (Introductions, Cosponsorships).58 The third variable, Hit Rate, is the 
proportion of MCs’ bills that becomes law each Congress (number of public laws / total number 
of bills introduced). 
There are multiple ways that MCs reach out to their constituents. I focus on how they use 
their Representational Allowances to this end, the sum of money the Treasury Department 
allocates them to set up, staff, rent, and purchase office supplies. These allowances are limited; 
MCs personally must reimburse the Treasury if they overspend their allowance (Parker and 
Goodman 2009, Young 2006). This requires that MCs make strategic decisions about how to 
allocate these funds. I concentrate on the percent of funds MCs spend on district travel, the 
percent spent on constituent mailings, and the percent of staff working in the district (% On 
Travel, % On Mailing, and % District Staff, respectively). Although MCs also spend their 
Representational Allowances on renting office space, I do not examine real estate expenditures 
                                                 
58 I examine House bills and House Joint Resolutions, the only legislation that has the full force 




because these costs are largely out of MCs’ control.59 I examine percent spending because 
Representational Allowances are not equal for every MC; they vary according to district 
population, the cost of district office space, and the distance between the district and the Capitol. 
Data on Representational Allowances is available for the 104th-108th Congresses only, so my 
analyses of these variables focus on these years.60 
Independent and Control Variables 
 The key independent variable, Political Experience, is a 0/1 variable that indicates 
whether MCs had any political experience before Congress.61 Being a member of the minority 
party in power (‘0’ for Majority Party), being a first term MC (First Term), having faced a 
competitive election (and perhaps likely to face another in the future) [Vote Share, and Vote 
Share2 to account for any nonlinearity in the effect of electoral margins], or being a racial 
minority typically all depress legislative participation (Clapp 1963, Mayhew 1974, Hibbing 
1991, Wilson and Young 1997, Carnes 2013). For instance, prior research indicates that junior 
members tend to cosponsor fewer bills than senior MCs; likewise, ideologically extreme 
members tend to cosponsor fewer bills than more moderate MCs (Canon 1990, Krehbiel 1995, 
Wilson and Young 1997). Ideological Distance From Party Median is the distance between 
MCs’ ideological positions and the median member of their party. I measure this by taking the 
absolute value of the difference between each MCs’ first dimension CS-NOMINATE score and 
                                                 
59 Not completely, though: I find that MCs with real estate experience prior to Congress spend 
significantly less, $115,600 on average, on office expenses than other MCs (t=1.85, p=.03). 
60 Data on Representational Allowances was provided by Craig Goodman and David Parker.  
61 As discussed in chapter three, MCs with political experience held positions that dealt 
specifically with political issues, including: city/county/state/federal officials, legislators, 
executives, attorneys or judges; congressional staff; and White House or party officials (local, 
state, or national). Career data are taken from the Almanac of American Politics. 
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the median first dimension CS-NOMINATE score for the entire party in that Congress.62 Higher 
values note a greater ideological divergence from the median party member. 
  Other scholars have found differences based on gender. Women (particularly those in the 
minority party) participate more frequently than men in collaborative activities like coalition 
building and cosponsorship (Volden et al. 2013). Features of the MCs’ district speak to 
congressional behavior as well. Following Fenno (1978) and Fiorina (1978) and those after them 
(see also Levendusky and Pope 2010, Lewis and Gerber 2004), I also control for MCs highest 
level of education with Education Level (1=less than high school, 2=high school degree, 3=some 
college, 4=college degree, 5=post-graduate degree). MCs may allocate their time and effort 
different depending on the diversity of interests, or heterogeneity, of their districts. 
Drawing on Sullivan’s (1973) measure of district diversity, District Heterogeneity is a 
composite measure that combines multiple district characteristics (measures tapping education, 
income, occupation, housing, ethnicity, and religion) into a single variable. The variable 
indicates the percent of characteristics on which two randomly selected district residents would 
vary; higher values indicate more diverse constituencies.63 MCs from larger state delegations 
(Delegation Size) know (and share an affinity with) a larger number of colleagues, which 
potentially increases cosponsorship (Born 1976, Fiellin 1962, 1970, Kingdon 1989). Likewise, 
                                                 
62 The median ideological position for the party is calculated by using the CS-NOMINATE 
scores for all members of the party regardless of seniority. 
63 In my period of analysis, the most diverse district (with a score of.5) is Montana’s at-large 
congressional district, represented by former teacher and Democrat Pat Williams and, after him, 
Rick Hill, a former Republican state politician and local party official. The most homogenous 
district is the Florida 8th, which runs along the Atlantic coast and encompasses the Kennedy 




the distance between Washington, D.C. and the district (Miles) can alter the willingness or ability 
(in terms of cost and effort) of MCs to visit their constituents (Fenno 1978, Young 2006).64  
Regression Results: Politically Experienced MCs versus Amateurs 
Results are presented in Table 4.2, where the excluded category is political amateurs. 
They support my general expectations. As I expected, experienced MCs cosponsor more bills 
than amateurs when factoring in differences in their vote shares, majority versus minority party 
membership, districts, and ideological extremity. Likewise, amateurs do send more staffers to 
their district offices, as I anticipated, whereas there are no significant differences between 
experienced and amateur MCs for the other outreach decisions that I examine.  
MCs with political experience show a tendency to be more active in the legislative arena, 
introducing a greater number of bills than amateurs, but the result is not significant. Nor do 
significant differences emerge for legislative effectiveness. The low hit rate values seen in Figure 
4.2 suggest that freshmen MCs in general are unlikely to introduce legislation that becomes law 
(Frantzich 1979, Volden and Wiseman forthcoming). This pattern of results raises two 
implications. First, it may be that rather than introducing more legislation than political amateurs, 
MCs with political experience introduce the ‘right’ of amount of legislation – neither too little 
nor too much that they could not actually fight for the bills. Second, the hit rate results are a 
reminder that, for an individual MC – particularly a new one – getting a bill s/he introduced 
passed into law is difficult, all other things considered.  
I also find an effect for MCs’ first term and membership in the majority party.  First term 
MCs introduce fewer bills than second term MCs. New MCs in the majority party also introduce 
a greater number of bills and, with this, allocate fewer staffers to their district offices, 
                                                 
64 I include this variable only for analyses of Representational Allowances. 
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concentrating them on Capitol Hill – perhaps to staff their legislative activities. Majority party 
MCs also spend slightly more on district travel and enjoy greater legislative success than MCs in 
the minority. Comparing a MCs’ ideology to her/his party, ideologically extreme MCs are less 
likely to see their bills become law.  
Interestingly, MCs who represent more heterogeneous district have a higher hit rate than 
MCs from more homogenous districts. As I take up in chapter five, this pattern may be due to the 
specialization of MCs’ legislative agendas. MCs from heterogeneous districts may choose their 
legislative topics more carefully in order to avoid offending parts of their district. MCs from 
heterogeneous district also spend a significantly greater percent of their office allowances on 
district travel. Cultivating a hands-on homestyle may help these MCs build name recognition and 
constituent trust in more diverse districts (Fenno 1978). In addition, the diversity of the 
constituency may reduce the effectiveness of district mailings. MCs may want to emphasize 
different activities to different audiences within the district, which makes blanket mailings less 
useful. This would help to account for why MCs from more heterogeneous districts spend less on 
constituent mail. 
Political Amateurs: Legal and Business Experience  
These analyses demonstrate some basic differences in the activities of new MCs with 
different precongressional career experiences. In the rest of the chapter, I explore the same by 
looking separately at different types of political and nonpolitical backgrounds. In this section, I 
focus on political amateurs. Amateurs’ career experiences include the ordinary and the unique – 
from lawyers and doctors to musicians and magicians. While there may be substantive lessons to 
be learned about Congress as a street magician (cynical readers may think of sleight of hand and 
other such tricks), not all of these experiences yield the same familiarity with the tasks and 
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information necessary to succeed on Capitol Hill. I concentrate on legal and business experience, 
common nonpolitical experiences.  
Political Amateurs with Legal Experience 
Legal careers have elements that strongly resemble legislative careers.  Like legislative 
careers, legal careers focus and revolve around questions of law, legal writing, the representation 
of different interests, advocacy, and argumentation (Cohen 1969, Gold 1961, Green et al. 1973, 
Miller 1995, Podmore 1977, Schlesinger 1957). Lawyers perform numerous tasks that resemble 
what MCs do: advocating for clients in an adversarial setting, mediating between different 
interests, and serving as a ‘go-between’ or point of connection (Eulau and Sprague 1964).  
In addition, lawyers also are called on for advice about the creation or implementation of 
legislative statutes. As a result, and compared to other nonpolitical experiences, legal experience 
cultivates familiarity with the tasks and demands of legislation and legislating. This fosters 
insights into the legislative process and the congressional arena, both of which are strongly 
influenced by legal vocabulary and processes (Miller 1993).65 Compared to other political 
amateurs, amateurs from legal backgrounds enter Congress more familiar, and better equipped, 
                                                 
65 Lawyers perceive these connections as well. They are more likely than non-lawyers to view 
themselves as qualified to seek political office and to agree that their “professional experience 
[is] relevant to politics” (Lawless 2012, 119, see also Eulau and Sprague 1964, 129). As noted by 
one congressional staffer, “bill drafting is easier for lawyer members; they understand the 
importance of proper drafting” (Miller 1993). Alternatively, it is possible that individuals 
interested in a legislative career in the long-run go to law school because they perceive it to be 
relevant to a legislative career. This underlying ambition for legislative office may impact the 
number of bills they introduce in the House – particularly if legal experience facilitates their 




to adjust to their new tasks and dive in.66 I hypothesize that political amateurs with legal 
experience introduce a greater number of bills than other amateurs.  
Political Amateurs with Business Experience 
 Like legal experience, business experience has attracted attention because it is considered 
to provide unique skills and insights for a legislative career. Prewitt notes that one in four city 
council members ranked “occupational skills” as “being the most help” to them with their 
legislative work, drawing connections between the skills developed through business experiences 
and politics (Prewitt 1970, 156-157). These skills range from the general (a sense of vision, a 
commitment to goal-driven action, and the ability to find or create new solutions) to the specific: 
negotiating, building coalitions, and articulating arguments to diverse audiences (Carnes 2013, 
Lawless 2012, 120).  
But applying these skills in Congress may be difficult for amateurs with business 
experience. Business and political experiences have different approaches (Tead 1937). While 
negotiating business deals or navigating collegial interactions within a business setting involves 
bargaining and compromise, unilateral decision-making is also more common (Prewitt 1970, 
Romano 2010). By comparison, legislating is the art of negotiation and compromise, more like 
“pushing a rope” than “cracking a whip” (Buss 2006). In light of these considerations, I expect 
that amateur MCs with business experience are less likely to allocate their time and attention to 
legislative activities like bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in their early terms in office. I 
hypothesize that amateurs with business backgrounds introduce and cosponsor fewer bills than 
other political amateurs. In general, given the difficulties in getting a bill passed into law, I do 
                                                 
66 A congressional staff lawyer concluded, “by training, lawyers understand the importance of 
neutral principles, of fair processes, and of rational arguments, and when working for Congress 
they inject these values” (Yoo 1998, 19). 
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not expect that there are differences in the success of amateurs from different career paths in 
getting their bills passed into law. 
Comparing Amateurs’ Legislative Activities 
In Figures 4.4 and 4.5, I compare new MCs with legal, business, or other nonpolitical 
experience. As seen in Figure 4.4, lawyers do introduce more bills than other amateurs. They 
introduce an average of 10 bills per term, compared to the 7-8 bills introduced by MCs business 
experience or other nonpolitical experiences, but the difference is not significant. Since new 
MCs in general (regardless of prior experiences) average 9 introductions per Congress, a 2-3 bill 
difference in legislative activity is notable though. Interestingly, it is amateurs without either 
business or legal experience who cosponsor the most bills, contrary to what I expected. In line 
with my expectations, Figure 4.5 shows only small (and nonsignificant) differences in amateurs’ 
hit rates.  
Amateurs’ Constituent Outreach Activities 
Legislating is only half of the story of interest in this chapter. I am also interested in 
whether amateurs from different nonpolitical career backgrounds differ in their constituent 
outreach as well. At its heart, constituent outreach is strategic self-promotion. It requires 
deliberative communication, strong networking skills, and the ability to develop listeners’ trust 
(Arnold 1990, Fenno 1978, Mayhew 1974). Practically, it also requires the ability to manage and 
direct staff, delegate tasks, and oversee multiple projects. These skills and tasks resonate with 
those emphasized in many different nonpolitical experiences. One career of which this may be 
true is business experience. Business experience is a common path to Congress for amateurs, and 
many amateurs have business management experience – which aligns with the management, 
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administration, and oversight tasks entailed in overseeing congressional offices and staff 
(Salisbury and Shepsle 1980).  
This raises competing hypotheses. On the one hand, MCs with business experience may 
outpace their amateur counterparts when it comes to constituent outreach activities given these 
professional skills and abilities. On the other hand, management and public relations skills are 
not uncommon and could be developed in many different careers (Eulau and Sprague 1964). 
Were this true, political amateurs would act relatively similarly in regards to how they allocate 
funds for constituent outreach. They could be uniformly concerned about reelection, and make 
similar choices all around. In addition, lacking prior political experience makes amateurs 
especially receptive to ‘insider’ advice about these spending decisions. For example, the 
Congressional Management Foundation advises new MCs to hire only core staff during their 
early terms in order to get a sense of their staffing needs (Young 2006). If new MCs followed 
this advice, it would reduce the variation observed in how new MCs allocate their staff 
resources.  
Figure 4.6 helps judge between these competing considerations. There are small 
differences in the percent of staff that new amateurs allocate to their district offices, and little 
variation in the percent they spend on district travel. Larger but significant differences emerge 
for constituent mailings. Surprisingly, again, it is amateurs without either legal or business 
experience that pull ahead (t=-1.8, p=.04). 
Multivariate Analyses: Amateurs’ Legislative and Outreach Activities 
To examine the relationship between career experiences and amateur’s activities when 
controlling for other considerations, I estimate new negative binomial and ordinary least squares 
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regression models. My sample is the 116 new amateurs in the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-
2008); MCs with prior political experience are examined in the next section.  
The dependent variables the same as above (number of bills introduced, cosponsored, hit 
rate, percent of staff working in district, spending on district travel, and spending on mailings). I 
use two dichotomous independent variables for nonpolitical precongressional careers: Legal and 
Business. The Legal variable captures only nonpolitical legal experiences since I analyze 
political amateurs. Business takes the value of ‘1’ if MCs have worked in a private or corporate 
business setting.67  
The regression results are presented in Table 4.3. The baseline category is political 
amateurs without legal or business experience. This group includes veterans and MCs with 
experience in academia (college professors or administrators), farming, manual work, medicine, 
media, social work, sports, and nonprofit work.  
As I expected, MCs from business backgrounds introduce and cosponsor less legislation 
than amateurs from a mix of different backgrounds, but do not differ in regards to their outreach 
decisions. Note that, for introductions, the pattern is in the expected direction, but the results fall 
just outside standard levels of statistical significance (p=.105). Advocates of ‘citizen legislators’ 
or electoral change propose business experience as a salutary antidote to the weaknesses of 
‘career politicians’ and ‘inside the Beltway’ politics. But I find that amateurs from business 
                                                 
67 For example, 43 had founded a company before running for Congress, and an additional 31 
had held upper level management positions like CEO, vice president, or general manager. 
Although it would be interesting to parse the differences between MCs with different levels of 
responsibility in their business careers, I do not. The small number of MCs without management 
positions and the limited availability of the data on representational allowances (104th-108th 
Congresses only), combined, drastically reduce the sample size. Therefore, Business 




backgrounds do not overwhelm the legislative process with new legislation that has ‘fresh’ 
insights. Rather, they take a more selective approach to their legislative activities.  
Lawyers do not introduce more bills than other amateurs, in contrast to what I had 
expected. Nor do significant differences appear in the legislative effectiveness of amateur MCs. 
In regards to legislative effectiveness, other MCs do not appear to respond differently to 
amateurs from one background versus another. However, first term amateur MCs are more 
successful than second term MCs. Perhaps they enter Congress with a strong claim to a policy 
mandate that other congressional actors feel incumbent to heed (Barnett 1999). Overall, though, 
new amateurs uniformly face high barriers in seeing their bills become law.  
First term MCs introduce also fewer bills than second term MCs. District heterogeneity 
has a strong relationship with MCs’ outreach decisions, particularly district staffing. If a new 
amateur represented the most diverse constituency possible, s/he would increase the percent of 
staff working in the district by over 50%. District staffers are the front-lines when it comes to 
handling constituent concerns and problems, and a more diverse district likely poses a wider 
array of these. 
The Legacy of Political Experience: MCs with Prior Political Experience 
 So far, I have outlined broad differences in the activities of new MCs from different 
career backgrounds. I expect similar differences to emerge when I compare different kinds of 
political experience, which the majority of new MCs have. To examine these connections, in this 
section I concentrate only on MCs who have had political experience prior to Congress and 





Legislative Activity and Legislative Experience 
Both congressional staff and state legislative experience resemble Congress in the tasks 
that are undertaken and the way they undertaken, as acknowledged by individuals from these 
backgrounds. For example, Esther Kia’aina, a former congressional staffer and congressional 
candidate, explained that, “I have a good appreciation for what is necessary on Day 1, and not 
only organizing an office and assembling a good staff…I know how to hit the ground running” 
(Dumain and Epstein 2011). Congressional and state legislative experience should sharpen MCs’ 
insights into constituent interests (often the same constituents) and provide other resources – 
policy and constituent knowledge, political contacts, and campaign donations – that facilitate 
participation in the policy process.68 I expect three general patterns to result. 
First, I hypothesize that MCs with state and congressional legislative experience 
introduce a greater number of bills than MCs with other political experiences.69 Former state 
legislators and staffers should have a grasp on major issues under debate and a handle on the 
process and procedures for introducing bills. 70 Expectations are less clear for cosponsorship. On 
one hand, MCs from state and congressional legislative backgrounds may understand the 
importance of supporting colleagues’ initiatives and how cosponsorship is an opportunity for 
MCs to identify themselves with constituent interests. In addition, congressional and state 
                                                 
68 Alternatively, MCs may choose these backgrounds because they are interested in participating 
in the policy process. While I cannot answer the causal question, it is not damning to the study of 
precongressional career experiences. These skills or insights they acquire in those careers may 
sharpen their ability to participate in legislative activities. 
69 I do not include MCs with local legislative experience in this hypothesis because local 
legislatures differ in structure and process from Congress. As a result, they provide less crisp 
insights into congressional behavior. 
70 Likewise, as a former state legislator argued, “The way I came to Congress was the ultimate 
way to be sworn in. Those who serve in the state legislature are better prepared, they have better 
command of issues, they know about things: the debate, the compromise, the policy disputes – 
they are all dealt with in the statehouse” (Berkman 1993, 86). 
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legislative experiences are common pathways to Congress, which increases the number of MCs 
they know and strengthens personal ties that may increase cosponsorship decisions.71 But, on the 
other hand, these same assumptions may be true of political experience in general, which would 
lead to no significant differences in cosponsorship behavior. 
Second, I anticipate that MCs with state or congressional legislative experience introduce 
more bills that make substantial changes to the law. Bills may vary on many dimensions – two of 
which are of particular interest: the topic addressed in the bill and the scope of change entailed 
by the bill (Volden and Wiseman 2009).72 Symbolic bills make little to no change to existing 
law. Rather, they help MCs identify with and represent their constituents by taking typically 
uncontroversial, low impact actions like changing the name of a federal building, designating 
public holidays, or commemorating historic events. On the other end of the spectrum, significant 
bills make the weightiest and most controversial changes to existing law, creating or revising 
statutes and policies (like the 2010 Affordable Care Act which overhauled the U.S. healthcare 
system).  
While all legislation is important from the perspective of representation, significant bills 
make a greater contribution to policy outcomes. As a result, crafting and introducing substantive 
legislation requires sharper legislative skills and more nuanced constituent insights. In their early 
terms, MCs with prior legislative experience should be more familiar with the sorts of changes 
these laws entail and also possess insights into where such changes are necessary. Compared to 
other MCs with political backgrounds, I anticipate that legislatively experienced MCs introduce 
                                                 
71 434 of 838 (52%) new MCs have these backgrounds. 
72 Differences in the scope of legislation (symbolic vs. significant) are taken from Volden and 
Wiseman (forthcoming) and are available only for introductions, not cosponsorship. 
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more significant and substantively significant bills (those making non-symbolic changes and 
those making the most weighty or far-reaching changes). 
Third, I expect that MCs with state and congressional legislative experience have lower 
hit rates than other experienced MCs. This hypothesis stems from my expectation about the type 
of bills that MCs with legislative experience introduce. The weightier the changes to the law, the 
more resistance the bill is likely to receive. If MCs with legislative experience introduce more 
contentious bills, I anticipate that they lower hit rates.  
Precongressional Executive Experience  
State and federal executive positions engage with a range of important policy topics.73 
These are work environments where “command and control techniques [are] acceptable” and 
“everything revolved, or seemed to revolve, around” the chief executive, these experiences pair 
policy expertise with an emphasis leadership and independent action (Barnett 1999, 136, 
Matthews 1960, 1075). These individuals have practice being out in front, proposing and 
debating policy ideas. 
 As a result, I expect that MCs with executive experience put their policy and political 
skills to work on legislative introductions, which are prominent ways to make policy changes 
and command public attention. In light of the number of important policy debates with which 
interact, I hypothesize that executive experience increases the volume of bills that MCs introduce 
and the number of bills introduced that make weighty changes to the law (when compared to 
MCs with non-legislative political experience). Like MCs with legislative experience, if MCs 
with past executive experience introduce more controversial bills, they may be less likely to see 
their bills become law (i.e. have lower hit rates) than MCs from local or judicial backgrounds. 
                                                 
73 Executive experience refers to employment in the state governor’s office or in the federal 
executive branch, such as Cabinet secretaries or under-secretaries. 
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Comparing Legislative Activities Among MCs with Prior Political Experience 
Figure 4.7 examines these claims, summarizing the activities of MCs from different 
backgrounds. MCs with executive and congressional experience do introduce a greater volume 
of bills than other experienced MCs. Interestingly, state legislators lag behind former staffers in 
terms of the total volume of introductions, 9 introductions to the 11 bills introduced by former 
staffers. There is little variation in cosponsorship behavior by political experience.  
Compared to all other experienced MCs (including those with legislative experience), 
new MCs with executive experience introduce a greater number of bills make significant 
changes to law, as show in Figure 4.8 (t=-2.0, p=.02). In Figure 4.9, I show that the hit rates of 
MCs with state and congressional legislative experience are lower than other experienced MCs, 
but the difference is small and not significant.  
Constituent Outreach Decisions 
The decisions that MCs make about how much effort to devote to legislative activity 
affect how much attention and resources they can devote to other tasks.  For instance, if MCs 
with legislative and/or executive experience concentrate their attention on legislative activities, 
then they may spend more time on Capitol Hill where those activities occur. Two competing sets 
of hypotheses arise from this consideration.  
On one hand, MCs with legislative and/or executive experience may allocate a smaller 
portion of their budget to district travel than other experienced MCs. In conjunction, they may 
send more staff to their D.C. office to assist their legislative endeavors. On the other hand, 
politically experienced MCs in general may value constituent outreach, and their past 
experiences may all encourage building district relationships. If this were true, then I would not 
expect to see distinct patterns emerge in the outreach decisions of experienced new MCs. This 
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latter train of thought is evidenced in Figure 4.10.  Looking at new politically experienced MCs’ 
constituent outreach, broad differences do not emerge in the ways that new MCs allocate their 
Representational Allowances. 
Analyzing the Legislative and Outreach Activities of MCs with Prior Political Experience 
 As before, I use regression analyses to investigate my expectations for the politically 
experienced new MCs in 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2010). The dependent variables and basic 
regression framework (negative binomial and ordinary least squares, standard errors clustered on 
individual MCs) are unchanged. To explore differences in the types of bills that MCs introduce, I 
introduce three additional variables: Symbolic Bills, Significant Bills, and Substantively 
Significant Bills. These measures indicate the number of each type of bill that MCs introduce, 
per Congress, based on the scope of policy change. 
 The coding scheme and data about the scope of policy change were provided by Volden 
and Wiseman and are available for the 101st-110th Congresses only. Significant bills make some 
change to existing law or create a substantively important new statute. To understand what 
counts under this criteria, consider two alternatives. First, symbolic bills make little change to 
existing law. Rather, as their name implies, these bills enable MCs to take more ceremonial 
actions on constituents’ behalf. A bill is categorized as symbolic if it includes in its titles any of 
the following phrases: commemoration/commemorate, for the (private) relief of, medal, mint 
coins, posthumous, public holiday, to designate/redesignate, to encourage, to express the sense of 
Congress, to provide for correction of/remove any doubt, to name/rename/retention of name.  
Second, substantively significant bills are the rare bills that make exceedingly large or 
landmark changes to law (like the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which overhauled 
national healthcare standards and regulations). Due to the scope of legal changes entailed, 
‘substantively significant bills’ are the select handful of bills that congressional observers (such 
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as the Congressional Quarterly Almanac) single out from the thousands introduced each 
Congress as the most important bills that term. (I examine ‘substantively significant bills’ in a 
later section.)  
This leaves ‘significant bills’. Significant bills meet both of the following criteria: 1) 
include none of the key phrases denoted above that characterize legislation as ‘symbolic,’ 2) are 
not found in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac’s annual summary of the most important 
legislation from the term. I control for the total number of bills a MC introduces per term in 
order to distinguish increased activity on certain kinds of bills from an overall greater volume of 
legislative activity (Total Introductions). 
 I use dichotomous variables to indicate former state legislators or congressional staffers: 
State Legislator and Congressional Staff. I create an interaction variable Legislator*Staff to 
capture the effect of combined state legislative and congressional staff experience, as was true of 
32 new MCs in this time period. Executive (0/1) is for MCs who were employed in federal or 
state executive offices.74 The baseline category in the analysis is the MCs without these 
legislative or executive experiences. This includes city and local officials (such as mayors, 
county administrators, and school board officials), state bureaucrats, judicial officials (judges and 
attorneys across all levels of government), and political party officials/volunteers. 
The results in Table 4.4 clarify the patterns identified above. For example, I hypothesize 
that MCs with executive experience introduce a greater volume of bills, which is borne out in the 
regression analysis. Also, as I anticipated, MCs with executive experience introduce more 
substantively significant bills than other MCs with local or judicial political experiences. Having 
                                                 
74 This does not include MCs with local executive or administrative experience. I exclude these 
MCs because the diversity of tasks and institutional structures in these positions makes it 
difficult to generalize well about their aggregate effects. 
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been at the forefront of implementing public policies, MCs with experience in federal or state 
executive office take action on more far-reaching and weighty policy goals.  
What does this mean, practically, for congressional outputs? Imagine a scenario in which 
ever new MC during the 101st-110th Congresses with prior political experience had worked in an 
executive office. In that alternative world there would have been approximately 72 more of these 
substantially significant bills introduced.75 As there were only 208 such bills introduced in this 
entire time period (by all new MCs), this is a significant increase. While this says nothing about 
the chance of these bills being passed into law, this increase would provide contributions to 
policy debates that could become law. 
In contrast, and contrary to my expectations, MCs with state or congressional legislative 
experience do not introduce a greater overall number of bills, as seen the first two rows of the 
first column. Nor do they cosponsor a greater number of their colleagues’ bills. But they do 
introduce a greater number of significant bills (those making actual changes to the law, but not 
sweeping or landmark alterations). Former state legislators, congressional staffers, as well as the 
MCs who have had both experiences all introduce a greater number of bills making actual policy 
changes.  
This has notable aggregate implications. Imagine, like above, that I took the 173 
experienced MCs without either state legislative or congressional experience and could ‘give’ the 
state legislative experience. In that alternative world, there would have been 123 more significant 
                                                 
75 I multiple the increase in introductions of these bills by the average number of substantially 
significant bills introduced per Congress, and then multiple that product by the number of new 
MCs without executive experience (but other political experience) in the 101st-110th Congresses. 
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bills introduced, or 205 significant bills if it ‘gave’ other experienced MCs congressional staff 
experience instead.76 
Finally, like MCs from executive backgrounds, MCs with both state and congressional 
legislative experience introduce more substantially significant legislation than other experienced 
MCs. MCs with both congressional and state legislative experience are also slightly more likely 
to get their bills enacted to law. New MCs with legislative experience start their time in office by 
offering more substantial policy contributions – to the tune of 60 more of these bills had all 
politically experienced new MCs had these specific political experiences.  
Whereas strong and significant differences emerge regarding experienced MCs’ 
legislative decisions, there are few significant differences in regards to constituent outreach. The 
only exception is constituent mailings; former state legislators spend a fraction more of their 
Representational Allowance on mailings than other experienced MCs. As has been true 
throughout this chapter, MCs’ first term and majority party membership continue to contribute to 
their behavior. Like other scholars have found, I see an effect of gender on cosponsorship 
behavior among experienced MCs, suggesting that this finding is also driven by the contexts – 
political versus nonpolitical – of female legislators’ previous experiences (Volden et al. 
forthcoming). 
Conclusion 
MCs from different career backgrounds make different decisions about engaging in 
legislative and outreach activities. As I contend, it may be that career experiences before 
Congress shape how individual MCs adjust to their new institutional work environment, 
providing guidance and support during a crucial transition period to congressional office. For 
                                                 
76 I calculated these numbers, and that in the paragraph below, in the same way as above. 
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instance, I find differences in the volume and type of bills that MCs introduce. MCs with 
previous experiences that provide sharp policy, process, or constituent insights like legal or 
executive experience introduce more legislation. MCs with prior legislative experience introduce 
legislation that makes more far-reaching changes to the law. In contrast, amateur MCs with 
business experience introduce and cosponsor less than their colleagues, suggesting that the 
transition into the policy process is longer or more arduous. Differences like these bear directly 
on the type of representation that constituents receive from their representative, their ability to 
access and monitor their representative, and the likelihood that these decisions substantially alter 
public law. Three key points bear mention in closing. 
First, I demonstrate how MCs with political versus nonpolitical experiences take up 
different mixes of legislative and outreach activities. Politically experienced MCs engage more 
often in interpersonal and coalition-building activities like cosponsorship than do political 
amateurs. These are activities that revolve around Washington D.C. and its legislative process. In 
addition, politically experienced MCs send fewer of their staff to their district offices. Broad 
distinctions in precongressional experiences provide a window into how candidates from 
different backgrounds may approach the decisions they face in office.  
Second, congressional context matters, as do district considerations. Membership in the 
minority party and congressional tenure (first versus second term) add to the difficulty of 
participating in the policy process. District heterogeneity also plays an important role in shaping 
the amount and allocation of MCs’ resources towards building up district relationships.  
Third, I demonstrate that the type of political and nonpolitical experiences matters, for 
both politically experienced and inexperienced MCs. For example, amateurs with business 
experience are less active in the policy process. This adds weight to the supposition that 
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experience outside the political realm matters within it. Moreover, it hints that candidates’ claims 
about their nonpolitical experiences are not empty gestures or political posturing. Rather, they 
point to skills and insights MCs have acquired that help them navigate the transition to public 
office.  
Likewise, the type of political experience shapes the decisions that new MCs make and 
how other actors seem to respond to them. For instance, MCs with state or congressional 
legislative experience introduce a greater number of bills proposing substantive policy changes, 
and MCs with both experiences are more likely to see these bills become law. Unique career 
paths bring MCs to office. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, when new MCs enter 
Congress, they are faced with many decisions about how to represent their constituents in office 
and reach out to them in the district. Precongressional career experiences may provide key assets 














Tables and Figures  
Table 4.1 Summary of Legislative and Outreach Activities, All First and Second Term MCs 
101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008) 
 
Total Minimum         Maximum Mean 
Bill Introductions 10,293 0 44 9 
Bill Cosponsorships 272,113 0 838 228 
District Staff % -- 14% 78% 47% 
District Travel  $24,453,155 $1,552 $253,987 $78,881 
Mass Mailings  $34,550,384 $4,725 $330,376 $111,453 
Note: Cell entries are calculated as means per MC-per Congress. MCs that served more than one 
term are included twice in the analysis. Data on staff, district travel, and mass mailings are 
available for the 104th-108th Congresses only. 


































Table 4.2 Differences in Legislative and Outreach Decisions, Experienced and Amateur MCs 
 
Introductions Cosponsorships Hit Rate 
Political Experience .07 (.07) .10 (.04)*** .01 (.02) 
First Term -.32 (.04)*** -.04 (.02) .00 (.01) 
Majority Party .19 (.05)*** -.05 (.03) .08 (.01)*** 
Woman .07 (.07) .08 (.04)** -.01 (.01) 
White .21 (.09)** -.12 (.06)** -.00 (.02) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median -.14 (.31) .46 (.20)** -.17 (.06)*** 
Vote Share -.03 (.02) -.01 (.01) .00 (.00) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Partial Term -.65 (.11) -.76 (.08)*** .05 (.03)* 
Education Level .07 (.04)** -.01 (.02) -.01 (.01) 
Delegation Size -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
District Heterogeneity -1.01 (.63) -2.62 (.37)*** .42 (.12)*** 
Constant 3.07 (.73)*** 6.70 (.43)*** -.11 (.14) 
N 1,193 (677 unique clusters) 1,162 (672 unique clusters) 
 
% District Staff  % On Travel % On Mail 
Political Experience -1.69 (.85)** -.04 (.23) .01 (.50) 
First Term -.62 (.69) .07 (.11) .42 (.30) 
Majority Party -3.11 (.82)*** .47 (.17)*** -.35 (.42) 
Woman -1.18 (1.20) .04 (.22) .22 (.46) 
White -.22 (1.58) .11 (.25) 1.31 (.61)** 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median -2.39 (4.77) -.97 (.97) -1.71 (2.49) 
Vote Share .20 (.25) -.02 (.04) -.42 (.12)*** 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)*** 
Partial Term 1.34 (.2.26) -.39 (.36) .10 (1.34) 
Education Level -.95 (.55)* -.20 (.12)* .12 (.28) 
Delegation Size -.02 (.03) -.04 (.01)*** .05 (.01)*** 
Miles -.00 (.00)* .00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00) 
District Heterogeneity -.63 (10.62) 14.30 (2.09)*** -11.90 (5.14)** 
Constant 48.77 (10.68)*** -1.13 (1.92) 26.60 (5.22)*** 
N 
642 (405 unique 
clusters) 
642 (408 unique 
clusters) 
642 (408 unique 
clusters) 
Note: All standard errors are clustered on the individual MC; the models for Introductions and 
Cosponsorships are negative binomial regression models. All other model results are ordinary 
least squares. MCs who did not introduce a single bill in one Congress are not included in the Hit 
Rate analysis. The unit of analysis is an individual MC in a single Congress, and the sample is all 
new MCs. Political amateurs are the excluded category. The dependent variables are: the number 
of bills introduced and cosponsored per MC in a single Congress, an MC’s proportion of the bills 
that become public law per Congress, the percent of staff that work in district offices, and the 
percent of MCs’ Representational Allowance spent per Congress on travel to the district and on 
mailings. Data on Representational Allowances is available for the 104th-108th Congresses only. 
Hit Rate R2 = .07, % District Staff R2 = .05, % On Travel R2 = .32, % On Mail R2 = .14 *** p < 






Table 4.3 Regression Analysis, Political Amateurs’ Legislative and Outreach Activities 
 
Introductions Cosponsorships Hit Rate 
Legal  -.01 (.18) -.22 (.10)** .05 (.04) 
Business -.20 (.12) -.16 (.09)** .01 (.04) 
First Term -.18 (.09)** -.02 (.05) .06 (.03)** 
Majority Party .16 (.12) -.10 (.07) .04 (.03) 
Woman .36 (.17)** .18 (.09)** -.01 (.03) 
White .69 (22)** .21 (.14) .06 (.04) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median 1.23 (.69)* .92 (.45)** -.28 (.19) 
Vote Share .00 (.00) .01 (.02) .01 (.01) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
Partial Term -.79 (.26)*** -.95 (.16)*** .09 (.09) 
Education Level .10 (.09) .02 (.05) -.03 (.02) 
Delegation Size -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
District Heterogeneity .39 (1.77) -1.88 (.93) .40 (.41) 
Constant 1.56 (1.45) 5.57 (.97)*** -.38 (.45) 
 
198 (116 unique clusters) 194 (115 unique clusters) 
 
% District Staff  % On Travel % On Mail 
Legal  .82 (1.55) .14 (.52) -1.37 (1.34) 
Business  .56 (.1.58) -.19 (.58) -.93 (1.47) 
First Term -.91 (1.89) .10 (.30) 1.00 (.69) 
Majority Party -1.00 (1.87) 1.41 (.60)** -1.03 (1.58) 
Woman .70 (1.81) .17 (.78) -1.47 (1.41) 
White -3.91 (2.79) 1.41 (.68)** 1.52 (1.95) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median -17.88 (8.86)** -3.34 (1.77)* -9.25 (6.00) 
Vote Share -.74 (.64) -.11 (.13) -.20 (.31) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Partial Term -3.66 (1.66)** -.76 (.51) -.84 (2.83) 
Education Level 1.62 (1.15) .09 (.25) -.18 (.76) 
Delegation Size -.03 (.05) -.01 (.02) .02 (.04) 
Miles .00 (.00) .00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00) 
District Heterogeneity 59.48 (20.53)*** 6.21 (4.77) -27.31 (13.44)** 
Constant 47.70 (24.44)* 1.38 (5.37) 28.95 (15.02)* 
 
112 (70 unique clusters) 
Note: Standard errors are clustered on the individual MCs; the Introductions and Cosponsorships 
models are negative binomial regression models. All other model results are ordinary least 
squares. MCs who did not introduce a single bill in one Congress are not included in the Hit Rate 
analysis. The unit of analysis is an individual MC in one Congress; the sample is political 
amateurs and the excluded category is amateurs without business or legal experience. The 
dependent variables are: the number of bills introduced and cosponsored per MC in a single 
Congress, an MC’s proportion of the bills that become public law per Congress, the percent of 
staff that work in district offices, and the percent of MCs’ Representational Allowance spent per 
Congress on travel to the district and on mailings. Data on Representational Allowances is 
available for the 104th-108th Congresses only. Hit Rate R2 = .10, % District Staff R2 = .15, % On 





Table 4.4 Regression Results, Legislative and Outreach Activities, Politically Experienced MCs  
 
Introductions Cosponsorships Hit Rate 
State Legislator -.03 (.07) -.03 (.04) -.02 (.01) 
Congressional Staff .03 (.10) -.01 (.07) -.06 (.01)*** 
Legislator*Staff -.02 (.15) .10 (.11) .11 (.03)*** 
Executive .18 (.10)* -.08 (.06) -.00 (.02) 
First Term -.35 (.04)*** -.04 (.02) -.01 (.01) 
Majority Party .22 (.05)*** .04 (.03) .08 (.01)*** 
Woman -.01 (.06) .07 (.05) -.00 (.02) 
White .16 (.10)* -.14 (.06)** -.01 (.02) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median -.42 (.34) .41 (.22)* -.15 (.06)** 
Vote Share -.02 (.02) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.00) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Partial Term -.67 (.11)*** -.01 (.02) .05 (.04) 
Education Level .04 (.04) -.74 (.10)*** -.01 (.01) 
Delegation Size -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
District Heterogeneity -1.35 (.67)** -2.88 (.41)*** .44 (.13)*** 
Constant 3.46 (.81)*** 6.91 (.49)*** -.05 (.15) 
N 994 (561 unique clusters) 967 (557 unique clusters) 





State Legislator -.15 (.13) .09 (.03)*** -.22 (.20) 
Congressional Staff -.26 (.24) .14 (.04)*** -.73 (.42) 
Legislator*Staff .51 (.32) -.12 (.06)* 1.07 (.60)* 
Executive -.02 (.21) .05 (.04) .56 (.32)* 
First Term -.03 (.10) -.07 (.03)*** -.35 (.19)* 
Majority Party -.04 (.11) .11 (.04)*** 1.77 (.26) 
Woman -.24 (.16) .08 (.03)*** 1.18 (.43)*** 
White -.37 (.16)** .11 (.04)*** 1.18 (.43)*** 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median -.53 (.69) -.12 (.14) .03 (1.05) 
Vote Share -.03 (.04) -.01 (.01) .00 (.06) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
Partial Term -.12 (.24) -.27 (.08)*** -1.24 (.69)* 
Education Level .13 (.09) -.00 (.02) .07 (.14) 
Delegation Size .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.01) 
District Heterogeneity .66 (1.48) .07 (.28) -3.72 (2.10)* 
Total Introductions .05 (.00)*** .08 (.00)*** .04 (.01)*** 
Constant -.70 (1.52) 1.51 (.46)*** -2.93 (2.58) 










Table 4.4 (cont.) 
Note: Standard errors are clustered on the individual MCs; the Introductions, Cosponsorships, 
Symbolic Bills, Significant Bills, and Substantively Significant Bills models are negative 
binomial regression models. All other model results are ordinary least squares. MCs who did not 
introduce a single bill in one Congress are not included in the Hit Rate analysis. The unit of 
analysis is an individual MC in a single Congress, and the sample is politically experienced MCs 
only. The excluded category is politically experienced MCs without either state legislative, 
congressional staff, or executive experience. The dependent variables are: the number of bills 
introduced and cosponsored per MC in a single Congress, an MC’s proportion of the bills that 
become public law per Congress, the number of symbolic, significant, and substantively 
significant bills introduce per MC-Congress, the percent of staff that work in district offices, and 
the percent of MCs’ Representational Allowance spent per Congress on travel to the district and 
on mailings. Data on Representational Allowances is available for the 104th-108th Congresses 
only. Hit Rate R2 = .09, % District Staff R2 = .07, % On Travel R2 = .33, % On Mail R2 = .15  












 % District Staff  % On Travel % On Mail 
State Legislator -.27 (1.00) -.17 (.19) .78 (.43)* 
Congressional Staff .86 (1.62) -.03 (.28) .37 (.75) 
Legislator*Staff -.11 (2.46) .03 (.51) -1.01 (1.17) 
Executive .32 (1.83) -.05 (.27) .05 (.73) 
First Term -.69 (.75) .02 (.11) .29 (.33) 
Majority Party -3.41 (.93)*** .36 (.19)* -.21 (.45) 
Woman -1.61 (1.34) .06 (.23) .56 (.50) 
White .09 (1.68) .01 (.26) 1.34 (.65)* 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median 1.64 (5.51) -.34 (1.18) .07 (2.80) 
Vote Share .35 (.28) -.02 (.05) -.46 (.13)*** 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)*** 
Partial Term 2.17 (2.76) -.25 (.40) .34 (1.45) 
Education -1.46 (.67)** -.29 (.14)** .20 (.32) 
Delegation Size -.04 (.04) -.04 (.01)*** .06 (.02)*** 
Miles -.00 (.00)* .00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00) 
District Heterogeneity -11.81 (12.32) 15.33 (2.36)*** -7.51 (5.78) 
Constant 48.51 (12.42)*** -.85 (2.06) 25.11 (5.66)*** 
N 530 (336 unique clusters) 
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Figure 4.1 Comparing the Volume of Legislative Activities of MCs With Prior Political 
Experience to Political Amateurs, 101st-110th Congresses 
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ introductions and cosponsorships per MC-per Congress. MCs that served more than one 
term are included twice in the analysis. There were 116 political amateurs and 561 MCs with 
political experience in the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008). 




Figure 4.2 Little Difference in Hit Rate of MCs’ With, and Without, Prior Political Experience, 
101st-110th Congresses 
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ hit rate (# bills became public law/# bills introduced) per MC-per Congress. MCs that 
served more than one term are included twice in the analysis. There are 116 political amateurs 
and 561 MCs with political experience in the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008). 
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Figure 4.3 Comparisons of MCs’ Constituent Outreach through District Staffing, Travel, and 
Mailings, 104-108th Congresses  
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ staffing, district travel spending, and mailing spending per MC-per Congress. MCs that 
served more than one term are included twice in the analysis. Data on staff, district travel, and 
mass mailings are available for the 104th-108th Congresses only. In these Congresses, there are 
258 MCs with political experience and 57 political amateurs. 









































































Figure 4.4 Political Amateurs’ Volume of Legislative Activity, 101st-110th Congresses 
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ introductions and cosponsorships per MC-per Congress for political amateurs only. MCs 
with prior political experience are not included in the figure. MCs that served more than one 
term are included twice in the analysis. In the 101st-110th Congresses, there are 70 political 
amateurs with business experience, 21 amateurs have legal experience, and 29 amateurs have 
other experiences (not business or legal). 
Source: Library of Congress THOMAS 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Comparison of Political Amateurs’ Hit Rate, 101st-110th Congresses 
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ hit rate (# bills became public law/# bills introduced) per MC-per Congress for political 
amateurs only. MCs with prior political experience are not included in the figure. MCs that 
served more than one term are included twice in the analysis. In the 101st-110th Congresses, there 
are 70 political amateurs with business experience, 21 amateurs have legal experience, and 29 
amateurs have other experiences (not business or legal). 














































































Proportion of MCs' Bills 









Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ staffing, district travel spending, and mailing spending per MC-per Congress for political 
amateurs only. MCs with prior political experience are not included in the figure. MCs that 
served more than one term are included twice in the analysis. Data on staff, district travel, and 
mass mailings are available for the 104th-108th Congresses only. In the 104-108th Congresses, 
there are 31 political amateurs with business experience, 12 amateurs with legal experience, and 
16 amateurs with other nonpolitical experiences (nonbusiness, nonlegal).  
Source: Parker and Goodman (2009) 
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Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ introductions and cosponsorships per MC-per Congress for MCs with prior political 
experience only. Political amateurs are not included in the figure. MCs that served more than one 
term are included twice in the analysis. In the 101st-110th Congresses, there are 345 state 
legislators, 76 congressional staff, 46 MCs with executive experience, and 156 MCs with judicial 
and/or local political experience. 
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Figure 4.8 Comparing Number of Bills Introduced per MC/Congress by Scope of Change, 
Politically Experienced MCs 101st-110th Congresses 
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figure, I used the mean 
number of significant and symbolic bills that each MC introduced per Congress for MCs with 
prior political experience only. Political amateurs are not included in the figure. MCs that served 
more than one term are included twice in the analysis. In the 101st-110th Congresses, there are 
345 state legislators, 76 congressional staff, 46 MCs with executive experience, and 156 MCs 
with judicial and/or local political experience. 
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Figure 4.9 Differences in Hit Rate Among Politically Experienced MCs, 101st-110th Congresses 
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ hit rate (# bills became public law/# bills introduced) per MC-per Congress for politically 
experienced MCs only. Political amateurs are not included in the figure. MCs that served more 
than one term are included twice in the analysis. In the 101st-110th Congresses, there are 345 
state legislators, 76 congressional staff, 46 MCs with executive experience, and 156 MCs with 
judicial and/or local political experience. 
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Figure 4.10 Comparing Politically Experienced MCs’ Staffing, District Travel, and Mailing 
Decisions, 104-108th Congresses 
 
 
Note: The unit of analysis a single MC per Congress. To calculate the figures, I used the mean of 
MCs’ staffing, district travel spending, and mailing spending per MC-per Congress for political 
amateurs only. MCs with prior political experience are not included in the figure. MCs that 
served more than one term are included twice in the analysis. Data on staff, district travel, and 
mass mailings are available for the 104th-108th Congresses only. In the 104th-108th Congresses, 
there are 160 state legislators, 34 congressional staff, 20 MCs with executive experience, and 70 
MCs with other political experiences. 
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Chapter 5: Policy Agendas and Previous Experiences  
 
In 1975, Tom Coburn – a manufacturing manager for an optics company in Virginia – 
received news no one wants to hear: he had cancer. While potentially life-threatening, Coburn’s 
bout with malignant melanoma turned out to be career-altering instead. Making a full recovery, 
he and his family (his wife Carolyn was his high school sweetheart and a former Miss 
Oklahoma) returned to Oklahoma so that he could attend the University of Oklahoma medical 
school. After graduation in 1983, he opened his own medical practice, Maternal and Family 
Practice Associates, in his home town, Muskogee (Almanac of American Politics 1996, 1092). 
When Coburn and his family relocated to Muskogee, it was a bastion of Democratic 
power in an otherwise conservative state. Democrats had represented Oklahoma’s second district 
in the House of Representatives since 1923. Having grown tired of being represented by a 
Democrat, in 1994 Coburn, a conservative Republican, decided to run himself for an open seat. 
That November 1994, he defeated a retired high school principal, 52% - 48%, becoming the first 
Republican elected from the district in 71 years. 
Rep. Coburn quickly earned a reputation on Capitol Hill. He often took on Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich for what Rep. Coburn saw as egregious departures from the Republicans’ 
electoral platform, the Contract with America. Rep. Coburn also developed a reputation as a 
policy expert on health issues. For instance, his first term, he introduced six bills, all of which 
focused on health or medical issues. These include: the Medicare Patient Choice and Access Act 
of 1995, the Health Care Anti-Fraud Act of 1995, the Senior Citizens' Access to Health Care Act 
of 1995, the Radiopharmaceutical Review Improvement Act of 1996, and the HIV Prevention 
Act of 1996, and .H.R. 3079 – “To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to assure access 
to services under the Medicare health maintenance organization program.” Likewise, in his 
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second term, Rep. Coburn again introduced six bills on medical and health issues. In comparison, 
other new Republican MCs in the 104th and 105th Congresses (Rep. Coburn’s first and second 
terms) introduced less than one health related bill per Congress. In short, Rep. Coburn’s policy 
agenda drew from his precongressional career experience. 
Studying the Intersection of Policy Agendas and Career Experiences 
In this chapter, I explore the connection between career experiences and policy agendas 
for all the new MCs in their first four years in the House of Representatives during the 101st-
110th Congresses (1989-2008).77 More specifically, I focus on how precongressional career 
experiences connect to their legislative agendas, by which I mean the contents of the bills they 
introduce and cosponsor as well as the number of policy topics on which they work.  
Studying new MCs’ legislative agendas is a natural extension of the discussion in chapter 
four. There, I explored two types of decisions that new MCs make: how active to be in the 
legislative process in D.C. and how to reach out to constituents in the district. Both are 
important, I argued, because they shape the type of representation provided for constituents and 
the ability of constituents to monitor and hold their representatives accountable. However, in 
chapter four, I looked only at the volume of MCs’ legislative activities and the scope of changes 
entailed by their bills. I said nothing about the actual issue content of these legislative actions, 
e.g. whether new MCs act on the environment, the economy, education, or energy policies, etc. I 
take up these questions here.78  
 
                                                 
77 Data on policy agendas is not available for the 111th and 112th Congresses. 
78 Of course, there are other ways MCs could take action on an issue: introduce amendments, 
speak about a topic on the House floor, advocate for a bill in committee, hold hearings in the 
district, etc. I focus on bill introductions and cosponsorships because they lie at the heart of the 
legislative process and have direct impact on public law.  
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Categorizing Policy Topics and Precongressional Careers 
Legislative scholars have proposed different categorization schemes to describe the topics 
of congressional legislation. Here, I rely on Sulkin’s (2011) codes, categorizing legislative bills 
and cosponsorships into 19 major policy topics, as derived from the Congressional Bills Project 
(Alder and Wilkerson 2013). Table 5.1 shows how the total number of bills introduced and 
cosponsored by MCs in my sample for each topic. 
Just like policy topics, precongressional careers can be categorized in different ways, too 
(Schlesinger 1966, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). In the previous chapter, I explore the impact 
of political experience and then broke out different types of political and nonpolitical 
experiences. I follow that basic pattern in the first half of the chapter. I compare MCs with and 
without political experience. Then, I separately look at experienced MCs – examining different 
political experience, and afterwards take up political amateurs – comparing various nonpolitical 
experiences.   
In the second part of this chapter, I do something different. I do not separate MCs into 
two groups based on whether they have had political experience. Instead, I look at a broader 
range of career experiences and their relationship to the contents of MCs’ legislative agendas. 
Since there are many different combinations of policy issues and career experience, I examine 
experiences that are common paths to office, both political and nonpolitical. As a result, I focus 
on agricultural, business, education, gubernatorial, law enforcement, legal, legislative, medical, 
and military experience. This approach resonates with the advice of legislative scholar Roger 
Davidson (1969), who advocated thinking of precongressional experiences through the lens of 
whether the experience equips MCs with relevant skills. In addition, it aligns with the approach 
taken by Fox and Lawless (2005) and Carnes (2013), who focus on the most common 
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precongressional career experiences in their explorations of nascent political ambition and of 
social class backgrounds. 
Figure 5.1 shows the number of individuals with each kind of experience who served 
during the 101st-110th Congresses. (Since individuals can have multiple experiences, they may be 
counted multiple times.) As Figure 5.1 suggests, my approach covers a wide swath of new MCs, 
allowing me to paint a comprehensive picture of how precongressional careers and legislative 
agendas connect across a variety of topics and occupations.79 
The Importance of Policy Agendas 
Understanding the connections between careers and legislative agendas is important for 
several reasons. For one, it clarifies how career experiences relate to policy outcomes. The 
election of new MCs influences what bills are considered for a vote in the first place and how 
seriously they are considered (Browne 1985, Kessler and Krehbiel 1996, Koger 2003, Krutz 200, 
Wilson and Young 1997). Consequently, the decisions that new MCs make about issue 
prioritization contribute directly to the recognition and definition of public problems (Kingdon 
1984, Polsby 1984).  
The allocation of attention is a central component of democratic representation and is 
central to the production of legislative results (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Cobb and Elder 
1972, Cohen et al. 1972, Jones and Baumgartner 2005). For example, if MCs like Rep. Coburn 
with previous medical experience focus on medical or health issues to the exclusion of other 
topics, then a Congress composed of more medically experienced MCs would produce more 
health related legislation. In effect, electing MCs with different career experiences would alter 
                                                 
79 Because I narrow my discussion of precongressional career experiences in this way, I do not 
hypothesize about all 19 of the possible policy topic categorizations. Rather, I concentrate on 
those that are relevant to the career experiences I highlight. 
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the topics under discussion in Congress and, perhaps, in the long-run, congressional policy 
outcomes.  
If career experiences and MCs’ legislative agendas are connected, then career 
experiences can also enhance congressional policy discussions. For example, when a former 
doctor introduces a medical bill, it provides other MCs with an indication of what doctors may 
think about an issue. These insights can help congressional actors evaluate the implications and 
consequences of public policies. By adding to the information MCs have when making policy 
decisions, the connection between precongressional careers and legislative agendas should 
enhance the quality of congressional policy debates.80 
In sum, exploring new MCs’ policy preferences is important for assessing how they 
contribute to the congressional agenda and its results. The depth and breadth of the policy agenda 
are key ways that constituent concerns and preferences are included in the policy process, and so 
studying these decisions is of interest to wider audiences as well. I examine these considerations 
below by focusing on two questions: how many topics new MCs take on in office (the 
specialization of MCs’ legislative agendas) and which topics they take up (the policy content of 
MCs’ legislative agendas). 
Connecting Precongressional Careers and Legislative Agendas: Overview and Roadmap 
As I discuss in chapter two, there are multiple policy debates that MCs could join, but 
they do not have unlimited time, energy, staff power, and constituent support to do so. Because 
                                                 
80 When making committee assignments, party leaders use these past experiences to judge the 
issues that new MCs could conceivably care about in the future (Frisch and Kelly 2006). I do not 
examine committee assignments, though. Rather, I focus on the purposeful, or ‘proactive,’ 
decisions made by individual MCs, whereas committee assignments are largely out of their 
control (Hall 1996). Granted, MCs do request to serve on certain committees, but these requests 
can be strategic – such that they have reduced value for understanding the proactive decisions 
that new MCs make (Fenno 1973). 
133 
 
of these resource constraints, I expect that MCs build their legislative agendas selectively around 
issues of interest to themselves (and their constituents). Scholars of occupational behavior note 
that career decisions often track with issues people care about (Holland 1985). If these careers 
deepen that interest and build policy expertise, it may also increase their credibility and lower 
barriers to legislative action, making it easier for new MCs to make unique contributions to 
public policy (Frisch and Kelly 2006, Hall 1996).  
As a result, I expect to find strong and systematic connections between the content of 
new MCs’ legislative agendas and their precongressional career experiences. The number of 
topics on which MCs work is the question of specialization – the decision whether to focus and 
develop expertise on a few versus many policy topics (Hall 1996, Krehbiel 1991, Matthews 
1960).81 MCs that focus on one or only a few issues ‘specialize,’ whereas generalizing may help 
MCs represent districts with diverse constituents. Why would MCs specialize, then?  
MCs’ resource constraints are one reason. MCs have limited time, energy, and effort and 
work in a complex institution that considers a diversity of topics. In this environment, 
specialization helps to enhance MCs’ effectiveness in successfully advocating for policy change, 
developing their policy reputation among colleagues, and strengthening their name-recognition 
among voters (Asher 1973, Fenno 1973, Kingdon 1984, Matthews 1960, Schiller 1995, Wawro 
2000). This division of labor can increase MCs’ power within the chamber and enhance the 
efficiency of congressional policymaking.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that policy specialization is employed in practice. For example, 
new MCs in the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008) introduced bills on 4-5 of the 19 possible 
                                                 
81 Specialization is different than the volume of legislation that MCs introduce. A specialized MC 
may introduce a large volume of legislation, but only on a few topics – typically assumed to be 
those that are related to their committee assignments (Asher 1973, Fenno 1973). 
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topics.82 Nevertheless, specialization is not practiced to the same extent by all MCs (Hall 1996). 
More senior MCs specialize more narrowly than junior MCs (Asher 1973, Hibbing 1991, 
Matthews 1960). There is also an indication that precongressional careers play a role in these 
decisions. Matthews (1960) found that Senators with political experience specialize their agendas 
more than other newly elected Senators. However, the analysis was never extended to the House 
of Representatives. 
I expect that there are career based differences in specialization among new MCs in the 
House. Since specialization is a legislative norm, I hypothesize that MCs with previous 
legislative experience introduce bills across a smaller number of policy topics. I expect that 
political amateurs from legal backgrounds may specialize as well, in light of the specialization in 
legal experience. Legal specialization cultivates policy topics on specific issues (Miller 1995). In 
addition, it familiarizes MCs with the advantages of not taking on too much. As a result, MCs 
from these backgrounds may be able to more quickly gain policy expertise and solidify their 
reputation among colleagues and voters.  
In addition, in this chapter I look at the policy content of the bills that new MCs introduce 
and cosponsor. I expect that there are strong connections between precongressional careers and 
the types of issues that new MCs take up. For instance, these experiences develop policy ideas 
that MCs can apply in Congress, which may facilitate their participation in these policy 
discussions.  Along these lines, I hypothesize that new MCs introduce and cosponsor more bills 
on policy issues with clear ties to their career backgrounds than other MCs without these 
experiences. For example, I expect that MCs with medical experience like Rep. Coburn 
introduce more medical bills than a former farmer. As I noted above, to see these connections, I 
                                                 
82 New MCs, on average, cosponsor at least one bill on 17 of the 19 possible policy topics. 
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do not separate out MCs with versus without any prior political experience. Rather, I look at 
eleven common precongressional experiences, demonstrating the variety of connections that 
occur between MCs’ precongressional careers and congressional behavior. 
Policy Specialization: Focused Agendas 
MCs can introduce or cosponsor bills on every different policy under consideration by 
Congress, or they could focus on a selection of them. Rep. Coburn (R-OK), the doctor turned 
MC introduced at the beginning of this chapter, provides the consummate example of policy 
specialization. During his first term in the 104th Congress, all of the bills he introduced related 
directly to health issues. Conversely, new MCs may introduce bills across a range of policy 
issues. Former attorney and state court judge Rep. Jimmy Duncan (R-TN), for example, 
introduced bills on seven different topics his first term (101st Congress) and on thirteen policy 
topics his second term (102nd Congress).  
I argue that MCs from different career backgrounds take different approaches to the 
specialization of their legislative agendas. If new MCs are going to take legislative action on an 
issue, then they have to be familiar with the topic and policies in question. As I noted in chapters 
one and two, individuals interested in certain issues may pick career options that address these 
topics, be it for reasons of personal history, personality, family tradition, etc. In addition, career 
experiences can provide additional policy insight into these issues; they build an issue-specific 
body of knowledge from which new MCs can draw when making legislative decisions (Hall 
1996). As such, career experience can provide additional expertise to individuals interested in 
fighting for particular issues. This is advantageous for members newly elected to a complex 
legislative institution that covers an enormous breadth of policy concerns. They have a head start 
in wading through the issues and arguments that flavor policy debates. 
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Beyond establishing policy knowledge, career experiences can also teach MCs the value 
of specialization. Focusing on a few topics allows new MCs to conserve scarce resources. In 
turn, they can deploy their resources strategically to buttress their attempts to cultivate policy 
expertise and a clear reputation among voters and colleagues (Matthews 1960, Asher 1973). I 
expect that MCs whose career experiences illuminate the value, and encourage the practice, of 
specialization introduce bills on fewer topics in Congress as a result. I have three hypotheses 
about which MCs construct more specialized legislative agendas. The first considers the 
comparison of political experience to political amateurs, the second focuses on only MCs with 
prior political experience, and the third looks at political amateurs. 
 First, I do not expect that differences emerge in the specialization of MCs’ legislative 
agendas based on political experience, broadly defined. Specialization is a norm of legislative 
(congressional) behavior (Matthews 1960, Frantzich 1979, Payne 1980). As a result, there is less 
reason to expect that all politically experienced MCs act the same. Instead, I expect that MCs 
from different political and nonpolitical backgrounds construct more/less specialized legislative 
agendas.  
Second, I anticipate that MCs with legislative political experience specialize more 
narrowly than other  politically experienced MCs. Since specialization is a legislative 
(congressional) norm, legislative experience should drive home the lesson that successful 
legislators build policy reputations around a manageable number of issues.  This may be a 
particularly salient lesson for any individuals whose interest in a select number of policy issues 
motivated their run for legislative office. As a result, I hypothesize that former state legislators 




 But I expect that legislative experience is not related to the number of topics on which 
MCs with legislative experience cosponsor. Because cosponsoring requires less effort than 
sponsorship, cosponsoring one bill does not subtract from the ability to cosponsor another bill. 
Since specialization is driven by the resource constraints of legislators (and, by extension, 
legislatures), I posit that specialization is characteristic of MCs’ sponsorship versus 
cosponsorship behavior. 
Third, looking at MCs without prior political experience, amateurs with legal experience 
may differ from other political amateurs, although there are competing expectations that arise. In 
chapter four, I discussed similarities between legal experience and congressional experience that 
enhance legislative productivity – bargaining, advocacy, and legal analysis (Eulau and Sprague 
1964). Underlying all of these similarities is a basic familiarity with the creation and 
interpretation of legislative statutes. This may work in two ways. On one hand, like legislators, 
lawyers typically specialize on one area of law (Miller 1995). Similar to legislative experience, 
legal experience may help MCs discern the value of focusing on a few policy topics and set them 
up to do so by developing policy expertise on specific topics. On the other hand, lawyers who are 
familiar with the policy process and creating legislative statutes may be able to put their legal 
and legislative knowledge to use on a broad range of topics. I address these expectations below. 
Comparing Patterns of Specialization 
 Figure 5.2 provides an initial assessment of these hypotheses for new MCs during the 
101st-110th Congresses.83 Because I formulate hypotheses about three groups of MCs (all MCs, 
MCs with precongressional political experience, and political amateurs), the three panels of the 
figure shows three sets of comparisons. The first panel compares all MCs based on whether or 
                                                 
83 Because I want to capture behavior over MCs first four years, I include each term that MCs 
served separately when computing these averages (means per MC-Congress). 
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not they have had prior political experience. The middle panel highlights differences between 
MCs with prior political experience. Finally, the bottom panel looks at political amateurs. 
There are two columns in each panel of the figure, one for the number of policy topics on 
which MCs introduce bills and cosponsor bills, per MC-per Congress. On average, MCs 
introduce at least one bill in 17 of 19 policy topics and cosponsor an average of 25 times the 
number of bills that they sponsor (9 bill introductions versus 225 cosponsorships). In other 
words, using one cosponsorship per policy topic is an uninformative standard. As an alternative, 
I look at whether or not MCs cosponsor more than the average (mean) number of bills 
cosponsored by all new MCs in that policy topic.84  
As is evident in the first panel of the figure, there is essentially no difference in the 
agenda size of MCs with versus without political experience for bill sponsorship. I find a sharper 
and significant distinction in cosponsorship behavior. MCs with political experience build 
broader cosponsorship agendas than amateurs (t=-3.5, p=.00), perhaps in reflection of the range 
of policy experiences they encounter in their earlier political offices. On average, they cosponsor 
an above average number of bills on an additional policy topic. 
In the second panel, I focus on only the sample of MCs who had prior political 
experience. Like I expected, MCs with legislative political experience construct more specialized 
legislative agendas, although the difference is small. Their cosponsorship activities do not differ, 
though, in line with my expectations. In the final set of figures, I show the comparisons for 
                                                 
84 To calculate this, I determined the average number of cosponsorships for each policy topic 
(per MC per Congress). Then, I counted the number of policy topics for which each MC 
cosponsored more than the topic-specific average. This calculation reflects activity levels per 




political amateurs. Contrary to what I expected, lawyers do not show markedly different patterns 
of behavior on introductions.  
Examining Policy Specialization By Career Experience: Regression Analyses 
To ascertain whether these differences remain in light of other salient considerations, I 
estimate three sets of ordinary least squares regression analyses. (Results are presented in 
separate tables.) I start with a simple regression framework, comparing MCs based on broad 
political experience (Political Experience), with the excluded category as political amateurs.85 
These analyses examine all MCs in their first four years during the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-
2010). I next examine different types of political and nonpolitical experiences, to test my second 
and third hypotheses. To do so, I look at MCs with political experience separately from political 
amateurs (and vice versa). In the second set of regression analyses, I look only at political 
amateurs in the 101st-110th Congresses. Legal Experience (0/1 for nonpolitical legal experience) 
is the key variable of interest in the political amateur model. The baseline category is all other 
amateurs.  
In the third set of analyses, presented in Table 5.5, my sample is all new MCs from the 
101st-110th Congress who had political experience before Congress. There are two key 
independent variables in model for MCs with prior political experience, taken from chapter four: 
State Legislator and Congressional Staff.  Experienced MCs without state or federal legislative 
experience are the omitted category.  
Dependent and Control Variables 
My dependent variables are the number of policy topics on which MCs introduce at least 
one bill and the number of issues on which they cosponsor more than the mean number of bills in 
                                                 
85 This variable is the same as that described in chapters three and four.  
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that topic. As I noted above, I use the mean number of cosponsorships per policy topic because 
cosponsorship is a common activity. Using this as my standard of comparison captures the 
number of policies to which MCs devote greater attention.  
In each regression model, I control for other considerations that may influence MCs’ 
behavior. First, I include a variable, Career Experiences, that counts the number of 
precongressional career experiences (political and nonpolitical) that MCs have had. If career 
experiences provide policy insight, MCs with a greater number of career experiences may 
introduce and cosponsor bills on a greater number of policy topics (Holland 1996). Controlling 
for the number of career experiences helps to isolate the effect of specific types of experiences.  
In addition, status as a freshmen, minority party member, and electorally vulnerable 
member may all depress legislative activity across the board. MCs may lack either the 
knowledge or ability to participate as freshmen or minority party members. I use 0/1 variables 
that tap whether new MCs are: in their first term (First Term), majority party members (In 
Majority), white/minority (White), a woman (Woman), and whether they served a partial term 
(Partial Term). I also include variables that tap MCs’ ideological distance from the median 
member of their party (Ideo. Distance Party Median, as discussed in chapter four) and electoral 
vulnerability (Vote Share, percent of two-party vote in the previous election, and Vote Share2, to 
account for any non-linearity in the effect of vote share). Finally, I also include a categorical 
variable Education Level, with higher values indicating more advanced degrees, to control for 
any relationship between education and MCs’ issue activity.86 
                                                 
86 MCs’ education was coded from the Almanac of American Politics, where 1=less than high 
school degree, 2=high school degree, 3=some college, 4=college degree, 5=post-graduate degree. 
See chapter three for more details. 
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Because MCs who introduce or cosponsor a greater number of bills are more likely to do 
so in any policy area, I also control for the total number of MCs’ bills and cosponsorships per 
Congress (across all policy categories) [Total Introductions, Total Cosponsorships]. Since MCs 
are elected to represent constituent interests, the range of these district interests may impact the 
breadth of MCs’ legislative agendas. I control for the heterogeneity of the district with District 
Heterogeneity, a composite measure that taps racial, educational, income, occupational, and 
religious differences in the district.  
Regression Results for Policy Specialization 
As shown in Table 5.2, the political/no political experience distinction does not capture 
significant differences in the specialization of new MCs’ legislative agendas. Political experience 
in general does not distinguish MCs’ legislative specialization from that of political amateurs, as 
I had anticipated. Rather, differences relate to the specific types of political and nonpolitical 
experience that MCs have had before Congress, as can be seen in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
Table 5.3 examines political amateurs only, with all other amateurs from non-legal 
backgrounds as the excluded category. I find that lawyers without prior political experience 
introduce bills on a smaller number of policy topics than other amateurs.  Perhaps because of 
their interest in specific topics that led them to a legal career or the emphasis of the legal career 
on specialization, political amateurs from legal backgrounds specialize their legislative agendas 
more narrowly than other new MCs without prior political experience. This means that, had 
every amateur entering Congress during the 101st-110th Congress had legal experience, fewer 
policy debates would have the input of political amateurs. 
Table 5.4 shows the results for MCs with prior political experience. MCs with legislative 
experience do not build more specialized legislative agendas compared to other experienced 
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MCs. Congressional staff experience washes out as well.87 Taking a closer look at both 
congressional staffers and state legislators helps explain the non-significant results for MCs with 
legislative experience. Of the 96 former staffers elected to Congress, 15% of them were elected 
to Congress immediately after working as congressional staff. The norm and value of 
specialization is particularly fresh for these staffers, and their sponsorships agendas are more 
focused. They sponsor bills on about one fewer topics compared to those of other staffers.  
Do these other staffers forget the value of specialization? Perhaps, although the results 
from chapter four suggest a different explanation. Staff experience in Congress, regardless of 
when it occurs, provides MCs familiarity with the policy process and policy debates. For 
example, compared to other MCs, former staffers introduce a greater number of bills making 
significant changes to the law. What I expect is occurring, then, is that congressional staffers 
who do other things before running for Congress combine their familiarity with the policy 
process with the policy insights gleaned from their other experiences. Upon reaching Congress, 
they take action on a wider range of policy topics. 
In the case of state legislators, patterns of specialization may differ based on the 
professionalization of the state legislature. Institutional factors can encourage legislative 
specialization (Matthews 1960, Schiller 1995). For example, Senators – who have longer terms 
and fewer colleagues – do not face the same pressure to specialize as House members, whose 
terms are shorter and who have more than four times the number of colleagues (Matthews 1960, 
Schiller 1995).  
Since professionalized legislatures bear the greatest resemblance to Congress, state 
legislators from them may specialize more narrowly than other state legislators (and other 
                                                 
87 This holds true in another specification of the regression model (not shown here) where I 
include a variable for Legal Experience.  
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experienced MCs). However, and counterintuitively, I expect the opposite. One of the incentives 
for specialization is the resource constraints that legislators face. Comparatively, these are 
greater for legislators in less professionalized legislatures. Individuals in less professionalized 
legislatures have fewer staff and serve in shorter sessions, both of which make it more difficult to 
develop policy knowledge on a broad range of policy topics. As a result, they may bring a more 
circumscribed bundle of policy insights to Congress. In light of this, I hypothesize that legislators 
from less professionalized state legislatures introduce bills on fewer policy topics than other 
politically experienced MCs. 
Examining State Legislators By Legislative Professionalism 
 To assess this expectation, I re-estimate the regression model for my sample of politically 
experienced MCs. I replace State Legislator with two dichotomous variables for state legislative 
experience that tap the professionalization of the state legislature in which members served: 
Professionalized Legislature and Less Professionalized Legislature.88 I use Squire’s index of 
professionalization to determine the professionalization of the state legislature. All other 
variables remain the same in the re-estimated model; results are presented in Table 5.5. 
State legislators do act differently when taking into consideration the professionalization 
of the state legislature. Legislators from less professionalized legislatures introduce bills in fewer 
policy topics than legislators from professionalized legislatures, all other things considered. In 
contrast, individuals who served in professionalized state legislatures construct broader 
cosponsorship agendas. For example, almost half (45%) of state legislators from professionalized 
                                                 
88 No MCs served in both a professionalized and less professionalized legislature. 111 MCs 




legislatures introduce bills on nine or more policy topics, compared to less than one-third (26%) 
of state legislators from less professionalized legislatures. 
 Initially, these results seem counterintuitive to the logic of professionalization. As I 
noted above, though, they highlight the connection between the structure of legislative 
institutions and member behavior. In addition, specialization is motivated by legislators’ 
resource constraints. The structure of state legislatures impacts the resources that state legislators 
have at their disposal, which creates different incentives for their behavior. I find that these 
differences remain during former state legislators’ early congressional terms in a surprising but 
statistically significant way.  
How do these differences matter?  Imagine each of the 19 policy topics considered in 
Congress as a separate table where conversations go on about related issues. Introducing a bill on 
a policy topic is like pulling up a figurative 'chair' to the table and joining the conversation. So, 
for example, if a new MC introduced bills on 4 policy topics, she figuratively pulled up chairs to 
4 policy tables. New MCs get to decide how many policy conversations they join, which I tap by 
looking at the size of their legislative agendas. Legislators from more and less professionalized 
legislatures differ in the number of policy conversations they join (via the number of policy 
topics on which they introduce bills). MCs from professionalized legislatures pull up ‘chairs’ to 
1-2 more policy tables than other former state legislators.  
To see the aggregate difference this makes, imagine a world in which the 111 state 
legislators from professionalized legislatures had served instead in less professionalized 
legislatures. In this alternative world, there would be approximately 60 fewer figurative chairs 
pulled up to policy tables in the 101st-110th Congress. Alternatively, if all of the 234 MCs from 
less professionalized legislatures had served in professionalized legislatures, then over these 
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years there would be approximately 129 more chairs pulled up to policy debates.89 
Unfortunately, my data do not speak to what new MCs do at these policy tables, i.e. the 
substance of the bills they introduce in different policy areas.90 This makes drawing firm 
conclusions about these differences is difficult. But, if we assume that participation influences 
legislative outcomes, then my (counterintuitive) findings point to directions for future research 
that elaborate on this connection.  
All Other Things Considered 
Of course, other things factor into MCs’ decision making. The greater the number of bills 
MCs introduce or cosponsor, the greater the number of topics they have the potential to address. 
Likewise, MCs who serve partial terms focus their introductions and cosponsorships on fewer 
topics. Serving a shorter term than the rest of their colleagues, these MCs may narrow their focus 
to accelerate the development of their policy reputation and record. 
Two other patterns stand out. First, correlates of cosponsorship and sponsorship differ. 
For example, first term MCs introduce bills in fewer topics than second term MCs, but there are 
not significant differences in their cosponsorship behavior. Likewise, electoral margins are 
                                                 
89 As a baseline for comparison, I multiple the number of new MCs from professionalized state 
legislatures during the 101st-1110th Congresses by the average number of policy topics on which 
they introduce bills (111 MCs * 4.95 policy topics = 549.45). This is the figurative number of 
chairs pulled up to policy tables by MCs with professionalized state legislative experience. Then 
I multiple the number of new MCs during the 101st-110th Congresses from less professionalized 
state legislatures by the average number of policy topics on which they introduce bills (234 MCs 
* 4.4 policy topics = 1,029.6). To see the difference in participation in my hypothetical scenarios, 
I multiple the number MCs from professionalized legislatures (111) by the number of topics 
introduced by MCs from less professionalized legislatures (4.4) and subtract this number (488.4) 
from the baseline (549.5) for a difference of 61. Similarly, I multiple the number of MCs from 
less professionalized legislatures (234) by the number of topics introduced by MCs from 
professionalized legislatures (4.95) and subtract this number (1,158.3) from the baseline 
(1,029.6) for a difference of 128.7.  
90 In the last half of this chapter, I find that MCs introduce and cosponsor a greater number of 
bills on topics related to their past career experiences.  
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related to MCs’ sponsorship agendas, but not their cosponsorship activity. Second, the behavior 
of MCs with and without political experience has different correlates as well. For example, there 
is a gender difference that emerges among politically experienced MCs. Female politicians with 
political experience prior to Congress introduce bills on a wider range of topics than female 
political amateurs. For women interested in serving in Congress, political experience paves the 
way for contributing to a wider scope of policy debates.  
Congruence Between Legislative Agendas and Precongressional Careers 
Overall, I find that there are discernible differences in the specialization of MCs’ 
legislative agendas that track their precongressional career experiences. Do the policy topics on 
which MCs specialize build from the career experiences that bring MCs to office? If so, this 
could look like the example of Rep. Coburn – a former medical doctor focusing on medical 
issues.  
In general, I expect that these connections occur. If policy specialization within Congress 
is intended to develop policy expertise, then career experiences effectively do the same before 
Congress. Given that individuals choose careers based in part on the job’s congruence with their 
personal interest in topics, tasks, or work environments, I expect that precongressional career 
experience helps to distinguish the issues about which MCs are concerned (Holland 1985). Thus, 
there is reason to think that MCs may continue advocating for these issues once elected to 
Congress. For example, as one MC explained, “My commitment to educational equity and 
excellence is what keeps me coming back to Congress. As a former educator, I can’t quit until 
I’m able to deliver that for each and every child” (Congressional Management Foundation 2013). 
I expect that MCs with related experience introduce a greater volume of legislation on 
corresponding policy topics than MCs without that same experience. I expect the same 
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relationship to appear for MCs’ cosponsorship activities as well. As I noted at the beginning of 
this chapter, connections between career experiences and the contents of MCs’ legislative 
agendas should emerge over a broad range of career experiences. In light of this, I do not 
separate out MCs by prior political experience, as I did in the previous section. Instead, I identify 
career experiences that provide direct or unique insights into public policy issues across the 19 
different policy categories for my entire sample of MCs.  
My hypothesis is that MCs with related career experience introduce and cosponsor more 
bills on career-relevant policies (such as education experience and education policy, agricultural 
experience and agriculture policy, military experience and defense issues, and law enforcement 
and crime policy) than MCs without that same career experience. I also hypothesize that MCs 
with business backgrounds are more active than other MCs on the budget, corporate regulation, 
jobs, and tax policies, having worked in or owned businesses have been directly impacted by 
these policies. For instance, Robert Draper – a New York Times journalist, recounts about House 
Majority Whip Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) that:  
“Just after graduating from high school, young McCarthy had walked into a 
store, purchased a lottery ticket for the very first time, and won five thousand 
dollars. With the proceeds he opened a sandwich shop, Kevin O’s, where his high 
school sweetheart and eventual wife, Judy, also worked. Tired of wading through 
onerous regulations on his small business, he sold out after about a year” (Draper 
2011, 79). 
I anticipate that MCs from legal backgrounds are more active than nonlawyers on budget, 
corporation regulations, taxes, and crime policy (Miller 1995).91 Former state legislators and 
                                                 
91 Here, as opposed to chapter four, I include both political and private legal practice. 
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gubernatorial staff have been government employees in the past, and so I expect them to have 
insights into related issues like intergovernmental relations, bureaucratic oversight, and questions 
about employee benefits and the civil service. I hypothesize that former state legislators and MCs 
with gubernatorial experience (working as or for a state governor) are more active on 
government operations topics relating to how the government is run. State governors are also 
responsible for introducing budgets to the state legislature and for recruiting economic 
development to their state (Kousser and Phillips 2012, Smith and Grenblatt 2014). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that MCs with gubernatorial experience introduce/cosponsor more bills on issues 
about which governors have authority: the budget and jobs. Table 5.6 summarizes the 
connections I expect to observe between precongressional career experiences and congressional 
policy topics.  
Shaping MCs’ Legislative Agendas: Regression Analyses  
To test my hypotheses, I estimate a series of regression models, looking at all of MCs in 
their first four years during the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008).92 I use the entire sample of 
MCs for each regression analysis. My dependent variables are counts of bill sponsorships and 
cosponsorships for each MC per policy topic, in each Congress. I estimate a regression model for 
both sponsorship and cosponsorship activity for each of the eleven policy topics I examine. 
Policy topics are taken from Sulkin (2011) and the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and 
Wilkerson 2013). Each bill is coded into one of the following mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
policy categories: agriculture, budget, campaigns, children and children’s issues, civil rights, 
consumer affairs, corporate regulation, crime, defense, education, environment, government 
operations, health, jobs and infrastructure, moral issues, Medicare, Social Security, taxes, and 
                                                 




welfare. I concentrate on the eleven policy topics that I anticipate relate to different career 
experiences: agriculture, budget, corporate regulation, crime, defense, education, government 
operations, health, jobs and infrastructure, Medicare, and taxes. Since the dependent variables 
are count variables, I estimate negative binomial regression models. 
Independent and Control Variables 
The key independent variables are 0/1 indicators for precongressional experience: 
Agricultural, Business, Education, Gubernatorial, Law Enforcement, Legal, Legislative, 
Medical, and Military.93 I include the independent variables in the regression for the related 
policy topic.  
Business and (state) legislative experience are coded the same as in chapter four. 
Agriculture indicates whether new MCs worked in farming or ranching endeavors, as did 5% of 
new MCs. For example, Rep. Kristi Noem (R-SD) helped run her family’s ranch after her 
father’s untimely death in a farm accident,94 and Rep. Bob Beauprez (R-CO) co-managed his 
family’s dairy farm. Education includes elementary through graduate administrators and 
instructors. Of the 134 new MCs that had prior education experience (20% of all MCs), 34 were 
administrators, 65 were college professors, and 56 taught at the elementary through secondary 
level.95 Gubernatorial includes former governors, lieutenant governors, or top gubernatorial staff 
– such as chiefs of staff. MCs with Law Enforcement experience worked for local/state police or 
sheriff’s forces. For example, Rep. Larkin Smith (R-MS) served in two county police forces, 
worked as the police chief in another, and then became the Harrison County Sheriff, from which 
                                                 
93 See chapters three and for how these career experiences are coded. 
94 Rep. Noem drew on this experience while running for Congress, airing a campaign aid in 
which the narrator described her as “one of us” and she was seen “galloping away on a horse” 
(Steinhauer 2012). 
95 These values do not sum to 134 because some new MCs had multiple education experiences, 
i.e. they were an elementary school teacher and before becoming a principal. 
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position he was elected to Congress. Legal experience captures both public and/or private legal 
practice. Medical experience (4% of new MCs) includes doctors, dentists, and nurses.96 And, 
finally, Military experience is coded for MCs in any branch of the armed forces, reserves, 
National Guard, or coast guard.  
I include the same set of control variables from the first half of this chapter: First Term, 
Ideology, Majority Party, Partial Term, Total Introductions/Cosponsorships, Vote Share, Vote 
Share2, Education Level, White, and Woman. 97 MCs’ legislative agendas should also reflect the 
interests of the districts that they represent. For example, MCs from more rural districts may 
introduce and cosponsor a greater number of agriculture bills. To control for the effect of district 
composition, I include indicators of district characteristics to correspond with the policy topic in 
question, as shown in Table 5.7.  
These variables represent the percent of residents in the district that live in poverty, live 
in a rural area, or are military veterans (% Poverty, % Rural, % Veterans, respectively). In 
addition, Military Base is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the district has a military 
base, and Median Income captures the annual median income of district residents. I control for 
district characteristics in each regression model only as they relate to my expectations in Table 
5.7. For example, since MCs from districts with higher percentages of residents living in rural 
areas may be more active on agriculture issues, I include % Rural only in the regression models 
about agriculture policy. (These variables are available starting with the 103rd Congress.) 
                                                 
96 This variable also includes veterinarians due to the similarity in medical training and practice 
(the difference in species aside!)  
97 The only other minor difference is the variable for ideological extremity. Since MCs have sole 
discretion over the contents of their legislative agenda, the distance from the ‘average’ member 
of the party may be less influential than the overall extremity of their ideological positions. Thus, 
in these regressions the variable Ideological Extremity is the absolute value of MCs’ DW CS-




The Connection Between Career Experiences and the Content of MCs’ Legislative Agendas 
 Results are summarized in Table 5.8; full models can be found in Appendix B. Positive 
and statistically significant coefficients in these cells indicate that MCs with the relevant 
experience are more active on career-relevant polices. The results support my argument that 
career experiences are related to the policy agendas of new MCs. Starting with bill introductions, 
I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the contents of MCs’ policy 
agendas and their career experiences for seven of eleven policy topics: agriculture, corporate 
regulation, crime, government operations, health, Medicare, and taxes.  
I find a similarly strong and significant pattern for cosponsorship on four of the eleven 
policy topics: agriculture, crime, health, and Medicare. MCs with the related career experienced 
cosponsor a greater number of bills on these topics than other MCs. As I noted earlier in this 
chapter, cosponsorship is not the same as sponsorship. MCs take different tacks when it comes to 
specializing – being much more focused in their introductions than cosponsorships. A similar 
observation can be made here. In general, as would be expected, cosponsorship allows MCs the 
opportunity to identify with their constituents. Because it is a low-cost activity, it is perhaps 
surprising that career-agenda connections emerge for MCs’ cosponsorship activities. But they 
do. Across a spectrum of experiences, new MCs construct policy agendas that connect back to 
their prior career experiences. 
In general, district characteristics also largely play out as I had anticipated. For example, 
the greater the number of residents living in rural areas, the more agricultural bills that MCs 
sponsor and cosponsor. The null results for military presence are surprising. Defense bills 
represent issues of interest to constituents, especially those that are supportive of the military. 
Because of this, defense introductions are one of the two most common type of bills that MCs 
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introduce (the other being government operations bills). I posit that two distinct dynamics are 
likely occurring. First, MCs representing a military base or large veteran population introduce 
defense-related bills as a way to respond to, and represent, constituent preferences in the policy 
process. At the same time, other MCs (especially those without personal military experience) 
also introduce defense bills in an attempt to beef up their military credentials with constituents – 
particularly those that are pro-military.98  
The total number of introductions/cosponsorships is the only control variable that has a 
consistent relationship to legislative agendas in terms of magnitude, significance, and direction 
(positive and strongly significant). MCs serving a partial term introduce and cosponsor fewer 
bills, but not on every policy topic. This pattern emerges for the other control variables as well. 
The direction and magnitude with which other characteristics relate to legislative activity 
depends on the policy topic. MCs decide how to construct their policy agendas on a topic-by-
topic basis that fits their individual experience.  
This observation has implications for the influence of constituent preferences on 
congressional policy debates (via representatives’ actions). Positive and significant coefficients 
for MC characteristics imply that different policy topics are more accessible points of entry into 
the legislative process for certain MCs (e.g., freshmen, minority party members, minorities, 
women, etc.). Negative and significant coefficients indicate the opposite. There are topics that 
certain new MCs are less likely to take up, either because of the complexity of issues discussed 
or their resonance with electoral concerns.  
 
 
                                                 
98 For example, the maximum number of bills introduced by not veteran MC with a district base 
is 13, versus 5 for military-experienced MCs with a base in their district. 
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The Substantive Effect of Career Experiences 
The regression coefficients in Table 5.8 cannot be directly interpreted because the 
analyses are estimated with a maximum-likelihood procedure.99 Figure 5.3 shows the substantive 
impact of career experiences on MCs’ legislative agendas by graphing the average percent 
change in the number of sponsorships (top panel) and cosponsorships (bottom panel) as a 
function of having the relevant career experience.100 In the top panel (sponsorship), it is obvious 
that career experiences have a strong relationship with legislative activity.  
What does this mean in actual numbers of introductions? One way to think about it is to 
imagine what would happen if every new MC that entered Congress during the 101st-110th 
Congresses came from particular career backgrounds. For example, if, hypothetically, every new 
MC during those years came from a business background, there would have been 50 more tax 
bills and 43 more corporate regulation bills introduced. Additionally, if every new cohort was 
full of former farmers, they would have introduced 130 more agriculture bills. Likewise, if every 
new member of Congress from 1989-2008 came from a law enforcement background, there 
would have been almost 700 more crime bills introduced in the same period. Or, if every new 
member of Congress had medical experience during the 101st-110th Congresses, then over those 
years there would have been approximately 350 more Medicare bills and 750 more health bills 
introduced.101 MCs from distinct career backgrounds act in unique ways that have important 
ramifications for public policies and, through them, constituent representation. 
                                                 
99 The regression coefficients indicate the log of the expected count of the dependent variable as 
a function of the independent variables (Hilbe 2007).  
100 I estimate the incident rate ratio for each of the independent variables, and then transformed it 
into a percent change.  
101 I calculate the percent difference of relevant career experience in number of introductions and 




The relationship between career experiences and cosponsorship is more muted, which is 
not overly surprising. These results suggest that MCs use cosponsorship as a way to devote 
attention to an issue that is important to constituents when MCs cannot take action on every topic 
and lack relevant, first-hand expertise on the issue. Yet career experiences still emerge as 
strongly related to new MCs’ legislative activities. Agriculture, law enforcement, and medical 
experience have the strongest effect. In terms of numbers of bills cosponsored, MCs with the 
relevant career experience cosponsor 3 more Medicare bills, 4 more agriculture bills, 6 more 
crime bills, and 6 more health bill per MC-per Congress. 
Although these may seem like small differences, they add up to an important aggregate 
difference. If every new MC in the 101st-110th Congresses had medical experience, for example, 
there would have been over 1,800 more cosponsors on Medicare bills and over 3,700 more 
cosponsors on health bills. Similarly, in a world in which every new MC had prior agricultural 
experience, agriculture bills in the 101st-110th Congresses would have had 2,600 more 
cosponsors. If every new MC in those years had law enforcement experience, it would have 
added up to over 4,000 more cosponsors for crime policies.102 New MCs’ legislative agendas 
reflect the career paths that brought them to office, in ways that can impact the contents of the 





                                                 
102  I calculate the percent difference of relevant career experience in number of cosponsorships 





 Like Rep. Coburn introduced at the beginning of this chapter, MCs build their policy 
agendas around issues that relate back to previous work experiences.103 Granted, voters could 
select MCs for this very reason. Voters may want a representative from a business background, 
say, or a medical background, a person that can truly ‘understand’ and actively advocate for 
voters’ preferences. The evidence I have presented in this chapter suggests that this reasoning is 
sound.  
When considering which experiences inform policy activity, I find that MCs are more 
active on topics related to their past experiences than MCs without these occupational 
backgrounds. MCs both introduce and cosponsor a greater number of bills that correspond to 
topics addressed in their previous experiences. I find that these connections emerge across a 
broad range of experiences, both  political and nonpolitical – agricultural, business, legal, law 
enforcement, state legislative, gubernatorial, and medical.  
Along the same lines, MCs differ in the extent to which they specialize their policy focus 
and concentrate on a few related topics versus addressing a broader scope of legislative 
initiatives. MCs who have had previous experience in a setting that values this type of focus craft 
more specialized policy agendas in Congress, e.g. introduce bills on a smaller number of policy 
topics. For example, when I look at political amateurs, I demonstrate that MCs with legal 
backgrounds construct the most specialized agendas. Somewhat unexpectedly, and contrary to 
common expectations about legislative professionalization, I find that MCs from less 
professionalized state legislatures have more specialized agendas, not MCs from 
professionalized state legislatures. I argue that this reflects the importance of resource constraints 
                                                 
103 Thankfully, though, not every new MC shared Rep. Coburn’s opinions on the merit of 
political science research. 
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as a motivator for policy specialization and how less professionalized legislators face a greater 
number of them.  
These results suggest that career diversity is an important way that a diversity of issues 
and constituent interests get articulated on Capitol Hill. When MCs are more active on policies 
that relate to their past experiences, their legislative proposals benefit from the lessons and 
insights gleaned from their personal experiences. In turn, the concerns and opinions of 
constituents from different career experiences receive a voice in policy circles. The diversity of 
career paths taken to Capitol Hill has implications for the number of proposals that are 
considered across different policy topics. 
 In conclusion, in this chapter and the previous one, I paint a picture of the many ways in 
which MCs’ legislative decisions relate back to the career decisions they made before Congress. 
Whether it is the volume and type of policy tools they use, or the content and focus of their 
policy agendas, MCs differ in the way they contribute to policy outcomes. The final question I 
consider is whether they also relate to the ways that MCs navigate the partisan environment of 
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# Instances Bill 
Cosponsored 
Corporate Regulation 103 3,261 
Social Security 125 4,922 
Budget 197 6,744 
Consumer Affairs 217 4,798 
Medicare 243 10,054 
Campaign 340 4,877 
Agriculture 359 6,866 
Taxes 500 13,730 
Education 644 13,235 
Crime 661 17,911 
Health 862 30,481 
Jobs 1,481 35,691 
Defense 1,574 43,141 
Government Operations 2,119 28,543 
Note: The first column sums the total number of bills per policy topic introduced by all first and 
second term MCs from the 101st-110th Congresses. The second column sums the number of times 
MCs cosponsored a bill on that policy topic.  














Table 5.2 Differences in Legislative Specialization of MCs with versus without Political 






Any Political Experience .03 (.14) -.02 (.15) 
Number of Career Experiences .03 (.04) .02 (.05) 
First Term -.36 (.09)*** -.04 (.12) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median .21 (.55) -.25 (.75) 
Majority Party -.02 (.09) -.23 (.12)** 
Partial Term -.60 (.15)*** -.52 (.21)*** 
Total Intros./Cosponsorships .29 (.01)*** .04 (.00)*** 
Vote Share -.08 (.03)*** .01 (.04) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00)** -.00 (.00) 
White .33 (.18)* .30 (.22) 
Woman  .33 (.18)* .24 (.18) 
Education Level .12 (.07)* .12 (.08) 
District Heterogeneity -3.05 (1.13)*** 1.39 (1.61) 
Constant 5.91 (1.41)*** -2.47 (1.73) 
N 1,193 (677 unique clusters) 1,193 (677 unique clusters) 
R2 .66 .84 
Note: The dependent variable in the first column is the number of policy topics on which MCs 
introduced at least one bill (per Congress). The dependent variable in the second column is the 
number of policy topics on which MCs cosponsored more than the mean number of bills 
cosponsored in that policy topic (per Congress). The unit of analysis is a MC in a single 
Congress, and the sample is all new MCs (in the first and/or second term) during the 101st-110th 
Congresses. The excluded category is political amateurs. Regressions were estimated with 






















Legal Experience -1.02 (.34)*** -.37 (.27) 
Number of Career Experiences -.18 (.14) -.05 (.10) 
First Term -.44 (.23)* -.17 (.27) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median .25 (1.49) 1.05 (1.17) 
Majority Party -.01 (.21) .30 (.21) 
Partial Term -.64 (.45) -.16 (.42) 
Total Intros./Cosponsorships .28 (.04)*** .04 (.00)*** 
Vote Share -.05 (.08) -.16 (.09)* 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00)* 
White .20 (.36) -.51 (.46) 
Woman  .43 (.34) -.27 (.28) 
Education Level .20 (.18) .00 (.14) 
District Heterogeneity -6.89 (2.99)** 4.10 (3.27) 
Constant 6.92 (3.37)** 2.52 (3.02) 
N 198 (116 unique clusters) 198 (116 unique clusters) 
R2 .65 .88 
Note: The dependent variable in the first column is the number of policy topics on which MCs 
introduced at least one bill (per Congress). The dependent variable in the second column is the 
number of policy topics on which MCs cosponsored more than the mean number of bills  
cosponsored in that policy topic (per Congress). The unit of analysis is political amateurs in a 
single Congress, and the sample is all political amateurs in their first and/or second term during 
the 101st-110th Congress. The excluded category is political amateurs without legal experience. 
Regressions were estimated with ordinary least squares, and standard errors were clustered on 





















State Legislator .06 (.05) .06 (.15) 
Congressional Staff Experience -.15 (.11) -.08 (.22) 
Number of Career Experiences -.17 (.15) .03 (.05) 
First Term -.34 (.10)*** -.03 (.13) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median .29 (.59) -.63(.89) 
Majority Party -.01 (.10) -.29 (.14)** 
Partial Term -.58 (.16)*** -.52 (.23)** 
Total Intros./Cosponsorships .39 (.01)*** .03 (.00)*** 
Vote Share -.08 (.04)** .03 (.05) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00)** -.00 (.00) 
White .34 (.19)* .34 (.24) 
Woman  .40 (.13)*** .32 (.20)* 
Education Level .14 (.07)* .15 (.09) 
District Heterogeneity -2.43 (1.21)** .94 (1.78) 
Constant 5.45 (1.57)*** -3.20 (2.00) 
N 995 (562 unique clusters) 995 (562 unique clusters) 
R2 .67 .83 
Note: The dependent variable in the first column is the number of policy topics on which MCs 
introduced at least one bill (per Congress). The dependent variable in the second column is the 
number of policy topics on which MCs cosponsored more than the mean number of bills  
cosponsored in that policy topic (per Congress). The unit of analysis is politically experienced 
MCs in a single Congress, and the sample is all new MCs with prior political experience in their 
first and/or second term during the 101st-110th Congresses. The excluded category is MCs with 
non-legislative political experience. Regressions were estimated with ordinary least squares, and 


























Less Professionalized State Legislature -.30 (.11)*** -.10 (.16) 
Professionalized State Legislature .16 (.15) .41 (.21)** 
Congressional Staff Experience -.16 (.15) -.08 (.22) 
Number of Career Experiences .04 (.04) .02 (.05) 
First Term -.34 (.10)*** -.03 (.13) 
Ideo. Distance Pty Median .33 (.59) -.61 (.90) 
Majority Party .01 (.10) -.27 (.14)** 
Partial Term -.61 (.16)*** -.57 (.24)** 
Total Intros./Cosponsorships .29 (.01)*** .03 (.00)*** 
Vote Share -.09 (.04)*** .02 (.05) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00)** -.00 (.00) 
White .36 (.19)* .36 (.23) 
Woman  .43 (.13)*** .35 (.20)* 
Education Level .06 (.09) .09 (.10) 
District Heterogeneity -1.69 (1.23) 1.67 (1.77) 
Constant 5.75 (1.60)*** -2.97 (1.97) 
N 995 (562 unique clusters) 995 (562 unique clusters) 
R2 .67 .83 
Note: The dependent variable in the first column is the number of policy topics on which MCs 
introduced at least one bill (per Congress). The dependent variable in the second column is the 
number of policy topics on which MCs cosponsored more than the mean number of bills 
cosponsored in that policy topic (per Congress). The unit of analysis is politically experienced 
MCs in a single Congress, and the sample is all new MCs with prior political experience in their 
first and/or second term during the 101st-110th Congresses. The excluded category is MCs with 
non-legislative political experience. Regressions were estimated with ordinary least squares, and 


















Table 5.6 Expected Relationships Between Policy Topics and Career Experience 
Career 
Experience Related Policy Topic(s) 
Agriculture Agriculture 
Business Budget, Corporate Regulation, Jobs, Taxes 
Legal Budget, Corporate Regulation, Crime, Taxes 
Law Enforcement Crime 
Military Defense 
Education Education 
State Legislators Government Operations 
Governors Budget, Government Operations, Jobs 
Medical Health, Medicare 
Source: Congressional Bills Project, Sulkin (2011) 
 
Table 5.7   Expected Relationships: Policy Topics and District Characteristics 
Policy Topic Key District Characteristics 
Agriculture % Rural 
Corporate Regulation % White Collar 
Crime % Poverty, % Minority 
Defense Military base in district, % Veterans 
Jobs % Living in poverty 
Medicare % Living in poverty 
Taxes %  Living in poverty 
Note: District characteristics are measured as the mean per district and are not available for the 
101st and 102nd Congresses. 











Table 5.8 Relevant Career Experience Increases Legislative Activity of New MCs, Summary of 
Regression Results 
 INTRODUCTIONS Agriculture Budget Corp. Reg. 
Agricultural .53 (.25)**   
Business  .27 (.24) .79 (.32)*** 
Governor  -.04 (.57)  
Legal  .25 (.27) .70 (.32)** 
 INTRODUCTIONS Crime Defense Education 
Education   .23 (.15) 
Law Enforcement 1.06 (.40)***   
Legal .24 (.15)   
Military  .02 (.12)  
INTRODUCTIONS Gov Operations Health Jobs 
Business   .02 (.09) 
Governor .44 (.17)***  -.12 (.23) 
Legislative .13 (.07)*   
Medical  1.10 (.18)***  
 INTRODUCTIONS Medicare Taxes  
Business  .28 (.15)*  
Legal  -.14 (.16)  
Medical 1.29 (.28)***   
COSPONSORSHIPS Agriculture Budget Corp. Reg. 
Agricultural .54 (.08)***   
Business  .06 (.09) .09 (.06) 
Governor  -.25 (.19)  
Legal  .06 (.10) .09 (.06) 
 COSPONSORSHIPS Crime Defense Education 
Education   -.02 (.05) 
Law Enforcement .25 (.14)**   
Legal .12 (.04)***   
Military  .04 (.04)  
COSPONSORSHIPS Gov Operations Health Jobs 
Business   .02 (.03) 
Governor .36 (.09)  .08 (.05) 
Legal -.02 (.03)   
Medical  .21 (.05)***  
COSPONSORSHIPS Medicare Taxes  
Business  .03 (.04)  
Legal  -.04 (.04)  
Medical .31 (.09)***   
Note: Negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered on the individual MCs. Full 
models can be found in Appendix B. The dependent variables are the number of bills that 
individual MCs introduce/cosponsor per policy topic per Congress. The excluded category is all 




Figure 5.1Variation in Career Experiences of New MCs, 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008) 
 
Note: The figure depicts the number of individual MCs who had different career experiences; 
MCs are not counted twice in a category if they serve more than one term. I counted each of 
MCs’ precongressional career experiences, so they may be included in the sum for more than one 
column.  
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Figure 5.2 (cont.) 
 
Note: The figures show the mean number of policy topics on which individual MCs introduced 
at least 1 bill per term. Since cosponsorship is more ubiquitous than sponsorship, I use a different 
standard for calculating the cosponsorship figures. I determine the average number of bills 
cosponsored in each policy topic, and count the number of policy topics on which individual 
MCs cosponsor an above average number of bills. MCs that serve more than one term are 
included twice in the analysis. In the 101st-110th Congresses, there are 561 MCs who had prior 
political experience and 116 political amateurs. Of the 561 MCs with prior political experience, 
there are 345 state legislators, 76 congressional staff, 46 MCs with executive experience, and 
156 MCs with judicial and/or local political experience. Of the 116 political amateurs, 21 have 
legal experience. 

















































Figure 5.3 Average Substantive Effect of Career Experience, Percent Increase in Number of 
Introductions and Cosponsorships 
 
 
Note: Each panel depicts the percent increase in legislative activity with the hypothesized 
relevant career experience. I calculate this by converting the incidence rate ratio of each negative 
binomial regression coefficient to a percent increase/decrease. In the panel for introductions, I 
graph the average percent increase of activity on corporate regulation and tax policies for MCs 
with business experience (120% increase for corporate regulation and 31% increase for tax 
policy). Similarly, for both introductions and cosponsorships, I graph the average percent 
increase of activity on health and Medicare policies for MCs with medical experience. (For 
introductions, this is a 199% increase on health policies and a 264% increase on Medicare 
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Chapter 6: Career Paths to Party Loyalty 
 At first glance, the backgrounds of Reps. Chris Cannon (R-UT) and Anna Eshoo (D-CA) 
have some significant differences. Rep. Eshoo, a Democrat, was born in Connecticut to parents 
of Assyrian and Armenian descent; her father was a watchmaker and jeweler. She was raised in 
the Catholic church and moved west to attend community college, where she earned an English 
degree. After graduation, she worked in the communications field for two corporations. When 
the seat for 14th district of California in the House of Representatives opened up in the 1992 
election (the incumbent ran, unsuccessfully, for the Senate), Eshoo entered the Democratic 
primary, beat six other candidates, and won the general election by 18 percentage points 
(Almanac of American Politics 1994, 122). 
In comparison, Rep. Cannon, a Republican, was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, to a well-
known political family. His great-grandfather was a non-voting member of the House of 
Representatives from 1873 to 1881, before Utah was a state. Future generations of the Cannon 
family had sustained the prominence of the Cannon name in Utah politics. A practicing Mormon, 
Cannon attended Brigham Young University, graduating with a B.S in 1974 and with a J.D. in 
1980. After graduation, he worked in private practice before being hired as a solicitor for the 
Interior General. In 1996, he ran for the seat in the House of Representatives held by Rep. Bill 
Orton (D-UT), a three term incumbent up for reelection. The partisan breakdown of the district 
was not in Rep. Orton’s favor, and Cannon won the November election by four percentage points 
(Almanac of American Politics 2000, 1611). 
 Despite these differences, as new members of Congress, Reps. Cannon and Eshoo’s 
behavior was similar in one important regard. On contentious issues, when the Democratic and 
Republican parties took opposite sides on a policy, Reps. Cannon and Eshoo sided with their 
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parties almost 100% of the time. They were both incredibly loyal partisans; Reps. Cannon and 
Eshoo voted with the other party on only 1% of party line votes.104  
In the case of both Reps. Cannon and Eshoo, I argue that this pattern of party loyalty is 
rooted in what is the most prominent similarity in their precongressional careers: political 
experience. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Cannon served as the Utah Republican Party 
Finance Chairman. Rep. Eshoo had even more extensive political experience. She had been a 
county chairwoman, a Democratic national committeewoman, a member of the California 
Democratic state central executive committee, and a member of the Democratic National 
Commission on Presidential Nominations (Almanac of American Politics 1994, 122; Almanac of 
American Politics 2000, 1611). For Reps. Cannon and Eshoo, their partisan behavior followed 
closely on the heels of their precongressional experiences.105 While loyal partisans may be 
attracted to the idea of a congressional career, in this chapter I explore how career experiences 
encourage partisan loyalty.  
Exploring Precongressional Careers and Partisan Loyalty 
In chapters four and five, I examined the individual decisions that MCs make about their 
representational activities and the topics they take up in office. There, I discuss MCs as 
                                                 
104 Party line votes are roll call votes where the majority (at least 50%) of one party voted 
opposite of the majority (at least 50%) of the other party. On average, new MCs in the 101st-
112th Congresses voted with the majority of the other party on 11% of these votes. Nine new 
MCs sided with the other party on 50% or more of party line votes. 
105 Reps. Cannon and Eshoo’s loyalty did not go unnoticed. In the case of Rep. Eshoo, for 
example, it earned her a reputation as a “loyalist unlikely to break with the party leadership,” 
paving her way into former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s confidence (O’Keefe and 
Sullivan 2013). In February 2014, Speaker Pelosi “stunned colleagues” by endorsing Rep. 
Eshoo’s bid to be the chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee in public and in so doing 
bypassing a Democrat with more seniority on the committee (Rep. Frank Pallone Jr., D-NJ) also 
interested in the position (Dumain 2014). 
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essentially on their own to decide what to do and how to best represent their constituents. But, as 
one Washington D.C. observer noted, new MCs do not always ‘go it alone’:  
“When a brand-new member of Congress comes to Washington, he is fresh from 
the heady experience of winning public acclaim for his politics and victory for 
himself. Then suddenly, the newcomer is a naked freshman in a world of veterans, 
a stranger in the political home he has won for himself. Instinct tells him 
immediately that no individual politician can operate as an atom. He must make 
his way to clusters of comrades” (Smith 2002, 709). 
From the perspective of new MCs, supporting the party, or party loyalty, is intuitive. 
Because parties are coalitions of like-minded legislators, party loyalty entails supporting policies 
and initiatives with which MCs likely agree. Doing so can result in collective benefits like 
passing legislation (Aldrich 1995, Downs 1957, Fenno 1978, Mayhew 1974, Rohde and Shepsle 
1987, Riker 1980). Partisan loyalty has individual benefits, too. Since the success of party 
initiatives depends on members’ support, parties work to ensure party loyalty. They punish 
deviators and reward loyal members using tools like: scheduling bills for votes, assignments MCs 
to committees, and giving them campaign contributions or leadership positions (Cantor and 
Herrnson 1997, Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005, Hasecke and Mycoff  2007,  Heberlig et al. 
2006, Heberlig and Larson 2012, Hedlund et al. 2009, Rohde 1990). 106 These incentives and 
sanctions provide additional impetus for new MCs to demonstrate party loyalty in their early 
                                                 
106 For example, through the strategic use of institutional structure, rules, and scheduling, parties 
solve collective action and social choice problems that would prevent members from passing 
legislation (Aldrich 1995, Clausen and Wilcox 1987, Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005, Giligan 
and Krehbiel 1995, Rohde 1990). Parties also assist members by providing a voting cue for 
citizens, mobilizing the electorate, and donating money to incumbents and challengers (Aldrich 
1995, Heberlig and Larson 2012, Maestas et al. 2005). 
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terms. They also increase the importance of party loyalty to new MCs by influencing MCs’ 
ability to achieve their policy and political goals.  
Party loyalty also has broader importance, too. From the perspective of the parties, 
loyalty can affect the success of partisan initiatives. As a senior MC described his interactions 
with the freshmen MCs in the 104th Congress, 
“In the first six months freshmen would say, ‘Well, Mr.Chairman, I didn’t come 
here for the status quo, I came here to make changes; let the politics take care of 
themselves.’ I would respond, ‘Okay, but…[y]our voting affects our ability to set 
the agenda. So, wake up and be a team player, at least to some extent” (as quoted 
in Barnett 1999, 242). 
  While party loyalty can aid the party in passing its agenda, at the same time it can also 
lead to partisan gridlock if experienced partisans compromise or cross party lines less frequently, 
which has implications for policy outcomes. Gridlock, particularly if driven by partisan loyalty, 
can reduce the number of bipartisan initiatives that become law. Since these voting decisions 
directly impact which policy proposals become law, they have a strong influence on constituent 
representation – particularly for moderate voters.  
Exploring Party Loyalty 
There are many different ways that new MCs can be loyal to their parties: on the votes 
they take, the proposals they advocate, the deals they drive, the explanations they give to 
constituents, and the money they give to party causes. I examine two aspects of party loyalty. I 
look at new MCs’ voting records and campaign contributions – how frequently they vote with or 
against their party and its leaders, and how much money they donate to copartisans. 
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In the first half of the chapter, I examine MCs’ voting records. I focus on “party votes” 
where the majority (at least 50%) of Democrats votes against the majority (at least 50%) of 
Republicans. I also look at whether new MCs vote with or against their party leaders (Speaker, 
Majority Whip, Minority Leader, Minority Whip) when the top two leaders in each party take 
opposite policy positions. Crossing party lines goes against the party’s attempt to pursue its 
legislative agenda.  
In addition to new MCs’ voting records, I examine the amount of money that new MCs 
donate to copartisans to help them get (re)elected. Congressional candidates raise a substantial 
sum of money. Figure 6.1 shows the average amount of money spent by new MCs in the 101st-
112th Congresses. The sum has rapidly increased over time, from approximately $550,000 in the 
101st Congress (1989-1990) to almost three times that amount ($1,600,000) in the 112th Congress 
(2011-2012). Due to recent changes to campaign finance laws, copartisans have become an 
important source of campaign funding (Heberlig and Larson 2012).  
I study campaign donations because, like MCs’ voting records, they too have an impact 
on constituent representation. This campaign cash can make the difference between winning and 
losing an additional seat in the House and, in the aggregate, the chamber majority.  This has 
reverberating policy implications. Berkman, (1994), for example, argues that “long-term change 
in the composition of the House membership is significant because new policy agendas, partisan 
alignments, and attitudes toward legislative norms work their way into the House through 
membership replacement” (1025). Studying precongressional careers deepens the understanding 





What Effect Do Precongressional Careers Have on Party Loyalty? 
Following the pattern of chapter four, I trace the intersection of precongressional careers 
and partisan behavior in two steps. First, I look at all new MCs and compare politically 
experienced MCs to political amateurs. Second, I separately look at MCs with and without 
political experience.  
I expect three broad differences in the party loyalty of new MCs given their career 
experiences. First, I hypothesize that politically experienced MCs donate more money than 
amateurs to copartisans, controlling for the amount they have available to give. I expect that 
experienced MCs donate more money to copartisans than political amateurs because they have 
personal relationships with many of them. Second, comparing MCs with political experience, I 
hypothesize that former congressional staffers, party officials, and state legislators are all more 
loyal partisans than other politically experienced MCs (such as former judges, city 
administrators, or state bureaucrats). They have first-hand familiarity with the roles and 
inducements of the political parties in a legislative setting. Likewise, their political or 
nonpolitical experiences highlight the value and importance of party loyalty (and they may have 
chosen these careers for that reason). Third, and finally, I focus on political amateurs. I 
hypothesize that amateurs from legal backgrounds are more loyal partisans than other political 
amateurs, given that the professional skills and contacts developed through their legal experience 
may encourage party loyalty.107  
                                                 
107 For all three broad expectations, then, I anticipate that career experiences may reinforce any 
preexisting or other inclinations (i.e., personality, socialization, etc.) to party loyalty that may 
lead certain individuals to these precongressional career experiences. Because I cannot run a 
randomized experiment on real MCs’ career backgrounds, I am unable to draw conclusions about 
whether the relationship between career experiences and legislative behavior is casual. 
Nevertheless, my data do allow me to ascertain whether there are significant patterns in the 
behavior of MCs from certain career experiences. Since this replicates the situation (and 
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To test these hypotheses, I concentrate on the loyalty of MCs in their first four years in 
the House of Representatives during the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008).108 The time period 
I study features majority control by both parties, ensuring that results are not due to one party’s 
control of the chamber. The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by differentiating 
broadly between MCs with, versus without, prior political experience. I outline the differences I 
anticipate to observe and use regression analyses to analyze MCs’ voting records and campaign 
contributions. Then I separate MCs into two groups (experienced MCs and amateurs) to 
highlight variation across types of career experiences.  
Voting Cues and Partisan Connections: Amateurs and Experienced MCs 
 New MCs cast thousands of votes per Congress, varying in topic, scope, and significance. 
In chapter five I demonstrated how MCs typically specialize on a small number of the topics 
addressed in these votes. Yet even when new MCs choose to focus their legislative attention on a 
handful of topics, they do not ignore all the others. They have to vote on them when they reach 
the House floor, providing a record of how loyally they support their party. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, I expect that political amateurs and politically experienced are both loyal 
partisans.  
 Amateurs’ lack of prior political experience may encourage their partisan loyalty when 
MCs are uncertain how to vote – when there is a conflict in this ‘field of forces’ that shape MCs’ 
voting decisions (Kingdon 1989). In these situations, I posit that the party position is an 
especially helpful guide for political amateurs (Stratmann 2000). Amateurs step into an 
occupation that can significantly differ from what they have done in the past. But new MCs can 
                                                                                                                                                             
information) of voters and political observers, my findings still have valuable and substantive 
import and shed light on the implications of precongressional careers in Congress. 
108 I do not have voting data on all the MCs elected in special elections.  
175 
 
use the party position to distinguish actions that may or may not sit well with constituents. 
Likewise, party whip activity may help clarify why voting with the party is important and what 
impact it may have on MCs’ voters. Amateurs’ lack of prior experience may lead them to rely 
more frequently on the party position for deciding how to vote – increasing their voting loyalty. 
Politically experienced MCs may use the party line as a voting cue as well. I expect they 
have less need to do so, though, if they can rely on their prior experiences to facilitate their 
decision-making process. But I do not anticipate they are less loyal voters as a result. The reason 
is that political experience may emphasize the value of party loyalty (Thurber 1976). In addition, 
MCs who have associated with the party in the past may be particularly strong partisans. 
Experienced MCs may vote the party line regularly, then. As a result, I do not expect to observe 
significant differences in voting loyalty based on prior political experience.  
MCs can also demonstrate their party loyalty by donating money to party causes. In 
general, new MCs receive a ‘pass’ from their party leaders on contributing to copartisans. From 
the party’s perspective, the priority of new MCs should be to win their own election (Heberlig 
and Larson 2012). Nevertheless, I anticipate that a difference emerges between experienced and 
amateur MCs. I expect that politically experienced MCs enter Congress with attachments to 
other MCs (Berkman 1994). Political experience also illuminates the way that parties operate as 
collective units in pursuit of shared goals, and familiarizes individuals with the value of party 
cooperation (Aldrich 1995, Downs 1957).  I expect that this knowledge and relationships act as a 
motivation to support partisan causes or colleagues, in addition to any predisposition towards 
party support that motivated their desire to run for partisan office. It should be comparatively 
more difficult or unpleasant for them to turn down donations solicited by individuals that new 
MCs know personally. As a result, I hypothesize that MCs with political experience donate more 
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money to copartisan colleagues than political amateurs, controlling for electoral vulnerability and 
the total amount of money they have available to donate.  
Assessing How Amateurs and Experienced MCs’ Loyalty Stack Up 
 To examine these connections, Figure 6.2 compares the voting and donation records of 
MCs with versus without political experience. The first panel shows how frequently MCs vote 
with their party when at least 50% of Democrats voted against at least 50% of Republicans and 
how often MCs vote with their party leaders when opposite sides were taken by the top party 
leaders (Speaker, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, Minority Whip). Higher percentages indicate 
more loyal members (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).109 The second panel reflects the average 
amount of money MCs donate to copartisans (colleagues/candidates) per Congress. Higher 
values equal more generous or supportive partisans.  
On average, the voting patterns of MCs with versus without political experience are 
similar. Amateurs slightly edge out experienced MCs on both counts – voting with the majority 
of the party and party leaders. But the difference is neither substantively nor statistically 
significant. However, members with prior political experience are more generous donors. They 
give approximately $13,500 dollars more to copartisans than amateurs (t=-4.2, p=.00).110 
Table 6.1 illustrates this difference by comparing the ten most generous donors based on 
political experience. Businessman Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY) topped the list for political 
amateurs, donating $217,804 during his second term (110th Congress). Rep. James McDermott 
                                                 
109 These variables were originally scaled so that higher values equal less party loyalty. I rescaled 
them here for clarity of presentation. MCs’ voting loyalty from the 101st-112th Congresses is 
included in the figure, although the regression analysis only looks at the 101st-110th Congresses 
due to the availability of other data. 
110 In the regression analysis to follow, I control for MCs’ electoral security and the amount of 
money they have available to donate (among other things), as both may affect how much MCs 
contribute to copartisans. 
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(D-WA), former psychiatrist and state legislator, gave the most of any experienced MC –
$644,960 in the 102nd Congress. Rep. Davis’ generosity puts him in the 29th spot on the list of 
political experienced MCs. As I expected, MCs with political experience demonstrate different 
partisan behavior in terms of campaign contributions. 
Regression Analyses for Political Experience, Votes, and Donations  
To test this expectation when taking other considerations into account, I conduct a series 
of regression analyses on the campaign contributions and voting records of the 677 new MCs in 
their first four years during the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008). The independent variable of 
interest is Political Experience, a 0/1 variable (as described in chapters three and four), so the 
excluded category is political amateurs.  
Dependent Variables 
My dependent variables are measures of MCs’ voting records and campaign 
contributions. I measure MCs’ voting loyalty in two ways: Party Voting Loyalty and Leader 
Voting Loyalty. These variables capture, respectively, how frequently each MC voted with 
his/her party when at least 50% of both parties vote against each other, or when the top party 
leaders (Speaker, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, Minority Whip) vote against one another. To 
provide an example, consider a MC whose Party Loyalty value was 60%. The MC votes with the 
majority of her party 60% of the time and against it the other 40% of the time. These measures 
were constructed from MCs’ roll call voting records compiled by Poole and Rosenthal and cover 
the 101st-112th Congresses (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).111 On average, new MCs vote 
                                                 
111 Data is not available for all MCs elected in special elections. 
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with the majority of their party and their leaders about 90% of the time, although both range 
between 30% and 100%.112 
My measure of campaign contributions is taken from Heberlig and Larson (2012). Total 
Contributions captures the dollar amount an MC contributes per Congress to other congressional 
candidates. By using contributions to copartisans, I tap MCs’ willingness to help their party even 
when it entails parting with a scarce resource (campaign cash) that could be used for their own 
reelection. As was true of MCs’ voting patterns, new MCs support their parties to different 
extents. For instance, copartisan donations average $42,480 dollars per Congress, but a handful 
of new MCs donate nothing to copartisans and 37 MCs donated over $200,000 per Congress 
(with a maximum of over $600,000, see Table 6.1).   
Control Variables 
I expect that voting and contribution decisions are also influenced by the macro-political 
environment, MCs’ electoral situation, and personal characteristics. The variable Campaign 
Cash captures the aggregate sum of money (both cash on hand at the beginning of the Congress 
and campaign receipts received during the campaign) that MCs could potentially donate.113 MCs 
with greater campaign ‘war chests’ may be more generous partisan donors (Heberlig 2004, 
Heberlig and Larson 2009, 2012). 
                                                 
112 MCs with low loyalty scores faced particularly competitive elections, either because they ran 
in districts that were narrowly split between supporters of the two parties or because they faced a 
quality challenger. There were 10 MCs with loyalty scores under 50%. The MCs with the least 
loyal voting record, Rep. Constance Morella (R-MD), won election to the 101st Congress in a 
district where the 1988 Democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis won 53% of the vote. 
Rep. Morella (R-MD) voted with his party 28% of the time and with his party leaders 30% of the 
time. To take another example, Rep. Bobby Bright (D-AL) won election to the 111th Congress in 
2008 by less than 2,000 votes and supported his party and party leaders on only 44% of party-
line votes.  
113 I include this variable as a control only in the campaign contribution models. 
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Parties exert more pressure on their members to toe the party line and contribute to party 
causes as competition for the House majority increases (Heberlig and Larson 2012). Feeling this 
pressure, MCs may support their party more frequently as the margin of seats between the two 
parties declines. Party Margin is a count of the difference in the number of seats held by the 
majority versus minority party in each Congress.  Similarly, partisans may feel greater pressure 
to contribute to party causes to secure a majority in periods of divided government. Divided 
Government (0/1 variable) takes the value ‘1’ when the president and the majority of (at least) 
one chamber of Congress are from different parties.   
The incentives to be loyal partisans are greater for members of the majority versus 
minority party (Majority Party, 0/1), owing to the increased institutional capacity of the majority 
party to reward loyal members (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). In addition, these pressures 
have increased over time. Heberlig and Larson (2012) argue that the campaign finance landscape 
has been altered by increased competition for majority control in the House and campaign 
finance reforms passed since the 1980s. In particular, the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform 
Act of 2002 banned the use of ‘soft money’, unregulated funds spent by parties on ‘party 
building activities’. As this had been a primary source of party funding, parties turned to their 
own members to help make up the difference.114 This implies that MCs who entered Congress in 
later years should donate more money to their parties, all other things considered. In order to 
distinguish the effects of MCs’ career experiences from systematic changes over time, I include 
                                                 
114 For party leaders, asking members to donate makes sense: it encourage members to ‘buy into’ 
party goals, and it gives party leaders access to members’ donor networks. For members, 
donating to the party has value as well. It functions like a type of ‘fire insurance’; if members 




the variable Congress to capture when MCs served. I anticipate that MCs entering Congress in 
later years will donate more money than MCs who served in earlier years. 
Tenure in office may increase the number of colleagues to whom MCs want to donate. I 
capture MCs’ seniority with the 0/1 dichotomous variable First Term. My expectations are less 
clear regarding whether a difference emerges between the voting records of first and second term 
MCs. Electorally secure MCs may be more generous donors since they do not face as 
competitive, that is – expensive, elections. For roll call votes, the higher the percentage of the 
two-party vote the MC receives, the greater the support in the district for the MCs’ positions and, 
likely, their party. If the alignment between district and partisan interests is stronger, then the 
MC may vote more frequently along party lines. I measure electoral security/vulnerability with 
Vote Share (the percent of the two-party vote obtained by the MC in the previous election) and 
Vote Share2 to account for any nonlinearity in the effect of electoral security. Finally, partisan 
support may be greater for MCs from larger state delegations. These MCs have a greater number 
of same-state colleagues from whom they can take voting cues or whom they may feel 
compelled to donate (Kingdon 1989, Squire and Wright 1990).115 Delegation Size measures the 
size of the state delegation in the House (in number of MCs).  
Finally, I include a handful of other variables. Ideological Distance From Party Median 
is the distance between MCs’ ideological position and the median member of their party, as 
described in chapter four. Higher values indicate a greater ideological divergence from the 
median party member. I expect that as ideological similarity with the party increases, MCs more 
frequently vote with the party line and give more money to its candidates. I expect the opposite 
from the number of votes that MCs miss each Congress (% Missed Votes). MCs who miss more 
                                                 
115 An additional explanation is that MCs from populous states compete in more expensive media 
markets, and rely on the generosity of copartisans to help fund their campaign activities.  
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votes may be campaigning in the district, particularly if they are in competitive reelection races. 
Alternatively, they may be purposefully trying to avoid going on the record on an issue that is 
contentious with constituents. In either case, I expect that MCs who miss a greater percentage of 
votes will vote less frequently with the majority of their party and party leaders.  
In the pattern of chapters four and five, I include 0/1 variables for MCs’ race (White), 
gender (Woman), and highest level of education (Education Level), although I do not have strong 
prior expectations about what direction the results may take. District heterogeneity may have an 
influence on MCs’ voting loyalty as well, and so I include District Heterogeneity as well (which 
is available for the 101st-110th Congresses). As discussed in chapter four, the measure taps the 
degree of difference in the education, income, occupation, housing, ethnicity, and religion of 
district residents; higher values indicate more diverse districts. 
Votes and Dollars: Regression Results for Amateurs versus Experienced MCs  
 The results in Table 6.2 show that differences in party loyalty among experienced and 
amateurs MCs emerge for campaign donations but not roll call votes. As I expected, politically 
experienced MCs are more generous donors when compared to political amateurs.116 On 
average, they give approximately $13,500 more to copartisans than do political amateurs.117 
                                                 
116 To ensure that this result is not driven by extremely generous MCs with political experience, I 
reran the analysis without them (not shown here). The regression coefficient decreased in 
magnitude, from $13,515 to $9,636, but a significant difference remains (p < .02). Alternatively, 
I  also re-estimate the models and take the log of MCs’ individual contributions. There is no 
significant difference in regression results compared to when I exclude the outliers, so for ease of 
interpretation I present the models with the outliers excluded. 
117 Of the 10 most generous politically experienced donors, 8 held leadership positions in their 
party: Budget Committee chair – Rep. James McDermott (R-WA), Republican Steering 
Committee – Rep. John Linder (R-GA), House Majority Leader – Rep. Eric Cantor (R-VA), 
vice-president of the Republican Conference and Republican Policy Committee – Rep. Susan 
Molinari (R-NY), Speaker of the House – Reps. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and John Boehner (R-OH) 
National Republican Congressional Committee chair – Rep. Tom Reynolds (R-NY), and 
Assistant Majority Whip – Rep. Bobby Jindal (R-LA). 
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The election of experienced candidates bears dividends for the success of partisan 
agendas in Congress. Electing experienced MCs can advance the party’s efforts to retain or 
secure seats and enact partisan initiatives. Indeed, party leaders act as if these differences are 
real: they purposefully target and recruit politically experienced candidates to run for Congress 
(Maestas et al. 2005). The connection between career experiences and donations has tangible 
implications for each party. How much more money would each party have received had their 
amateurs entered Congress with political experience? It turns out to be a significant sum: 
$1,283,925 for Democratic party and $2,202,945 for the Republican party.118 This is money that 
might make a key difference in a closely contested race.119  
 Personal characteristics of MCs and their electoral situation also have an impact on MCs’ 
partisan loyalty. For example, first term MCs are more loyal voters but less generous donors, 
perhaps because they concentrate on securing their own reelection (Heberlig and Larson 2012). 
MCs who are more electorally secure also vote more frequently with their party and donate more 
money to copartisans. Likewise, ideology influences MCs’ partisan behavior. More extreme 
MCs support their party less frequently. At first, this seems counterintuitive, as it would suggest 
that extremely conservative Republicans break with their party to vote with Democrats. Recall, 
though, that the variable taps ideological distance from the median ideological position of the 
entire party. MCs could vary on either side of it. They could move, figuratively, toward the 
                                                 
118 I calculated these sums by multiplying the number of terms served by amateur Democrats 
(95) and Republicans (163) by $13,515 – the difference in contributions based on political 
experience. 
119 That this money comes from new MCs is also important for encouraging on-going party 
support. As Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK), the former chair of the National Republican Congressional 
Committee, explained, “I think [freshmen are] absolutely critical. They're a third of our class. 
Quite a few of them got help from the NRCC to get here…A number of these freshmen have 




ideological poles, making them more extreme (conservative or liberal) than everyone else in 
Congress. Alternatively, they could move away from the party median towards the other party – 
Democrats becoming more conservative and Republicans more liberal. 
Extreme liberals and extreme conservatives are more loyal than MCs who land in the 
middle of the ideological spectrum. To illustrate this, I split each party’s new MCs into quartiles 
based on the ideological positions of the party and compare the voting patterns of ideologically 
extreme partisans (the quartile farthest away from the other party) to moderates (the quartile 
closest to the other party). On average, Democratic ideologues vote with the majority of their 
party 94% of the time and their leaders 93% whereas Democratic moderates vote with their party 
and its leaders 81% of the time (on each count). The patterns are similar for Republicans: 
ideologues vote with the party an average of 95% percent of the time and their leaders 94%, 
compared to 88% of the time (on each count) for moderates. In effect, moderates have more 
policy options than their ideological counterparts. They find it more palatable, at least some of 
the time, to cross party lines than more extreme members of their party.  
Ideologically extreme MCs also give more to copartisan candidates than other MCs of 
their party. The difference is again driven by the more moderate members of each party. For 
example, Democratic ideologues donated an average of $43,862 per Congress versus the $27,180 
by their other copartisans. Likewise, Republican ideologues donated an average of $54,935 per 
Congress compared to the $45,073 in donations of their more moderate copartisans. I expect that 
the difference driven in part by electoral vulnerability. Overall, ideologically extreme members 
have higher electoral returns than members who sit closer to the other party – perhaps because 
they represent districts that are less competitive for the other party. This is most notable for 
Democrats. For instance, leaving aside MCs who ran unopposed, Democratic ideologues 
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received 67% of the two-party vote, versus 58% for more moderate members of the party. The 
difference is much smaller for Republicans, 60.4% to 60%. In lieu of donating to others, 
moderate members of each party may spend more of their campaign cash on their own, more 
tightly contested, races. Even taking these dynamics into account, though, precongressional 
careers still are associated with MCs’ behavior. 
The differences I find between experienced MCs and amateurs address concerns about 
professional versus citizen legislators. Whereas advocates of citizen legislators hope that political 
inexperience would increase their fidelity to the district, I do not find that political amateurs vote 
significantly different than experienced MCs. This does not necessarily entail that they are being 
unresponsive to their voters’ interests. It could, and should, be that the party line accurately 
captures the opinions its voters. But, if advocates for citizen legislators had intended the election 
of political amateurs to ensure a single-minded focus on district interests independent of the 
party line, then it has not worked out as anticipated.  
Learning Loyalty Before Congress: Staff, State Legislators, and Party Officials 
  My argument so far is premised on the assumption that new MCs enter office inclined to 
be loyal to their party, for a variety of different reasons. Distinguishing between MCs with and 
without prior political experience drew out these differences in regards to campaign 
contributions, but not for voting loyalty. I expect that MCs vote differently depending on the 
type of political experience they have had (and nonpolitical experience, too, as I discuss in the 
next section).  
MCs can vote the party line for many reasons. But MCs may not always agree with the 
party, as Kingdon (1989) noted. Whether or not MCs go with the party in these instances 
depends, in part, on the value they place on partisan unity and intraparty compromise. Previous 
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experience with party organizations or legislatures may reinforce the value of party unity in the 
legislative arena (Snowiss 1966). This experience should highlight the value of copartisans 
sticking together on divisive issue and should illustrate that intraparty compromise is central to 
partisan success, particularly for a group of MCs who career decisions (i.e. run for partisan 
office) suggests they care about partisan outcomes. I focus the remainder of this section on three 
political experiences that stand out as particularly informative in this regard: congressional staff 
experience, state legislative experience, and party experience. I take up the question of different 
nonpolitical experiences in the section to follow.  
In general, I anticipate that MCs with congressional, legislative, and/or with party 
organization experience vote more frequently with their party and donate more money to partisan 
causes compared to other politically experienced MCs like former judges, state bureaucrats or 
local government officials. Certainly, congressional staff, state legislative, and party organization 
experience are each unique. However, I argue that they share a fundamental similarity: they 
enable MCs to better appreciate the value of party loyalty in a legislative context.  
Staff, Legislative, and Party Experience 
Working in the partisan atmosphere of Congress, for one, clearly illuminates the 
importance and value of party loyalty.120 Staffers work for members who are partisans and who 
are exposed to partisan pressure regarding votes and contributions (Herrnson 1994). 
Congressional staff have repeated opportunities to develop relationships with other staffers, 
MCs, and party leaders. MCs with congressional staff experience have lived out the reality that is 
partisan politics on the Hill, and are more loyal partisans as a result. 
                                                 
120 Former staffers were more active participants in the legislative process (they introduce a 
greater number of bills) and introduce more bills that make significant legal or policy changes.  
186 
 
Like Congress, state legislatures are partisan institutions (Rosenthal 1995). 121 This 
similarity helps new MCs adjust to the legislative environment in Congress and its norms, like 
the importance of teamwork – an essential element of party loyalty (Berkman 1993, 1994).122 
State legislative experience also builds partisan relationships. State legislators outpace any other 
occupational background in Congress, making it likely that MCs have served, or are acquainted, 
with colleagues from previous political experiences (Berkman 1994, 1033). Finally, state 
legislators are often politically ambitious (Maestas 2003, Rosenthal 1998, Squire 1988a, 1988b). 
Given this, state legislators have an incentive to demonstrate party loyalty at lower levels of 
office, patterns that may carry over into Congress (Aldrich 1995, Rosenthal 1995). MCs with 
legislative experience should understand and value party loyalty. 
 Like staffers and state legislators, party officials also know the value of party loyalty. 
They have witnessed how party support and experience can make the crucial difference in a 
political campaign. They have learned to build partisan relationships to further party goals, such 
as recruiting volunteers to work on a campaign or colleagues to support an initiative (Price 200).   
Similarly, party experience reinforces the lesson that electoral success often is reliant on the 
generosity of copartisans, be it party organizations or individuals. Party organizations play a 
significant role in helping copartisans coordinate campaign strategies, solicit donations, and 
build donor networks, all skills that can inform and shape similar decisions in Congress.  
                                                 
121 Although elections for it are technically nonpartisan, the Nebraska legislature organizes along 
party lines in the chamber (Little and Ogle 2006). 
122 Thomsen (forthcoming 2014) suggests that state legislators who run for Congress differ 
ideologically from those who remain in the state legislature. Those that run for higher office are 
less ‘in step’ with the mean ideological position of their state legislative party and more closely 
aligned with the ideological positions of their congressional party. While differences in 
ideological positions are controlled for the analyses that follow, the idea of ‘party fit’ strengthens 
the intuition that former state legislators demonstrate increased loyalty to their parties in office. 
In Congress, they finally ‘fit in’ and, having anticipated and strategically maneuvered their way 
to Congress, may demonstrate it through enhanced party loyalty. 
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Congressional, state legislative, and party organization backgrounds familiarize MCs 
with an environment where partisan support can make the crucial difference in legislative 
outcomes. Individuals also may be attracted to these careers because of this element of partisan 
support. Either way, once elected to Congress, I hypothesize that MCs with congressional, 
legislative, and/or party organization experience vote more frequently with their party and donate 
more money to their party compared to other politically experienced MCs.  
Comparing Voting Patterns Among MCs with Prior Political Experience 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, MCs with congressional, state legislative, or party 
experience do vote more frequently with their party and party leaders on divisive votes than MCs 
with other political experiences – executive, judicial, and local (party voting loyalty t=-2.6, 
p=.00; leader loyalty t=-2.2, p=.02). The substantively small size of the difference is indicative 
of the fact that new MCs, in general, support their party. But, in initial confirmation of my 
expectations, MCs with any of these three experiences do so more often.  
For example, before Congress, Rep. David Skaggs was an aide to Rep. Timothy Wirth 
(D-CO) from 1974-1977, and a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1984, 1988, 
1992, and 1996 while also serving as a member of Colorado’s House of Representatives from 
1980-1986 (Biographical Directory of the United States Congress). In other words, he was one 
of the six new MCs with all three of the loyalty experiences I outline – congressional, state 
legislative, and partisan. His voting loyalty was particularly high: he voted with the majority of 
his party 94% of the time in the 101st Congress and with his party leaders on 91% of votes that 
split the two parties. However, there is no statistically significant difference in the amount of 




Regression Analyses for MCs with Prior Political Experience  
To test these hypotheses, I use the same regression framework from the first half of the 
chapter. Here, my sample of legislators is new MCs with political experience who served during 
the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008). The excluded category is MCs without state legislative, 
congressional staff, and/or party experience – or those with judicial, executive, and/or local 
political experience. Political amateurs are discussed in the next section and are not included in 
this analysis.  
Again, the key dependent variables are: Party Voting Loyalty, Leader Voting Loyalty, and 
Campaign Contributions. Aside from the variables for career experiences, all other independent 
variables remain the same. Since my expectation is that congressional staff, state legislative, and 
party experience all push MCs’ party loyalty in the same direction, I include a 0/1 variable to 
capture whether MCs have had any of these experiences. Loyalty Experience takes the value of 
‘1’ when a MC previously worked in Congress, a state legislature, and/or a party organization. 
Of the 561 new MCs with political experience, 426 (76%) of them had at least one of these 
experiences. There were 342 former state legislators that served in the 101st-110th Congresses, 47 
former congressional staffers, and 40 party officials. There were also an additional 35 new MCs 
who had been state legislators and party officials, 33 more new MCs who had been legislators 
and congressional staffers, 10 other MCs who had been staffers and party officials, and, finally, 6 
MCs who had state legislative, staff, and party experience.123 
 
                                                 
123 77 staffers worked in 1 congressional office, 18 staffers worked in 2 offices, and 3 staffers 
worked in 3 offices. Party experience includes work for a party organization at a local, state, or 
national level. This covers both paid employment and volunteer positions, such as county party 
chair. The 6 MCs that had state legislative, staff, and party experience were: Reps. Gus Bilirakis 
(R-FL), Pat Danner (D-MO), Mike Kopetski (D-OR), David Rivera (R-FL), David Skaggs (D-
CO), and Jerry Weller (R-IL). 
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Regression Results: Loyalty on Roll Call Votes 
 Regression results are presented in Table 6.3. Again, a significant difference emerges 
between MCs congressional, state legislative, and/or party experience and other experienced 
MCs on party roll call votes but not their campaign donations. Even when factoring the variety 
of other considerations that influence MCs’ voting loyalty, MCs with congressional, state 
legislative, and/or party experience vote more often with the majority of their party and leaders 
than other experienced MCs. This is true even when controlling for being a member of the 
majority party, large state delegation, first term MC, electorally secure, nonwhite or female MC. 
Although the substantive increase in voting loyalty is not overwhelmingly large, it 
underscores an important reality from the perspective of the party. Party leaders or partisans 
often seek to put together a coalition in support of a legislative initiative, and MCs with 
congressional, state legislative, and/or party experience more frequently fall in line. This is 
particularly important when the margin of seats between the two parties declines, as it did from a 
high of 107 seats in the 102nd Congress to a razor thin, 10-seat margin in the 107th Congress. 
With chamber control so tightly contested, every vote in favor of the party line counts; MCs with 
congressional, state legislative, and/or party experience deliver more of those votes, regardless of 
other considerations. In the aggregate, a party whose MCs have prior experience with the value 
of party loyalty should face less intraparty disagreement on issues that split the two parties. MCs’ 
political experiences have a robust effect on their party loyalty in roll call voting. 
 Interestingly, I find no significant difference in how much money MCs with different 
types of political experience donate to their copartisans. It may be, however, that MCs with 
congressional, state legislative, and/or party experience actually are more generous donors than 
other experienced MCs, but that they give to different causes. Compared to other MCs, state 
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legislators send more campaign cash back to the state and local party organizations that 
supported their candidacy (Heberlig and Larson 2012). Consequently, certain politically 
experienced MCs could be loyal financers of party causes, but the target of these donations 
extends beyond the data I have available to test them. Exploring patterns of campaign 
contributions across levels of government in light of different career experience would extend 
our understanding of career experiences and how party loyalty works in a federal system where 
MCs have multiple potential options for supporting their party. If this is true of political 
experiences, is it true of different nonpolitical experiences as well? I take up this question in the 
section below by turning to the other group of MCs serving in Congress: political amateurs. 
Having What It Takes To Be Loyal: Political Amateurs  
Political amateurs, by definition, lack prior political experience, but the rest of their 
occupational backgrounds vary – sometimes dramatically, as I covered in chapter three. I expect 
that amateurs from different nonpolitical career backgrounds also interact differently with 
copartisans and party leaders. Specifically, I posit that, amateurs from legal backgrounds are 
loyal partisans, in light of the legal profession’s professional skills and close proximity to politics 
(Eulau and Sprague 1964, Miller 1995).  
Loyal Lawyers: Professional Skills and Political Contact 
 Lawyers have been dominant in legislative politics throughout U.S. history. For example, 
from 1789-1800, 45% of MCs in the House of Representatives had legal backgrounds. By 1841, 
it increased to an all-time high of 67% where it remained until 1860, gradually dropping to its 
current level of 32% from 1989-2012 (Miller 1995). The ubiquity of lawyers in legislative 
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politics reflects the long-standing sentiment about their general ‘fit’ for political office.124 I 
expect that amateur lawyers are more loyal toward their party than other political amateurs for 
two key reasons: the professional skills they develop and the proximity of their career to politics. 
Regarding the first, the ubiquity of lawyers in politics is thought to stem from 
professional similarities in the skills required of lawyers and legislators (Cohen 1969, Derge 
1959, Gold 1961, Green et al. 1973, Miller 1995, Podmore 1977, Schlesinger 1957). 125 The skill 
set that lawyers acquire from their professional experience also includes how to compromise 
between competing interests and demands (Eulau and Sprague 1964, Miller 1995). Negotiation, 
advocacy, and compromise are all central to legislating. As a result, a legislator’s “attempts to 
satisfy as many of these demands as possible, and to as complete a degree as possible, may 
require the same skills which the lawyer exercises in the practice of his profession” (Derge 1959, 
433; see also Gold 1961).   
This may help amateur lawyers appreciate the value of partisan loyalty. Supporting the 
party on a vote can entail adjudicating between competing interests. By cooperating in the 
present in support of the party’s goals, it may be easier for MCs to obtain their own goals in the 
                                                 
124 For instance, in his 1835 treatise on American democracy, French philosopher and historian 
Alexis de Tocqueville argued that “the government of democracy is favourable to the political 
power of lawyers…as they are the only men of information and sagacity, beyond the sphere of 
the people, who can be the object of popular choice” (1835, volume 1, 275). 
125 Previous scholars have failed to find many differences in legislative behavior of lawyers 
versus non-lawyers (Derge 1959, 1962, Eulau and Sprague 1964, Gold 1961, Green et al. 1973). 
At the same time, these conclusions were drawn from an analysis of either a limited number of 
state legislatures (Derge 1959, Engstrom and O’Connor 1980, Rutherford 1938) or Congresses 
(Brady et al. 1973, Dyer 1976, Green et al. 1973, Miller 1995). Also, previous work examines 
very different questions, primarily whether or not lawyers vote together as a group, voted more 
favorably towards the courts (the ‘reverence theory’), and took more or less conservative social 
and economic positions. None of them examine whether and why lawyers demonstrate 
greater/less partisan support once elected to office. Finally, previous work does not consider 
whether lawyers held political offices.  Thus, my dissertation presents a very different picture of 
how precongressional careers intersect with congressional behavior.  
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future. Having had extensive practice employing their skills in negotiation and compromise in a 
decision-making environment similar to Congress, lawyers enter Congress well-versed in this 
logic (Miller 1995).  
But, at the same time, if lawyers enter Congress with well-developed skills at striking 
compromises and bargains, are they more bipartisan in their voting records as a result? It could 
be that they take their professional skills and experiences and apply use them to support 
bipartisan compromises. I do not expect that it is the case, on account of the other consideration 
related to precongressional legal experiences: party recruitment. Lawyers’ professional skills and 
experiences may encourage partisanship versus bipartisan because of their effect on partisan 
recruitment. Party leaders selectively recruit individuals they view as competitive candidates 
(Herrnson 1988).  While competitiveness is assessed on multiple dimensions, the underlying 
question is whether the individual has ‘what it takes’ to be a successful candidate and member of 
Congress: “political savvy, skill at debating, deep involvement in politics as a way of life, and 
demonstrated respect for the give-and-take of democracy” (Fowler and McClure 1989, 123).  
These professional skills factor into potential candidates’ decisions about whether to 
enter a particular race: “eligible candidates’ assessments of their qualifications cannot be 
separated from the skills they acquired and hone professionally” (Lawless 2012, 119).  They may 
play a role in the calculus of party leaders as well (Maestas et al. 2005). MCs whose election is 
indebted to these attempts may feel stronger partisan attachments or a greater need to reciprocate 
by being loyal partisans (Snowiss 1969, Thurber 1976).  
If party recruitment tracks (at least partly) with the skills acquired in nonpolitical careers, 
then political amateurs from legal background who have received electoral support from the 
party may have stronger partisan attachments than other amateur MCs (Thurber 1976). This may 
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lead to an appreciation for the party position. As a result, I hypothesize that amateur lawyers vote 
more frequently with the majority of their party and party leaders than other new MCs without 
prior political experience. 
Political Amateurs’ Campaign Contributions 
At the same time, I do not expect that political amateurs’ campaign donations vary with 
different nonpolitical career paths.  Amateurs – of all career backgrounds – face more 
competitive reelection campaigns than politically experienced MCs. For instance, MCs with both 
political and legal backgrounds received 65% of the two-party vote share, versus 60% for 
lawyers without prior political experience. Political amateurs from diverse career backgrounds 
all face the same incentive to concentrate their spending on their own reelection race. As a result, 
even controlling for differences in electoral vulnerability, I hypothesize that amateur lawyers will 
not significantly donate more money to copartisans than other amateurs.  
A preliminary comparison of amateurs’ voting records and contributions supports my 
expectations. As shown in Figure 6.4, amateurs with legal experience vote more often with their 
party (t=-1.69, p=.05) and party leaders (t=-1.73, p=.04) than other amateurs.126 As I 
anticipated, there are no significant differences for campaign contributions. 
Stacking Up Amateurs’ Experiences: Regression Results 
To test these hypotheses, I estimate regression analyses for the 116 political amateurs 
elected during the 101st-110th Congresses (1989-2012). (MCs with political experience are not 
included in the analysis.) The dependent variables are the same as elsewhere in this chapter: 
Party Voting Loyalty, Leader Loyalty, and Campaign Contributions. I include an independent 
variable for Legal (0/1 variable). The baseline category is political amateurs without legal 
                                                 
126 These t-test differences of means compare amateurs with legal experience to all other 
amateurs. Politically experienced MCs are not included in the analysis. 
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experience, including MCs with business, military, and other experiences – such as educators, 
MCs with medical experience, farmers, and assorted other experiences. All other control 
variables remain the same from earlier in the chapter.  
The regression results listed in Table 6.4 support my expectations. Compared to amateurs 
from other backgrounds, MCs with legal experience do vote more frequently than other amateurs 
in support of the party majority and party leaders.127 Nor is there is any significant different in 
the amount of money amateurs donate based on their career backgrounds.  
There is a seniority difference, though. Second term amateurs donate significantly more 
than their first term counterparts. If party leaders provide first term members a ‘pass’ on party 
contributions, in general, first term political amateurs take it. This is true regardless of amateurs’ 
vote share, and suggests their need for guidance on key votes.  
Three other observations should be made. There is no significant change in amateurs’ 
behavior over time (as captured by the Congress variable). Nor, second, are there significant 
differences between majority and minority party members. Amateur lawyers are more loyal 
voters than other inexperienced MCs regardless of when they serve and whether they serve in the 
majority. 128 Third, district characteristics do significantly impact amateurs’ contributions. As the 
                                                 
127 To see if business experience have a unique effect on party loyalty via voting or contributions 
(in line with chapter four), I re-estimated the analysis in two ways (not shown here). First, I 
included two independent variables – for legal and for business experience – leaving the baseline 
category MCs with other political experiences. Again, amateurs with legal experience are more 
loyal to their party (.03, p=.02) and their leaders (.03, p=.02). Second, I re-estimated the models 
to include business experience as the sole independent variable. In none of the regression models 
is the business variable significant. 
128 To check whether politically experienced MCs with legal experience behave differently than 
other politically experienced MCs, I estimate the regression models for experienced MCs 
discussed above and included a variable for prior legal experience (not shown here). Experienced 
MCs with legal experience do not vote more frequently with their party/leaders than other MCs, 
nor does the coefficient for loyalty experience change. However, experienced MCs with legal 
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heterogeneity in their districts increase, they donate significantly greater sums of money to 
copartisans, although it is not clear why this is. Nevertheless, career experiences play an 
important role in encouraging partisan behavior, all other things considered. MCs from legal 
backgrounds incline them to back the party more frequently than other political amateurs. 
Conclusion 
In sum, a strong tie runs between multiple kinds of precongressional experiences and 
MCs’ partisan interactions in the House of Representatives. As was true of members’ other 
activities, the lessons and skills acquired before Congress may have an enduring effect on how 
members approach the decisions and tasks they face as members of the House of Representatives 
and of the Democratic or Republican party.  Looking at the votes that members take and the 
money they contribute to copartisan campaigns, partisanship has real implications, positive and 
negative. Partisan loyalty influences the likelihood of agenda items from the party platform 
becoming laws (or their ability to frustrate the majority party’s attempts to do so). For party 
leaders or partisans in general, the backgrounds from which MCs arrive on Capitol Hill can 
increase the likelihood that party-supported causes receive support on the House floor.  
I illustrated two broad ways this works out in this chapter. First, politically experienced 
MCs donate more money to their parties, which I hypothesized is the consequence of 
precongressional political relationships. Second, MCs with certain types of political 
(congressional, state legislative, and party) and nonpolitical (legal) vote more frequently with 
their party and its leaders. I argue that these experiences more strongly impress on members the 
value of party loyalty.  
                                                                                                                                                             
experience donate $10,513 less to copartisans (p <.10), although I had no prior expectation that 
this would be the case. 
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These results have mixed implications from the perspective of constituent representation. 
Rather than finding that one type of career experience emerges as the ‘catch-all’ for partisan 
unity, a variety of political and nonpolitical experiences encourage the cohesiveness of political 
parties. A party composed of members from many different occupational backgrounds is not 
necessarily hampered in its attempts to advocate for shared goals. This increased unity can 
secure the representation of interests important to voters, especially as parties draw on the 
collective policy and legislative expertise of its members that I examined in chapters four and 
five. This would be good news for party leaders, MCs, or voters who support or endorse the 
party position, but less hopeful for those who favor bipartisan or more moderate outcomes.  
My findings about campaign donations have implications, too. Electing MCs with 
political experience, particularly in the party organizations, increases the amount of money that 
parties have available to recruit, retain, and reelect copartisans. This has obvious connections to 
the party composition of Congress – the share of the chamber claimed by each party. In addition, 
the selection of representatives shapes congressional outputs, be it through votes, the amount of 
legislation that is taken up and the ways that members connect with their voters (chapter four), or 
the topics that are introduced and acted on in policy-making circles (chapter five).  
On the other hand, though, these results are troubling. Increased partisan unity could 
increase partisan gridlock if it decreases the number of members crossing party lines to pass 
bipartisan legislation. In eras of narrow party margins and divided government, partisan unity 
may make bipartisan legislation less likely, with immediate implications for the future of 
bipartisan issues valued by moderate voters. 
 Congressional outcomes are affected MCs’ decisions. Knowing something about these 
representatives, like the types of jobs they had before office, clarifies the connection between 
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legislators, their behavior in office, and legislative representation.  What I have argued 
throughout this dissertation is that the backgrounds of representatives differ in an important 























Tables and Figures 
 
Table 6.1 Top Campaign Donors by Political Experience, 101st-110th Congresses 
Political Amateurs 
Name Congress Campaign Contributions 
Geoff Davis (R-KY)  110 $217,804 
Tom Coburn (R-OK) 104 $217,000 
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) 105 $196,200 
Mike Ferguson (R-NJ) 108 $170,810 
Randy Cunningham (R-CA) 103 $161,200 
Richard Burr (R-NC) 104 $158,900 
Henry Bonilla (R-TX) 104 $158,900 
Joe Knollenberg (R-MI) 104 $154,560 
Richard Burr (R-NC) 105 $151,276 
Charles Boustany, Jr. (R-LA) 110 $150,649 
Politically Experienced MCs 
Name Congress Campaign Contributions 
James McDermott (D-WA) 102  $644,960  
John Linder (R-GA) 104  $599,200  
Eric Cantor (R-VA) 108  $594,156  
Susan Molinari (R-NY) 103  $569,768  
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) 101  $535,680  
John Boehner (R-OH) 103  $505,300  
Thomas Reynolds (R-NY) 107  $480,688  
Gerald Weller (R-IL) 104  $425,600  
Bobby Jindal (R-LA) 109  $374,943  
Mike Rogers (R-M) 108  $358,411  
Note: The top panel lists the 10 political amateurs who donated the greatest sums of money to 
copartisans in a single Congress during the 101st-110th Congresses. The bottom panel lists the 10 
most generous copartisan contributors for MCs with any prior political experience during the 
101st-110th Congresses.  










Table 6.2 The Value of Political Experience: Increased Donations From MCs with 








Political Experience -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) 13,515 (4,360)*** 
Congress .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** 570 (1,132) 
Divided Govt. -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)*** 5,550 (5,144) 
Majority Party .04 (.01)*** .03 (.01)*** 7,661 (4,286)* 
Party Margin -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) 115 (106) 
Delegation Size .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 389 (143)*** 
First Term .03 (.00)*** .02 (.00)*** -19,066 (4,266)*** 
Vote Share .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** 7,360 (1,585)*** 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00)*** -45 (10)*** 
Campaign Cash   .00 (.00)*** 
Ideo. Distance Party Median -.30 (.06)*** -.27 (.06)*** -33,484 (27,895) 
% Missed Votes -.00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00)*** -576 (461) 
White -.03 (.01)*** -.03 (.01)** 17,133 (6,597)*** 
Woman .02 (.01)*** .01 (.01)** -2,476 (5,635) 
Education Level -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 303 (3,068) 
District Heterogeneity -.09 (.09) -.13 (.09) -9,098 (61,083) 
Constant .15 (.17) -.07 (.16) -328,280 (133,633)** 
R2 .23 .21 .09 
N 
 1,094 (625 unique 
clusters) 
1,094 (625 unique 
clusters) 1,068 (616 unique clusters) 
 Note: The models are ordinary least squares and the standard errors are clustered on the 
individual member. The unit of analysis is an individual MC in a single Congress. The excluded 
category is political amateurs. The dependent variable in the first column is the percent of times 
that MCs vote with their party, on votes where at least half of one party votes against at least half 
of another. The dependent variable in the second column is the percent of times were MCs vote 
with their leaders, on votes where the Majority Leader and Speaker vote opposite of the Minority 
Leader and Minority Whip. The dependent variable in the third column is the amount of money 
that an MC donates to copartisan candidates in a single Congress. Regression analyses the 101st-















Table 6.3 Regression Results for Political Experiences and Party Loyalty: Increased Loyalty on 








Loyalty Experience .02 (.01)** .03 (.01)** 4,436 (5,671) 
Congress .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** 979 (1,331) 
Divided Govt. -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01)* 5,431 (4,908) 
Majority Party .04 (.01)*** .03 (.01)*** 7,863 (4,908) 
Party Margin -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) 148 (123) 
Delegation Size .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 378 (171)** 
First Term .03 (.00)*** .02 (.00)*** -20,145 (4,937)*** 
Vote Share .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** 7,934 (1,827)*** 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00)*** -49 (12)*** 
Campaign Cash   .01 (.00)* 
Ideo. Distance Party Median -.34 (.07)*** -.31 (.07)*** -31,258 (32,630) 
% Missed Votes -.00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00)** -712 (497) 
White -.03 (.01)*** -.03 (.01)*** 20,599 (7,068)*** 
Woman .02 (.01)*** .02 (.01)** -1,776 (6,437) 
Education Level -.00 (.00) -.01 (.00) 99 (3,627) 
District Heterogeneity -.11 (.10) -.14 (.10) -51,107 (8,478) 
Constant -.04 (19) -.24 (.18) -369,127 (157,389)** 
R2 .26 .25 .09 
N 
910 (516 unique 
clusters) 
910 (516 unique 
clusters) 890 (509 unique clusters) 
Note: The models are ordinary least squares and the standard errors are clustered on the 
individual member. The unit of analysis is an individual MC in a single Congress, and the 
sample is all MCs with prior political experience. Loyalty experience refers to MCs with state 
legislative, congressional staff, and/or political party experience. The excluded category is MCs 
with judicial, executive, or local political experience. The dependent variable in the first column 
is the percent of times that MCs vote with their party, on votes where at least half of one party 
votes against another. The dependent variable in the second column is the percent of times were 
MCs vote with their leaders, on votes where the Majority Leader and Speaker vote opposite of 
the Minority Leader and Minority Whip. The dependent variable in the third column is the 
amount of money that an MC donates to copartisan candidates in a single Congress. Regression 














Table 6.4 Regression Results, Political Amateurs and Party Loyalty: Lawyers Are More Loyal 








Legal .02 (.01)* .02 (.01)* -1,067 (6,681) 
Congress -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) -511 (1,836) 
Divided Govt. -.03 (.01)* -.03 (.01)** 1,609 (8,252) 
Majority Party .02 (.02) .02 (.01) 123 (7,653) 
Party Margin -.00 (.00)** -.00 (.00)* -82 (136) 
Delegation Size .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 367 (220)* 
First Term .02 (.01)** .01 (.01) -14,331 (6,704)** 
Vote Share .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 4,768 (2,444)* 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -35 (16)** 
Campaign Cash   .01 (.01) 
Ideo. Distance Party Median -.14 (.10) -.12 (.09) -40,808 (40,032) 
% Missed Votes -.00 (.00)** -.00 (.00) 1,471 (1,376) 
White -.06 (.02)*** -.06 (.02)*** -25,233 (12,830)* 
Woman -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) -15,768 (6,115)** 
Education Level .01 (.01) .00 (.01) 3,209 (4,663) 
District Heterogeneity .27 (.17) .21 (.17) 323,243 (125,681)** 
Constant .80 (.35)** .57 (.34)* -196,981 (315,306) 
R2 .28 .24 .22 
N 
184 (110 unique 
clusters) 
184 (110 unique 
clusters) 178 (108 unique clusters) 
Note: The models are ordinary least squares and the standard errors are clustered on the 
individual member. The unit of analysis is an individual MC in a single Congress. The excluded 
category is political amateurs without legal experience. The dependent variable in the first 
column is the percent of times that MCs vote with their party, on votes where at least half of one 
party votes against another. The dependent variable in the second column is the percent of times 
were MCs vote with their leaders, on votes where the Majority Leader and Speaker vote opposite 
of the Minority Leader and Minority Whip. The dependent variable in the third column is the 
amount of money that an MC donates to copartisan candidates in a single Congress. Regression 
















Figure 6.1 Average Campaign Spending by New MCs Increases Over 101st-112th Congresses 
(1989-2012) 
 
Note: The figure depicts the average amount of money spent by successful congressional 
candidates in their first and/or second terms during the 101st-112th Congresses. 
















































Figure 6.2 Amateurs and Experienced MCs’ Voting Loyalty and Campaign Contributions: 
Experienced MCs Donate More 
 
 
Note: In each panel, the unit of analysis is an individual MC per Congress. Party voting loyalty 
is calculated as the percent of votes that MCs vote with their party when at least half of the 
Republican party votes against at least half of the Democratic party. Leader loyalty is calculated 
as the percent of votes that MCs vote with their leaders when the Speaker and Majority Leader 
vote against the Minority Leader and the Minority Whip. The figure for voting data includes the 
111th and 112th Congresses (although the regression analysis cannot due to the availability of 
other data). Campaign contributions is the mean of the amount of donations that new MCs give, 
per Congress, to copartisan candidates. During the 101st – 110th Congresses, there are 561 MCs 
with political experience and 116 political amateurs.  






















































































Campaign Contributions, Political Amateurs vs. 
Politically Experienced MCs 
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Figure 6.3 Voting and Contributions Among Politically Experienced MCs 
 
 
Note: In each panel, the unit of analysis is an individual MC per Congress. The sample is all 
MCs with prior political experience before running for Congress. Loyalty experiences refers to 
MCs with state legislative, congressional staff, and/or political party experience. Party voting 
loyalty is calculated as the percent of votes that MCs vote with their party when half of the 
Republican party votes against half of the Democratic party. Leader loyalty is calculated as the 
percent of votes that MCs vote with their leaders when the Speaker and Majority Leader vote 
against the Minority Leader and the Minority Whip. The figure for voting data includes the 111th 
and 112th Congresses (although the regression analysis cannot due to the availability of other 
data). Campaign contributions is the mean of the amount of donations that new MCs give, per 
Congress, to copartisan candidates. There are 426 MCs with loyalty experience and 135 MCs 
without it in the 101st-110th Congresses.  





























































































Figure 6.4 Comparisons of the Party Loyalty of Political Amateurs 
 
 
Note: In each panel, the unit of analysis is an individual MC per Congress. The sample is 
political amateurs only. Party voting loyalty is calculated as the percent of votes that MCs vote 
with their party when half of the Republican party votes against half of the Democratic party. 
Leader loyalty is calculated as the percent of votes that MCs vote with their leaders when the 
Speaker and Majority Leader vote against the Minority Leader and the Minority Whip. The 
figure for voting data includes the 111th and 112th Congresses (although the regression analysis 
cannot due to the availability of other data). Campaign contributions is the mean of the amount 
of donations that new MCs give, per Congress, to copartisan candidates. 21 amateurs have legal 
experience and 95 amateurs with other experiences during the 101st-110th Congresses. 
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Chapter 7: The Legacy of Precongressional Careers 
 
 Of the many paths to office taken by new MCs, Ronald Packard (R-CA) has a 
particularly interesting one. Its basic outlines are similar to those of other MCs: college, graduate 
school, private employment, political positions, Congress. In Rep. Packard’s case, he grew up in 
Meridian, Idaho, attended Brigham Young University in Utah for two years before transferring 
to, and graduating from, Portland State University in 1953. He stayed in Portland after 
graduation to attend the University of Oregon Dental School, earning his D.M.D. in 1957. Then, 
he worked as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Dental Corps for two years before moving to 
Carlsbad, California, where he went into civilian dental practice. 
 Packard’s first foray into politics was at the local level. In 1976, he was elected to the 
Carlsbad City Council and, two years later, he was elected mayor of Carlsbad. After four years 
as mayor, he set his sights on an open seat for California’s 43rd congressional district but 
narrowly lost the 1982 Republican primary in a crowded field of contestants. Here is where his 
story differs from other MCs, since successful candidates typically win both their primary and 
general elections. After the primary, the Republican nominee Johnnie Crean, came under 
character attack, and – sensing the electorate receptive to his candidacy – Packard re-entered the 
race as a write-in candidate. Against the odds (he won with 37% of the vote), he became the third 
member of the House of Representatives ever to win a seat in this manner (Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress). 
 His unusual path to office notwithstanding, Rep. Packard (R-CA) drew on his 
precongressional career experience while in office. For example, on the House floor, he 
reiterated how, “as a former dentist, I always stressed the importance of prevention as the best 
way to fight disease” to explain his opinion about a fiscal policy passed by the House 
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(Congressional Record 1995, 3525). In drawing connections to his precongressional career 
experiences, my dissertation suggests that Rep. Packard was likely doing what other new MCs 
do: use the insights and skills gained from the precongressional career experiences to help them 
determine what to do in their early terms in Congress.  
What makes the example of Rep. Packard so noteworthy was not his floor statements 
(which just could be rhetoric), but how vocally he championed the importance of 
precongressional career experiences. In fact, it was Rep. Packard’s quote that opened the 
introduction to chapter one:  
“But the real experience that is important in this job is the experience we bring to 
the job, the experience of having been teachers, farmers, or 
businessmen[women]”(Congressional Record 1995 H3924, as quoted in Herrick 
and Fisher 2007). 
In this dissertation, I have outlined evidence that suggests that this intuition is sound: new 
MCs from different career backgrounds make different decisions in Congress. In this chapter, I 
summarize these findings, point out their importance for viewing congressional behavior from a 
wider lens, and discuss their implications for current debates among scholars, practitioners, and 
the public about term limits, electoral selection, and other legislative reforms. 
The Congressional Legacy of Precongressional Careers 
 Being elected to Congress is a career altering experience for everyone. Even those who 
have worked for Congress are faced with a variety of new tasks, considerations, and decisions to 
make, as well as a large number of people with whom and on whose behalf they work. In the 
whirlwind of the transition to Congress, which I outlined in chapter two, new MCs draw on 
numerous resources to help them navigate their new work environment. Their personal 
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preferences, staff, parties, colleagues, and outside groups are (typically) happy to help answer 
questions, give advice, or provide information. At the same time, problems present themselves 
for new MCs, since these resources can be exhausted and they are not always applicable. New 
MCs retain significant discretion over their mix of legislative and outreach activities, contents of 
their legislative agendas, and voting and contribution decisions. 
 In light of this discretion, I argue that new MCs can draw on what is familiar – skills and 
insights from past career experiences – when making decisions in their early terms in office. 
Career experiences are influential because, over time, individuals learn the importance of 
different tasks, how to do them, and how to interact with coworkers while accomplishing them. 
Granted, individuals with a long-standing interest in certain issues (say, medicine or fighting 
crime) may go into careers (such as being a doctor or serving in the military) that address those 
issues. 
 Because of this, and because I cannot randomly assign new MCs to different career 
paths, I cannot definitively make a causal claim that it is the skills and insights, and not some 
other mix of interests or preferences, that influence new MCs’ behavior in Congress. At the same 
time, this should not be damning to the study of career experiences. For whatever reason 
individuals choose different careers, they may still learn skills and insights from them. In 
addition, at the bottom line, the question of interest – particularly to voters – is whether MCs 
from different career paths make different decisions, the particular reason aside. My dissertation 
speaks clear to this question. I find that MCs from different career backgrounds make different 
decisions about their legislative and outreach activities (chapter four), their policy agendas 





Connecting Careers and Legislative Activities 
 I find that these connections played out in a variety of different ways. In chapter four, I 
illustrate differences in the volume and type of legislative activities that new MCs undertake, 
with more muted differences in the ways they reach out to constituents. There, I distinguish 
politically experienced MCs from political amateurs and find that new MCs with political 
experience introduce more bills and keep more of their staff in the Washington, D.C. office, 
perhaps in light of their concentrated legislative activity.  
But it is not just the presence or absence of political experience that matters. I find 
additional differences in MCs’ choices given different types of political and nonpolitical 
experiences. I expect that MCs with legal experience are active participants in the legislative 
process due to the similarities between legal practice and the legislative process (Eulau and 
Sprague 1964, Miller 1995). However, I do not find that political amateurs with legal experience 
have an increased volume of legislative activity. This suggests that the transition to Congress is 
an arduous one, even for those new MCs who come from backgrounds that are typically assumed 
to overlap with the legislative process.  
How to work in Congress is not a decision that all amateurs approach the same way, 
though. MCs with business experience, a background of particular interest to recent advocates of 
‘citizen’ legislators and the Tea Party movement, are actually less active, overall, in their early 
terms. They introduce and cosponsor fewer bills than other amateurs, even taking into 
considerations differences in the districts they represent, their electoral margins, or their 
ideological positions vis-à-vis their party. No differences emerge across types of political 
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amateurs in regards to legislative success – all are equally likely (or unlikely) to see their 
measures pass into law. 
I also find differences in the behavior of MCs with prior political experience. For 
instance, former state legislatures as well as MCs who have been former congressional staffers 
both introduce a greater number of non-symbolic bills than other MCs with political experience. 
MCs with both experiences (state legislative and congressional staff) introduce more bills that 
make wide-reaching changes and see more of their bills become law than other experienced 
MCs. In contrast to what I expected, MCs with legislative experience do not introduce/cosponsor 
a greater number of bills, but MCs with executive experience do. In addition, MCs with 
executive experience in key positions like federal agencies, the president’s cabinet, or state 
governors have higher hit rates. In chapter four, I discuss how – over time – these differences 
would have made a real impact on the number of bills introduced and debated in Congress. 
Connecting Careers and Legislative Agendas 
Of course, policy outcomes and constituent representation are shaped not only by the 
number or types of bills that MCs consider, but also by their contents. In chapter five, I find 
strong and significant connections between the number of topics that MCs take on (the 
specialization of their legislative agendas) and their past experiences. For example, political 
amateurs with legal backgrounds specialize their legislative agendas to a greater extent than any 
other group of amateurs. They introduce bills on a smaller number of topics, which I argue may 
reflect the value of specialization emphasized in legal practice.  
Likewise, I find that state legislators differ depending on institutional features of the state 
legislature. Less professionalized state legislators construct more specialized agendas than 
professionalized state legislators. This is counterintuitive to expectations about 
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professionalization. It may occur, I argue, because the pressures of a shortened session and fewer 
staff encourage less professionalized legislators to concentrate their attention on a handful of 
topics. In contrast, in professionalized state legislatures, legislators have longer sessions during 
which they can rely on staff to help them get up to speed on a larger number of issues. I find 
these patterns mirrored in former state legislators’ early terms in office. In fact, professionalized 
state legislators are more active cosponsors on a greater number of topics than any other group of 
experienced MCs.  
The connection between career experiences and legislative agendas does not stop at 
policy specialization, though. In chapter five, I also demonstrate how, again, new MCs from 
various career experiences affect MCs’ are more or less active on related policy topics. For 
instance, I find that MCs from agricultural backgrounds introduce almost 60% more agriculture 
bills than other MCs. The comparison is even greater for MCs with medical experience: they 
introduce over 230% the number of health bills than other MCs. These policy-career connections 
illustrate the logic voiced by Rep. Ron Packard (D-CA) above: career experiences (like being a 
dentist) can shape MCs’ policy focus. I find these connections emerge across a broad spectrum 
of career experiences and policy topics.  
This has both substantive and theoretical import. When hammering out the constitutional 
framework of their newly formed government, the framers of the constitution thought that it 
would be beneficial if politicians at the local level were elected to Congress. They argued that 
electing representatives with “local knowledge” of the people would bolster the 
representativeness of the institution. My results suggest that the same is true of career 
experiences. Career-policy connections form an important bridge between the people and their 
representatives. If the men and women who work in Congress who have been carpenters and 
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caregivers, teachers and talk show hosts (as well as lawyers, doctors, pilots, pastors, social 
workers, entertainers, business owners, etc.) make different decisions and take up different 
policies, then the deliberations and considerations that occur in Congress are enriched by “local 
knowledge” of what it is like to make a living in different workplaces and jobs. That MCs do not 
get elected to Congress and forget what comes before may sound obvious, but its implications 
are compelling. Electing MCs from a diversity of career experiences reinforces and expands the 
representativeness of legislative institutions.  
Connecting Careers and Party Loyalty 
In chapter six, I take the theme of career-congressional connections and apply it to the 
realm of partisan interactions: how loyally new MCs interact with copartisans and party leaders. 
Just like the decisions I explore in chapters four and five, party loyalty is, at heart, the product of 
MCs’ individual discretion and decision-making. But party loyalty also differs in light of the 
institutional and partisan incentives MCs have for supporting the party’s interests (Heberlig and 
Larson 2012). These sanctions/incentives may imply that all new MCs have reason to act 
similarly: they vote with their party on party-line votes and donate campaign funds to support 
copartisans in almost equal degree. But this is not what I find. Rather, MCs with political 
experience are more generous campaign donors. The difference between experienced MCs and 
amateurs has a significant impact on their partisan giving, which accrues to millions of dollars of 
difference in donations for each party.  
Looking only at MCs with political experience prior to Congress, I find that MCs with 
experience in state legislatures, Congress, or working for political parties – political settings that 
value and reward partisan loyalty – support their party more often than other experienced MCs. 
Partisan political experience produces partisan-seasoned legislators who are willing to stand by 
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the party cause. For party leaders or legislative entrepreneurs looking to construct a winning 
coalition, MCs with state, congressional, or partisan experience are promising targets. But if it is 
party loyalty that these experiences encourage, then this may spell increased difficulty for 
creating coalitions that cross party lines or advocate for bipartisan measures. 
Expanded the Understanding of Career: Connecting Congress to a Larger Career 
Trajectory 
 I make multifaceted connections between MCs’ careers before Congress and the 
congressional career. I find legacies of MCs’ precongressional career experiences across several 
significant dimensions of legislative behavior – MCs’ legislative activities, policy agendas, and 
partisan interactions. As I noted in chapter one, legislative scholars have offered numerous 
insights into what shapes members’ behavior and decision-making, but have tended to focus on 
explanations endogenous to the institution: constituents’ opinions and preferences, reelection, 
personal preferences about good public policy, party pressures, etc. To date, it has been unclear 
whether and how the career paths that bring MCs to Congress continue to play out once the 
session has started. 
 I draw from the observations of occupational and vocational scholars to illustrate one 
likely connection between precongressional and congressional careers. I use the framework of 
career assets to underscore the idea that prior career experiences can provide employees skills 
and insights that they take and apply during periods of career transition. This framework points 
to connections between what MCs did before and in Congress. In addition, drawing these 
connections allows me to highlight influences of legislative behavior that both voters and 
legislative scholars care about. The claim that a former governor may act differently in office 
compared to a former elementary school teacher has intuitive appeal to both voters and scholars. 
For example, during congressional campaigns, candidates use their career backgrounds as signals 
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about who they are and, by extension, what they may do in office. This background information 
helps voters because it resonates with the way people interact, where one of the first questions 
asked to a new acquaintance is ‘what do you do?’ Legislative scholars care about these 
differences, too. They differentiate ‘quality’ candidates from ‘hopeless’ ones based on their past 
experiences (Canon 1990, Jacobson 1987). Yet these claims are empty if they are never tested – 
if there is no comprehensive understanding of how individuals from different backgrounds act 
once elected to office. I put these intuitions to systematic tests and find that, in general, they are 
sound. MCs from different precongressional careers do make different decisions in Congress.  
This has additional implications for conclusions about policy outcomes and 
representation. For both voters and legislative scholars, knowing and assessing the career 
backgrounds of candidate may help make sense of what happens in elections. I find that part of 
the translation of electoral selection into representational outcomes is worked out through the 
skills and insights that individuals acquire from past experiences. In moments of decision, MCs 
make decisions that track with what is familiar from past experience. 
 Integrating the congressional career into the overall trajectory of individual’s career 
experiences not only broadens our perspective on legislative behavior but it also points to 
another conclusion. Serving in Congress is a job. As I have demonstrated, viewing congressional 
service from this perspective expands the explanatory ideas and frameworks, like career assets, 
available for understanding legislative behavior.  
It also adds additional weight to concerns about that are often raised about Congress. 
Questions about recruitment, job satisfaction, career advancement, and retirement are of interest 
to both scholars of legislative and occupational behavior (for instance, see Abbot 1993, Fox and 
Lawless 2005, Lawless 2012). Integrating the congressional career into MCs’ lifelong career 
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choices emphasizes how these concerns are interrelated. For instance, the decision to run for 
Congress is, at the same time, the decision to leave another job. Ambition, expressed or nascent, 
and career choices are all wrapped up in one for individuals considering a congressional bid. 
The Importance of Studying Precongressional Careers 
 One of the benefits of studying precongressional careers, then, is the way it adds to our 
understanding of legislative behavior by pointing out connections to the rest of MCs’ 
experiences. An additional benefit is the ability to contribute to on-going debates about 
congressional reform. I note three in closing: the ‘citizen’ legislator versus ‘professional’ debate, 
related interest in term limits, and the ramifications of electoral behavior.  
The Professionals versus Citizens: Why Experience Is Not All Bad 
In chapters one and three, I noted renewed interest over the last two decades in the idea of 
moving away from ‘professional’ politicians and back to ‘citizen’ legislators. The basic logic of 
this suggestion was that electing private individuals who serve a handful of terms and then retire 
from legislative politics would help prevent them from becoming unresponsive to citizens’ 
preferences (and corrupted by the daily grind of congressional politics). In theory, this sounds 
like an appealing solution to concerns about incumbents’ reelection rates (uniformly high) and 
the influence of ‘special interests’ on national politics. As Rep. Ernest Istook (R-OK) explained 
on the House floor, 
“This country was founded by those who set aside, for so long as was necessary, 
their individual businesses and pursuits, but never intending to become a 
professional political class. They brought with them the variety of strengths, 
backgrounds, and insights which can only be gained from interaction with fellow 
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citizens on a normal, everyday basis” (Congressional Record 1995, 3917, as 
quoted in Herrick and Fischer 2007, 1). 
Thus, the argument runs, if citizen legislators were present and active in the legislative process, 
the voices of their ‘fellow citizens’ would be voiced more loudly and more clearly. 
Congress has a steep learning curve that all new MCs face. I find that the experiences that 
new MCs have before office may equip them with skills and insights that relate to how quickly 
they solider through it. For example, new MCs with legislative experience enter Congress and 
are able to introduce more substantively significant bills, have more of their bills become law, 
gain policy expertise on a smaller number of issues, and give greater support to their party on the 
House floor and on the campaign trail. New MCs from a variety of career paths build successful 
and productive congressional careers. But all things are not equal at the beginning of those 
careers. New MCs do not start the congressional career from the same place, and these 
differences – for good or bad – show up in their subsequent behavior.  
These patterns of behavior can have implications for how well or how much new MCs 
rise in the leadership ranks of their committees and party, an avenue for future research. If new 
MCs with political experience hit the ground running at faster pace than other MCs, then electing 
citizen legislators comes with more trade-offs than proponents have heretofore acknowledged. 
This is not to say that citizen legislators cannot provide quality representation. Nor do career 
experiences determine legislative behavior. But congressional politics is a professional game. 
Hence, professionals may enter office with the experiences (skills, training, and insights) that 
help them more quickly adapt to it. 
Advocates of citizen legislators often propose business experience as an ideal 
qualification for office. But I this is not exactly what I find. Amateur MCs with business 
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experience are active on business-related issues: they introduce and cosponsor more bills on 
corporation regulation and taxes than other MCs. At the same time, they are less active in the 
legislative process overall, and they do not significantly differ from other amateurs in the 
specialization of their legislative agendas, their outreach spending, or their campaign donations. 
MCs with business backgrounds leverage those backgrounds in policy debates, but if they are 
going to ‘clean up Washington’ there either needs to be more of them elected or they need to do 
more. If voters desire quick policy change, then ‘professional’ politicians may be a more 
appealing alternative. 
Term Limits: Why Not to Kick Them All Out 
 Related to the comparison of citizen versus professional legislators is the push for 
installing legislative term limits in Congress. Terms limits could accomplish many of the same 
ends as electing citizen legislators, and the two are sometimes bundled together as well (i.e., 
citizen legislators limited to a certain number of terms). Ideally, it is thought, a representative 
who knew that her/his time in office was limited would be lifted beyond the realm of reelection 
to propose and enact bipartisan compromises (Jacob 1998). 
 This proposal revolves around the question of how legislative tenure influences 
legislative behavior. My findings help to answer that question by providing insight into the 
behavior of new MCs based on their prior career experiences. This is important because a 
potential implication of term limits is that it would dissuade certain MCs from running for 
Congress based on their previous experiences.  
Consider a professionalized state legislator considering a congressional bid after 
congressional term limits have been established. The state legislator has served several years in 
the state legislature; she is well-known in state politics, considered an expert on policy issues, 
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and has notable legislative experience. All of these make her a competitive congressional 
candidate. At the same time, congressional races are costly and competitive. To run, she most 
likely has to retire from the legislature, and losing the race could harm her chances of holding 
another political office in the state in the future. In addition, having served in professionalized 
state legislature, she knows that being a MC is demanding, time consuming, and entails 
increased time away from family and friends. Thus, she may reason, Why give up a rewarding 
and influential office for the chance of holding another (Congress) that is more complicated and 
demanding and will expire at the end of so many years?  
If played out over time and multiple individuals, term limits would change the 
composition of the legislature in ways that align with MCs’ career experiences. It may be that 
those who are self-employed and can easily jump back into their old jobs find the mix of costs 
versus benefits less disadvantageous than experienced MCs. That, in it of itself, is important 
from the perspective of representation. It is additionally consequential if new MCs from different 
career backgrounds act differently in their early terms in office, before the term limits would kick 
in. If so, then term limits would limit not just the number of terms individual MCs serve, but the 
number of MCs who were able to navigate and adapt themselves quickly in short period of time.  
My results suggest that this would be the case, since I find that new MCs from different 
career paths do act differently in their early terms. Fewer MCs with political experience prior to 
Congress would, in the aggregate, mean less money for copartisan campaigns, fewer bills 
introduced that made sweeping or significant changes to law, and fewer laws passed. Again, 
while no certain group of MCs corners the market on good representation, in their early terms 
they make different decisions that affect the amount and type of legislative work and bills that 
get done.  
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Why Electoral Choice Matters 
Finally, my dissertation lends insight into the implication of voters’ choices on Election 
Day. As I discussed earlier, when campaigning for Congress, it is not uncommon for candidates 
to draw attention to their past experiences and use them to highlight their policy priorities, 
preferences, and opinions. I find that this is not empty political posturing on the part of 
strategically minded, election driven individuals. Rather, candidates’ career experiences are a 
good indication of the types of policy topics they will take up in office. This, as I have noted 
before, has benefits from the perspective of constituent representation. Particularly in primary 
campaigns (when voter turnout and information is reduced), career experiences provide a useful 
heuristic for divining what candidates might do in office. To reiterate, career experiences are not 
determinative of MCs’ behavior: just because a MC had been an elementary school teacher does 
not mean that he will be active on education topics. But, in general, these connections emerge.  
One concerning implication of my research is that amateur MCs with legal experience 
and politically experienced MCs who have worked in state legislatures, Congress, and party 
organizations are more loyal voting members. Like I discussed in chapter six, this is positive for 
voters (and party leaders) whose opinions align with the party position. For everyone else, 
though, there is a downside.  
Loyal voters cross party lines less frequently. But bipartisan legislation depends on 
exactly this type of compromise. When the two parties face off, then, it would be more difficult 
to pass moderate bills in a Congress composed of more loyal MCs. In this way, future work 
could look at how career paths potentially track with increases in congressional polarization over 
time. Granted, supporting party initiatives is also key for accomplishing outcomes of interest to 
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the party’s electoral base. So party loyalty is not all bad. But, unmitigated and in excess, it 
reduces the opportunity for policy compromise on issues important to both sides. 
Conclusion and Further Research 
 Many of these considerations merit, and point to, avenues for additional exploration. 
Most notably, I examine only MCs in their first and second terms in Congress. I look at the 
gambit of career experiences across a large number of MCs and long period of time, a first in the 
legislative politics literature. From others, though, it is clear that congressional behavior does 
change over time (Hibbing 1991, Stratmann 2000). Since I only look at MCs’ first four years, 
when they are in the thick of fighting through the congressional learning curve, I am unable to 
see how the influence of career experiences changes over time. As MCs gain seniority, do they 
stick with the habits they set in their early terms? Do they move on to other topics, or do they 
continue to build policy expertise on issues of long-standing importance to them? Finally, if the 
impact of career experiences begins to diminish over time, does the rate of decay differ by career 
experience? Exploring these questions would flesh the understanding of career-congressional 
connections that I have introduced here.  
 Another avenue for exploration that stems from my analytical framework is comparing 
the sequence of MCs’ career experiences. I expect that MCs can glean insights and skills from 
the totality of their past experiences and not, say, just the one immediately prior to Congress. At 
the same time, careers do come in a sequence, and comparing MCs’ career experiences by their 
place in this sequence would help clarify how the jobs MCs leave to work in Congress interface 
with the work they do there. 
 Turning to my results, there are three potential places for further research. The first is the 
behavior of MCs with business experience. As I have noted throughout, business experience is a 
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popular path to Congress and one that comes with big claims about its impact. I find that amateur 
MCs with business experience are less legislatively active, but I find no difference in the pattern 
of their outreach activities. They do not spend more money traveling to the district, sending 
flyers to constituents, etc., when all other things are taken into consideration. Nor do they donate 
more money to their copartisans. What are they doing with their time, energy, and resources, 
then? I do find that they are more active on tax and corporation regulation policies, so looking 
into their committee activities, floor statements, and press releases could help elucidate any 
additional differences in their behavior as well as how their behavior changes over time.  
 Second, I examine the volume of MCs’ legislative activities in chapter four and their 
contents in chapter five. Future work could put the two together – looking at the types of bills 
that new MCs introduce in career-related policy topics and whether MCs are more successful in 
getting bills relevant to their experience passed into law. When combined with my insights into 
legislative specialization, this would paint a more detailed picture of how new MCs approach a 
significant aspect of their new job – legislating. 
 Third and finally, in chapter six I look at MCs’ voting loyalty on bills where the majority 
of both parties take opposite sides. This provides a clear window into the behavior of new MCs 
on issues of contemporary and partisan importance. Future work could take up other types of 
partisan interactions. In my dissertation, I focus on the purposeful actions and decisions of new 
MCs. But other MCs’ reactions to new MCs matter as well. They influence the committees to 
which MCs get assigned, the scheduling of their bills, and their ability to climb the House and 
party leadership ranks. Perhaps other MCs respond differently to a new MC who has, say, a 
legislative versus business background. Incorporating both MCs’ individual decisions and the 
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reactions of other political actors to them would provide a well-rounded picture of career 
experiences on Capitol Hill. 
 In this dissertation, I have laid out a framework for why I expect career-congressional 
connections to exist. Examining a large number of MCs with a variety of different career 
experiences, I find that my expectations are supported. MCs from different precongressional 
careers make different decisions as new legislators. It may be, by providing policy insights and 
political and legislative skills, career experiences help new MCs navigate broad decisions that 
touch on what they should do, why, and how. I find related differences for how much and how 
new MCs engage the legislative process, reach out to constituents, build their legislative agendas, 
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Appendix B: Legislative Activity of New MCs by Policy Topic 
 INTRODUCTIONS Agriculture Budget Corp. Reg. 
Agricultural .53 (.25)**   
Business  .27 (.24) .79 (.32)*** 
Governor  -.04 (.57)  
Law Enforcement    
Legal  .25 (.27) .70 (.32)** 
First Term -.33 (.13)*** -.26 (.19) -.28 (.27) 
Ideological Extremity -.17 (.30) 1.31 (.33)*** .76 (.49) 
Majority Party .24 (.17) -.42  (.19)** .42 (.35) 
Partial Term -.38 (.51) -.21 (.47) .01 (.57) 
Total Introductions .07 (.01)*** .07 (.01)*** .07 (.02)*** 
Vote Share -.03 (.06) -.03 (.06) .08 (.11) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
White -.13 (.37) 1.25 (.58)** -.7 (.57) 
Woman  .06 (.26) .14 (.34) .55 (.31)* 
Education Level .23 (.14)* .16 (.18) -.02 (.22) 
% Rural .03 (.00)***   
% White Collar   .05 (.02)** 
Constant -2.55 (2.51) -3.41 (2.52) -8.28 (4.07)** 
N 1,008 (578 clusters) 1,194 (677 clusters) 1,008 (578 clusters) 
 INTRODUCTIONS Crime Defense Education 
Education   .23 (.15) 
Law Enforcement 1.06 (.40)***   
Legal .24 (.15)   
Military  .02 (.12)  
First Term .17 (.10)* -.05 (.08) .07 (.09) 
Ideological Extremity .19 (.21) -.23 (.17) -.70 (.19)*** 
Majority Party -.24 (.14)* .10 (.10) .01 (.12) 
Partial Term -.74 (.30)*** .11 (.19) -.43 (.26)* 
Total Introductions .09 (.01)*** .10 (.01)*** .07 (.01)*** 
Vote Share .05 (.04) -.05 (.03) -.07 (.04)* 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)* 
White .52 (.26)** .04 (.18) -.31 (.19) 
Woman  .26 (.16)* .02 (12) .02 (.16) 
Education Level .14 (.11) -.04 (.07) -.01 (10) 
% Veterans  -.00 (.02)  
Military Base  .08 (.09)  
Constant -2.56 (1.58) 1.06 (1.31) 1.37 (1.47) 








Appendix B (cont.) 
INTRODUCTIONS Gov Operations Health Jobs 
Business   .02 (.09) 
Governor .44 (.17)***  -.12 (.23) 
Legislative .13 (.07)*   
Medical  1.10 (.18)***  
First Term .17 (.06)*** -.21 (.08)*** -.22 (.07)*** 
Ideological Extremity .31 (.11)*** -.81 (.16)*** -.00 (.14) 
Majority Party .06 (.07) -.04 (.10) .14 (.09) 
Partial Term -.05 (.14) -.76 (.31)*** -.11 (.22) 
Total Introductions .10 (.01)*** .08 (.01)*** .08 (.01)*** 
Vote Share .03 (.02) .05 (.03) .00 (.02) 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
White -.14 (.13) .37 (.20)* .14 (.18) 
Woman  -.35 (.10)*** .48 (.13)*** -.02 (.12) 
% Poverty   .00 (.01) 
Constant -1.91 (.93)** -4.35 (1.33)*** -.64 (.99) 
N 1,008 (578 clusters) 1,008 (578 clusters) 1,008 (578 clusters) 
 INTRODUCTIONS Medicare Taxes  
Business  .28 (.15)*  
Legal  -.14 (.16)  
Medical 1.29 (.28)***   
First Term -.34 (.15)** -.09 (.12)  
Ideological Extremity -.52 (.30)* -.08 (.21)  
Majority Party .14 (.19) -.01 (.14)  
Partial Term -1.00 (.44)** .02 (.28)  
Total Introductions .05 (.01)*** .08 (.01)***  
Vote Share -.14 (.06)** -.02 (.04)  
Vote Share2 .00 (.00)** .00 (.00)  
White 1.65 (.44)*** .31 (.27)  
Woman  .48 (.23)** -.59 (.20)***  
Education Level -.04 (.17) .19 (.10)*  
% Poverty .02 (.02) -.04 (.02)***  
Constant 1.26 (2.31) -1.65 (1.66)  














Appendix B  (cont.) 
COSPONSORSHIPS Agriculture Budget Corp. Reg. 
Agricultural .54 (.08)***   
Business  .06 (.09) .09 (.06) 
Governor  -.25 (.19)  
Legal  .06 (.10) .09 (.06) 
First Term -.02 (.04) .00 (.06) -.04 (.05) 
Ideological Extremity -.13 (.09) 2.06 (.12)*** .50 (.09)*** 
Majority Party .08 (.05)* -.65 (.08)*** .14 (.06)** 
Partial Term -.49 (.14)*** -.20 (.20) -.19 (.14) 
Total Cosponsorships .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00) 
Vote Share -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) .02 (.02) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
White .12 (.08) .63 9.12)*** -.10 (.09) 
Woman  .00 (.00) -.32 (.09)*** -.06 (.07) 
Education Level -.01 (.04) .07 (.06) .03 (.04) 
% Rural .01 (.00)***   
% White Collar   .00 (.00) 
Constant 1.27 (.66)** .57 (.89) -.74 (.72) 
N 1,008 (578 clusters) 1,194 (677 clusters) 1,008 (578 clusters) 
 COSPONSORSHIPS Crime Defense Education 
Education   -.02 (.05) 
Law Enforcement .25 (.14)**   
Legal .12 (.04)***   
Military  .04 (.04)  
First Term .08 (.03)** -.02 (.02) .07 (.03)** 
Ideological Extremity .26 (.06)*** .01 (.05) -.26 (.07)*** 
Majority Party .02 (.04) -.05 (.03)* .01 (.04) 
Partial Term -.39 (.09)*** -.02 (.08) -.27 (.09)*** 
Total Cosponsorships .00 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** 
Vote Share .00 (.01) -.04 (.01)*** .00 (.01) 
Vote Share2 -.00 (.00) .00 (.00)*** -.00 (.00) 
White .10 (.07) .04 (.05) -.14 (.07)** 
Woman  .04 (.04) -.02 (.04) -.02 (.05) 
Education Level -.05 (.02)* .01 (.02) .05 (.02)* 
% Poverty -.01 (.00)   
% White -.00 (.00)**   
% Veterans  .02 (.00)***  
Military Base  .04 (.03)  
Constant 1. (.50)*** 3.21 (.38)*** .90 (.49)* 






Appendix B (cont.) 
COSPONSORSHIPS Gov Operations Health Jobs 
Business   .02 (.03) 
Governor .36 (.09)  .08 (.05) 
Legal -.02 (.03)   
Medical  .21 (.05)***  
First Term .03 9.03) -.02 (.02) -.05 (.02)** 
Ideological Extremity .01 (.05) -.60 (.04)*** -.03 (.04) 
Majority Party .06 (.03)* -.05 (.02)** .10 (.02)*** 
Partial Term -.27 (.08)*** -.31 (.08)*** -.41 (.07)*** 
Total Cosponsorships .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)*** 
Vote Share -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) 
Vote Share2 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
White -.05 (.05) .07 (.04)* -.03 (.04) 
Woman  -.09 (.04)** .10 (.03)*** -.08 (.03)** 
Education Level .02 (.02) .01 (.02) .00 (.01) 
% Poverty .  .00 (.00) 
Constant 2.28 (.38)*** 2.17 (.31)*** 2.93 (.33)*** 
N 1,194 (677 clusters) 1,008 (578 clusters) 1,008 (578 clusters) 
COSPONSORSHIPS Medicare Taxes  
Business  .03 (.04)  
Legal  -.04 (.04)  
Medical .31 (.09)***   
First Term -.19 (.04)*** -.07 (.03)**  
Ideological Extremity -.35 (.10)*** 1.12 (.06)***  
Majority Party -.25 (.06)*** .07 (.04)**  
Partial Term .05 (.12) -.14 (.08)*  
Total Cosponsorships .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)***  
Vote Share -.04 (.01)*** -.01 (.01)  
Vote Share2 .00 (.00)*** .00 (.00)  
White .35 (.08)*** .03 (.06)  
Woman  -.02 (.06) -.03 (.04)  
Education Level -.00 (.03) .06(.02)**  
% Poverty .00 (.00) -.01 (.00)**  
Constant 2.28 (.59)***   
N 1,008 (578 clusters) 1,008 (578 clusters)  
Note: Models are estimated with negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered on 
individual MCs. The dependent variables are the number of bills that individual MCs introduce 
or cosponsor per policy topic per Congress. The unit of analysis is an individual MC in a single 
Congress. The sample is all new MCs in the 101st-110th Congresses for models that do not 
include district characteristic variables. For models with variables for district characteristics, the 
sample is all new MCs in the 103rd-110th Congresses (as these are available starting in the 103rd 
Congress). For each policy topic, the excluded category is all MCs without the hypothesized 
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